Elder v. City of Pueblo
| Decision Date | 28 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:22-cv-00460-CNS-MDB |
| Parties | REVEREND PAUL ELDER and THE CHRISTIAN GROWTH CENTER, INC., Plaintiffs, v. THE CITY OF PUEBLO, COLORADO, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Objection (ECF No. 41) to the United States Magistrate Judge's Recommendation (ECF No 38) that the Court should deny Plaintiffs' “C.R.C.P 106(a)(4) Opening Brief and Request for Oral Argument” (the “Rule 106 Motion”) (ECF No. 27). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' Objection is OVERRULED. The Magistrate Judge's Recommendation is AFFIRMED and ADOPTED. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Rule 106 Motion is DENIED.
The case's background is summarized in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation (see ECF No. 38).[1]The Magistrate Judge recommended denying Plaintiffs' Rule 106 Motion on the grounds that the Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Pueblo did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' appeal (see, e.g., id. at 13). Plaintiffs objected to the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation (ECF No. 41). Defendant subsequently filed its Response to Plaintiffs' Objection (ECF No. 44).[2]
When a magistrate judge issues a recommendation on a dispositive matter, Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3) requires that the district judge “determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's [recommendation] that has been properly objected to.” An objection to a recommendation is properly made if it is both timely and specific. United States v. 2121 East 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059-60 (10th Cir. 1996). An objection is sufficiently specific if it “enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues-factual and legal-that are at the heart of the parties' dispute.” Id. at 1059. In conducting its review, “[t]he district judge may accept, reject, or modify the [recommendation]; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Allegations are read in “the context of the entire complaint.” Chilcoat v. San Juan Cnty., 41 F.4th 1196, 1207 (10th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts, accepted as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See, e.g., Mayfield v. Bethards, 826 F.3d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 2016). A plausible claim is one that allows the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). If a complaint's allegations are “so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then a plaintiff has failed to “nudge [the] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). In assessing a claim's plausibility, “legal conclusions” contained in the complaint are not entitled to the assumption of truth. See Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011). The standard, however, remains a liberal pleading standard, and “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Dias v. City & Cty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).
The Court has reviewed the Complaint, Plaintiffs' Rule 106 Motion, the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation, Plaintiffs' Objection, Defendant's Response, and the relevant legal authority. The Court addresses and rejects Plaintiffs' arguments in turn, overruling the Objection.
Plaintiffs contend that the Magistrate Judge erred because the Rule 106(a)(4) claim is a “proper procedure” for declaring that the Board violated their federal civil rights regardless of whether they seek damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “for the same violation” (ECF No. 41 at 3). Rule 106(a)(4) relief for civil rights violations is not “precluded” when a plaintiff seeks monetary and declaratory relief, Plaintiffs' argument goes, and the Magistrate Judge incorrectly concluded otherwise (id. at 4-5). Defendant urges affirmance on the grounds that the Magistrate Judge properly determined that the Board did not abuse its discretion under Rule 106(a)(4), as well as that it was not erroneous to bifurcate Plaintiffs' remaining claims from the Magistrate Judge's analysis of the Rule 106(a)(4) claim (see, e.g., ECF No. 44 at 7-8). The Court agrees with Defendant.
Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 106(a)(4) provides a cause of action where any “governmental body or officer or any lower judicial body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion.” Rule 106(a)(4) is the “exclusive state remedy for challenging a decision concerning rezoning.” Sclavenitis v. City of Cherry Hills Vill. Bd. of Adjustment & Appeals, 751 P.2d 661, 665 (Colo.App. 1988) (citation omitted). A Rule 106(a)(4) claim is available “for contesting a zoning decision when the entire zoning ordinance is not challenged and when record review of the county procedure provides an adequate remedy.” Sundheim v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Douglas Cnty., 904 P.2d 1337, 1345 (Colo.App. 1995), aff'd, 926 P.2d 545 (Colo. 1996).
“C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) review is limited to consideration of whether the lower tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion.” Wilson v. Town of Avon, 749 P.2d 990, 992 (Colo.App. 1987) (citation omitted); see also C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4). “An agency abuses its discretion if its decision is not reasonably supported by any competent evidence in the record or if the agency has misconstrued or misapplied applicable law.” Giuliani v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 303 P.3d 131, 138 (Colo.App. 2012) (citation omitted); see also Eason v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Cnty. of Boulder, 70 P.3d 600, 609 (Colo.App. 2003) . “No competent evidence” means that the quasi-judicial body's decision is “so devoid of evidentiary support that it can only be explained as an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority.” Van Sickle v. Boyes, 797 P.2d 1267, 1272 (Colo. 1990) (quotations omitted). Administrative proceedings are “accorded a presumption of validity” and courts resolve all “reasonable doubts as to the correctness of administrative rulings” in favor of an agency's determination. Id. (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs contend that the Magistrate Judge erred because she determined that “Rule 106 is the only remedy available when a plaintiff seeks only declaratory relief for a violation of civil rights, but that Rule 106 relief is barred when a plaintiff seeks damages in addition to declaratory relief” (ECF No. 41 at 5 (original emphasis)). Plaintiffs make essentially the same argument later in their Objection: “The [R]ecommendation . . . asserts that, because [§ 1983] and RLUIPA” provide alternative remedies, “Rule 106(a)(4) is not available for [Plaintiffs] to obtain a declaration of rights” (id. at 6). Plaintiffs proceed from a faulty premise. The Magistrate Judge did not categorically determine that Rule 106(a)(4) relief was “barred” or “unavailable” to Plaintiffs based on the relief they seek under § 1983. Instead, the Magistrate Judge simply determined that bifurcating an analysis of Plaintiffs' Rule 106(a)(4) and § 1983 claims was appropriate given, for instance, that the district court judge previously assigned to this action bifurcated Plaintiffs' § 1983 and RLUIPA claims from the Rule 106(a)(4) claim, as well as that Plaintiffs' request for monetary relief was “presumably tied” to the separate and bifurcated § 1983 and RLUIPA claims, and therefore those claims “need not be collapsed into the [Rule 106(a)(4)] analysis” (ECF No. 38 at 10-11).
As Defendant argues, this reasoning-and the Magistrate Judge's analysis of Plaintiffs' Rule 106(a)(4) claim-is wholly consistent with Colorado law (see ECF No. 44 at 6-8). Under Colorado law, plaintiffs may plead § 1983 and Rule 106(a)(4) claims in the same action when an alleged federal constitutional injury arises from a zoning decision. See, e.g., Sclavenitis, 751 P.2d at 665. However, because Rule 106 “does not provide for a remedy in damages, a separate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [claim] based upon alleged violations of federal constitutional rights may be maintained” when a plaintiff seeks monetary relief for the alleged constitutional violations. Sundheim, 904 P.2d at 1345 (citation omitted); see also Luck v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Cnty. of Clear Creek, 789 P.2d 475, 477 (Colo.App. 1990). The Magistrate Judge's conclusion that Plaintiffs' § 1983 and RLUIPA claims “need not be collapsed into” the Rule 106(a)(4) analysis based on the nature of the relief sought resulted in the Magistrate Judge conducting an analysis of Plaintiffs' Rule 106(a)(4) claim “independent of . . . the merits of [the] § 1983 and RUILPA claims” (ECF No. 38 at 10-11). In conducting this analysis, the Magistrate Judge did not prohibit Plaintiffs from proceeding with their § 1983 or RLUIPA claims (see id.). Instead, she simply separated those claims from Plaintiffs' Rule 106(a)(4) claim-as instructed by the Court's prior bifurcation order (see ECF No. 19).[3]And the Magistrate Judge made clear throughout her Recommendation...
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