Eldredge v. Town of Falmouth, No. 11–1151.

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: HOWARD
• Citation: 662 F.3d 100
• Parties: James R. ELDREDGE, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. TOWN OF FALMOUTH, MA; Anthony Riello, individually and in his official capacity as the Chief of the Falmouth Police Department; Thomas Maguire, individually and in his official capacity as an Officer of the Falmouth Police Department; Michael Simoneau, individually and in his official capacity as an officer of the Falmouth Police Department, a/k/a “The Seminole”, Defendants, Appellees.
• Docket Number: No. 11–1151.
• Decision Date: 22 November 2011

662 F.3d 100

James R. ELDREDGE, Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF FALMOUTH, MA; Anthony Riello, individually and in his official capacity as the Chief of the Falmouth Police Department; Thomas Maguire, individually and in his official capacity as an Officer of the Falmouth Police Department; Michael Simoneau, individually and in his official capacity as an officer of the Falmouth Police Department, a/k/a “The Seminole”, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 11–1151.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard Oct. 6, 2011.Decided Nov. 22, 2011.

[662 F.3d 102]

George F. Gormley, with whom George F. Gormley, P.C. was on brief, for appellant.

Daniel G. Skirp, with whom Pierce, Davis & Perritano, LLP was on brief, for appellees.

Before BOUDIN, HOWARD and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.

HOWARD, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of a complaint alleging Section 1983 unreasonable seizure claims against two Falmouth, Massachusetts police officers. Plaintiff-appellant James R. Eldredge, who tragically was struck by a police cruiser during the course of the officers' response to a 911 call, challenges the district court's determination that qualified immunity shielded the officers from suit. Discerning no error, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Because this appeal involves a dismissal for failure to state a claim, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), we recount the relevant facts based upon the well-pleaded allegations in the amended complaint. S.E.C. v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 438 (1st Cir.2010) (en banc).

On a Wednesday evening in the summer of 2009, James Eldredge left his Falmouth home at approximately 10:30 p.m., accompanied by a friend, Jonathan Dubois, to

[662 F.3d 103]

walk to a nearby convenience store. Shortly thereafter, at around 10:50 p.m., the Falmouth Police received an unrelated 911 call reporting a domestic disturbance at a local residence. The call included, in part, the following exchange:

Operator: Falmouth Police recorded line, may I help you?

Caller: ... [Suspect] is now leaving in a little blue Toyota Tercel. Um, we've had an argument. He's been drinking. I asked him to leave. The relationship's over. He just shoved everything off the top of my refrigerator, smashed it all to the floor. The kids are here. We've had DSS involved before and I just, I want him gone. He's got all his stuff out. I just want him to leave me alone. I'm very afraid right now.

Operator: Okay. What's your address?

Caller: xxx Sandwich Road number one.

After verifying her full name and that of the suspect, the caller stated that her ex-boyfriend was “outside trashing my porch right now.” Armed with this information, three patrolmen—defendant Michael Simoneau and defendant Thomas Maguire, as well as Officer Clifford Harris—set out to respond in three separate police cruisers.¹

As the police responders drove towards the site of the disturbance these two heretofore unrelated events converged. In the lead, Officer Maguire drove north along Sandwich Road at varying speeds over the posted limit, with his cruiser lights flashing and siren activated. His course would soon bring the officers abreast of Eldredge and Dubois, who were walking against traffic on the grass shoulder of the same road.

As Officer Maguire approached Eldredge and Dubois about half a mile from his destination, he suddenly decelerated. The cruiser “nose-dived” to a virtual stop alongside the pedestrians. Maguire simultaneously activated a spotlight aimed at the men, causing them to stop and squint at the blinding light. Through the open passenger side window, Maguire shouted: “Stand right there!” Both men complied.

Unfortunately, the story does not end there. Officer Simoneau had been following in his cruiser closely behind Maguire and rapidly closed the distance between the two vehicles when Maguire suddenly braked. Mere moments after Maguire shouted to Eldredge and Dubois, Simoneau's cruiser “rear ended” Maguire's, caromed off it, and hit Eldredge. Upon impact, Eldredge was wrapped onto the vehicle's hood and propelled several feet through the air, suffering serious injuries. According to the complaint, this collision occurred sometime between 10:57 and 10:59 p.m.

[662 F.3d 104]

In the aftermath of this event, Eldredge sought recovery against Officers Maguire and Simoneau, the Town of Falmouth, and the chief of the Falmouth Police Department. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Eldredge claimed that Maguire's show of authority constituted an unreasonable seizure of him because it amounted to a detention without adequate justification; that Simoneau also unreasonably seized him when, similarly lacking adequate justification, he struck Eldredge with his police cruiser; and that the Town and its police chief failed to adequately train their personnel on how to safely respond to incidents reported to the police. In addition to the federal claims, Eldredge alleged parallel state civil rights violations, see Mass. Const. art. XIV; Mass. Gen. Laws ch.12, § 11(I), as well as a state law tort claim based on the officers' alleged negligence and recklessness during the event in question, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 2.

The defendants moved to dismiss Eldredge's claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion with respect to the federal claims, concluding that the individual officers were entitled to qualified immunity and that the failure to train claims were therefore foreclosed, as well. With only state law claims remaining, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and remanded the matter to state court. This timely appeal ensued.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, the plaintiff pursues only his Section 1983 claims against the individual officers. Accordingly, our review is limited to an assessment of whether the district court erred in dismissing those claims on qualified immunity grounds.

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo an order of dismissal for failure to state a claim. Tambone, 597 F.3d at 441. In conducting this review, “we accept as true all well-pleaded facts set forth in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the pleader's favor.” Artuso v. Vertex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 637 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2011) (citing Tambone, 597 F.3d at 441).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible if supported by “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. While “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ ” it demands “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Unless the alleged facts push a claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible,” the complaint is subject to dismissal. Id. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

B. Qualified Immunity

The doctrine of qualified immunity is designed to “balance[ ] two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). We apply a two-prong analysis in determining whether this balance weighs in favor of granting a defendant qualified immunity. Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 269 (1st Cir.2009). We ask “(1)

[662 F.3d 105]

whether the facts alleged ... by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right;...