Eldred v. Astrue
| Decision Date | 13 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:11-CV-00056-JPH,2:11-CV-00056-JPH |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Washington |
| Parties | RUSSELL D. ELDRED, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
BEFORE THE COURT are cross-motions for summary judgment noted for hearing without oral argument on June 8, 2012 (ECF Nos. 15, 21). Attorney Maureen J. Rosette represents Plaintiff; Special Assistant United States Attorney Robert L. Van Saghi represents the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner). The parties have consented to proceed before a magistrate judge (ECF No. 7). After reviewing the administrative record and the briefs filed by the parties, the court GRANTS defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff protectively filed an application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in November 2007, alleging disability beginning December 1, 1996 (Tr. 13). The application was deniedinitially and on reconsideration (Tr. 56-59, 68-72).
At a hearing before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Robert S. Chester on July 7, 2009, plaintiff, represented by counsel, and a vocational expert testified (Tr. 13, 29-53). On July 24, 2009 the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision (Tr. 10). The Appeals Council denied Mr. Eldred's request for review on December 23, 2010 (Tr. 1-3). Therefore, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner, which is appealable to the district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff filed this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) on February 4, 2011 (ECF No. 4).
The facts have been presented in the administrative hearing transcript, the ALJ's decision, the briefs of both plaintiff and the Commissioner, and are briefly summarized here.
Plaintiff was 50 years old on the application date and 52 at the time of the administrative hearing (Tr. 20, 34). He obtained a Graduate Equivalency Degree (GED) in or about 1975, and attended school through the tenth grade (Tr. 34, 118). Although the plaintiff did some assembly-line work in 1995, he has not otherwise worked in the past fifteen years and has not maintained full time employment since 1989 (Tr. 34-36, 107, 115).
The Social Security Act (the Act) defines disability as the as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less thantwelve months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act also provides that a Plaintiff shall be determined to be under a disability only if any impairments are of such severity that a plaintiff is not only unable to do previous work but cannot, considering plaintiff's age, education and work experiences, engage in any other substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). Thus, the definition of disability consists of both medical and vocational components. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001).
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Step one determines if the person is engaged in substantial gainful activities. If so, benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I), 416.920(a)(4)(I). If not, the decision maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether plaintiff has a medically "severe" impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).
If plaintiff does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the disability claim is denied. If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step, which compares plaintiff's impairment with a number of listed impairments acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii); 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P App. 1. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, plaintiff is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is not one conclusively presumed to bedisabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which determines whether the impairment prevents plaintiff from performing work which was performed in the past. If a plaintiff is able to perform previous work, that Plaintiff is deemed not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At this step, plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment is considered. If plaintiff cannot perform this work, the fifth and final step in the process determines whether plaintiff is able to perform other work in the national economy in view of plaintiff's residual functional capacity, age, education and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987).
The initial burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of entitlement to disability benefits. Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 1971); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999). The initial burden is met once plaintiff establishes that a physical or mental impairment prevents the performance of previous work. The burden then shifts, at step five, to the Commissioner to show that (1) plaintiff can perform other substantial gainful activity and (2) a "significant number of jobs exist in the national economy" which plaintiff can perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984).
Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of a Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A court must uphold the Commissioner's decision, made through an ALJ, when the determination is not based on legal error and is supported bysubstantial evidence. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). "The [Commissioner's] determination that a plaintiff is not disabled will be upheld if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence." Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1983)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975), but less than a preponderance. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 601-602 (9th Cir. 1989); Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence "means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citations omitted). "[S]uch inferences and conclusions as the [Commissioner] may reasonably draw from the evidence" will also be upheld. Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). On review, the court considers the record as a whole, not just the evidence supporting the decision of the Commissioner. Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989).
It is the role of the trier of fact, not this court, to resolve conflicts in evidence. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. If evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will still be set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432,433 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, if there is substantial evidence to support the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence that will support a finding of either disability or nondisability, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-1230 (9th Cir. 1987).
At step one the ALJ found that plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the application date (Tr. 15). At step two, he found plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of sleep apnea, diabetes mellitus, and degenerative changes in the right knee, as these impairments more than minimally limit claimant's ability to work (Tr. 15). The ALJ did not find plaintiff's mental impairments severe. At step three, the ALJ found plaintiff's impairments do not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (Tr. 16). The ALJ found plaintiff less than completely credible because his statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms were "inconsistent" with the ALJ's RFC assessment (Tr. 18). At step four, the ALJ found plaintiff has the RFC to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with specific non-exertional limitations. These limitations include the occasional use of ladders, ropes and scaffolds as well as avoiding concentrated exposure to hazards such as unprotected machines and heights (Tr. 17). At step five the ALJ found there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the plaintiff can perform (Tr. 18). The ALJ found plaintiff has not been disabled as defined by the Social Security Act at any time from theapplication date through the date of the decision, July 24, 2009 (Tr. 22).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's RFC determination and decision is not supported by substantial evidence (ECF No. 16 at 6). Plaintiff contends that he is more limited, both physically and psychologically, than what was determined by the ALJ (ECF No. 14 at 6). Regarding his psychological impairments, which the ALJ did not consider severe, Plaintiff contends the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of Amy Robinson, MS, and W. Scott Mabee, Ph.D. (ECF No. 16 at 7). Regarding his physical impairments, ...
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