Elba Bank & Trust Co. v. Blue
| Decision Date | 18 December 1919 |
| Docket Number | 4 Div. 818 |
| Citation | 84 So. 748,203 Ala. 524 |
| Parties | ELBA BANK & TRUST CO. et al. v. BLUE. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Coffee County; A.B. Foster, Judge.
Bill by Lucile Blue against Mrs. Lemmer Lee and the Elba Bank & Trust Company to cancel a mortgage. Decree for complainant, and respondents appeal. Affirmed.
See also, 200 Ala. 129, 75 So. 577.
The bill is to cancel a certain mortgage executed by Mrs. Lucile Blue and her husband to Mrs. Lemmer Lee, on June 1, 1916, to secure an indebtedness of $1,593.32, and by Mrs. Lee transferred on January 3, 1917, to the Elba Bank & Trust Company for an alleged consideration of the face value of the mortgage and accrued interest at 8 per cent. The bill charges usury in the debt, and has an alternative prayer for an accounting and elimination of usury, and for a redemption from the mortgage if the court should decree that any balance was due from complainant. The basis for the prayer for cancellation is the allegation that the debt secured was the debt of complainant's husband, for the payment of which she was but a surety. On final hearing, relief was granted and the appeal is from this decree, and the denial to respondents of the prayer of their cross-bill seeking to foreclose the mortgage and to have restored to the bank certain other collateral.
W.W Sanders, of Elba, for appellants.
H.L Martin, of Ozark, for appellee.
A careful analysis and consideration of the testimony and documentary evidence in this case convinces us that the conclusions of the trial court are sound, and that the decree appealed from should not be disturbed.
The issues presented are issues of fact, and we entertain no serious doubt that the aggregated debt, for the security of which the mortgage in question was given, was in fact the debt of the husband alone, with the exception of the item of $300, which is properly held to be a valid joint obligation, for which complainant is bound. We are satisfied, also, that the shifting of the debt, until then carried by the respondent bank, to Mrs. Lee, under the guise of a new and independent security, was in fact a collusive arrangement, designed to fasten the original debt upon complainant, the wife, and at the same time to purge it of its usurious taint in the hands of the bank.
In the face of these clear conclusions of fact, the contention of the appellant bank, founded upon the theory that it was a bona fide purchaser...
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