Eldridge v. Bouchard

• Decision Date: 09 October 1986
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 85-0042-A.
• Citation: 645 F. Supp. 749
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia
• Parties: G.J. ELDRIDGE et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ronald A. BOUCHARD et al., Defendants.

645 F. Supp. 749

G.J. ELDRIDGE et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ronald A. BOUCHARD et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 85-0042-A.

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Abingdon Division.

October 9, 1986.

Robert M. Galumbeck, James R. Henderson, Tazewell, Va., for plaintiffs.

Guy W. Horsley, Jr., Walter A. McFarlane, Malcolm R. West, Asst. Attys. Gen., Richmond, Va., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GLEN M. WILLIAMS, District Judge.

The plaintiffs, Division Four employees of the Virginia Department of State Police, challenge the Department's practice of paying Division Seven employees a salary differential. Plaintiffs contend that the defendants' actions violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and that a cause of action exists under Sections 1983, 1985 and 1988 of Title 42 of the United States Code. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1331 give this court original jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

The Virginia Department of State Police (VDSP or Department) is currently divided into seven (7) geographic regions called divisions. Plaintiffs, 139 employees of the VDSP, are all members of the Fourth Division which includes many counties and cities in Southwestern Virginia.¹ The department compensates employees of Division One-Six according to a uniform compensation schedule. Division Seven² employees, however, receive a salary differential which at the present time is 20% greater than the salary paid to Division One-Six employees.

VDSP began paying the differential in 1974 following a 1973 consultant's study of the competitiveness of all rates paid in the State Compensation Plan. The study measured competitive rates by area or region of the state and recommended where the state should pay differentials. The results of the 1973 study suggested that the VDSP should pay a salary differential to employees in the Northern Virginia area. Based upon the study's findings and recommendations, the VDSP proposed a plan to pay a salary differential to its employees in Northern Virginia. The governor approved the salary differential and the General Assembly appropriated money for the differentials. The pay differentials have continued since 1974 ranging from 12% to 22%. Periodic surveys verified the continuing need for the Northern Virginia differential. The VDSP's purpose in paying the differential is to remain competitive with private and other public employers in the Northern Virginia area and to retain well qualified personnel in the Seventh Division. Past surveys show that the Seventh Division has had the highest attrition rate of any of the divisions; losing a number of qualified personnel to local city and county law enforcement offices. The differential does not serve as a cost-of-living adjustment but rather as an incentive to retain well qualified individuals in the VDSP.³

II. HISTORY OF CASE

The plaintiffs commenced this action on February 1, 1985 by filing their complaint with the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1988 and a violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendants promptly filed a motion to dismiss and/or a motion for summary judgment and a motion to abstain. After accepting briefs and hearing oral arguments, this court overruled defendants' motion to abstain, overruled defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, but granted defendants' motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs' claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).

The plaintiffs subsequently made two (2) motions to file an amended and supplemental complaint. The court granted the second motion on March 20, 1986 wherein the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add seven (7) additional plaintiffs and to add Gerald Baliles as a defendant. Prior to trial, the court granted plaintiffs' motion to sever the issue of actual damages from the remaining liability issues. The court heard testimony at the trial on April 7-9, 1986, but took the case under advisement following the conclusion of all evidence. Both plaintiffs and defendants submitted post-trial briefs containing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

OPINION

The plaintiffs assert that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action by which they may challenge the defendants' actions. Section 1983, however, provides only the cause of action, but does not delineate the substance of the violation. To succeed in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must establish a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or the federal law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912-13, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981).⁴ Accordingly, the plaintiffs base their right to recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 upon the fact that the defendants' actions violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. They also contend that the differentials violate the Virginia Constitution.

III. EQUAL PROTECTION

The plaintiffs allege that the VDSP's practice of paying a salary differential violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The first step in any equal protection analysis is to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny. The government must show a compelling justification necessary to promote an important interest if the law or action impinges a fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect classification. (strict scrutiny). Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1003, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1331, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Harper v. Virginia State Board of Education, 383 U.S. 663, 670, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 1083, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967); Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 2321, 90 L.Ed.2d 899 (1986). However, if the action or law is a mere economic regulation, that neither discriminates against a suspect classification nor impinges a fundamental right, then the government need only show a rational basis for its action. (minimal scrutiny). Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 813, 96 S.Ct. 2488, 2499, 49 L.Ed.2d 220 (1976); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 942-43, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979). Therefore, this court must first determine if plaintiffs are a suspect class or if defendants' actions impinge a fundamental right.

The plaintiffs are Division Four employees of the VDSP. A suspect class, as defined by numerous court opinions, is a discrete and insular minority that is unable to shake or rise above the bonds and stigma of its minority status. Courts have been unwilling to extend suspect class status to any classification other than race, alienage and national origin. However, in certain instances, where the classification is based on sex or legitimacy, courts have applied a heightened scrutiny bordering between strict scrutiny and minimal scrutiny. (intermediate scrutiny). See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976), reh. den., 429 U.S. 1124, 97 S.Ct. 1161, 51 L.Ed.2d 574 (1977); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973). But mere economic status does not lend itself to a suspect classification. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1288, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 reh. den., 411 U.S. 959, 93 S.Ct. 1919, 36 L.Ed.2d 418 (1973). Plaintiffs, therefore, are not a suspect class and this court will not apply strict scrutiny unless the defendants' actions impinge a fundamental right.

Plaintiffs contend that the pay differential impinges their fundamental right of travel. The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez provides guidelines to determine when a state law or action impinges the right to travel. "A state law implicates the right to travel when it actually deters such travel, ... when impeding travel is its primary objective, ... or when it uses `any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right.' ..." Soto-Lopez, ___ U.S. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2321.

The pay differential does not actually and/or explicitly deter travel. The statute at issue in Edwards v. California, infra, is an example of a statute which actually deterred travel. The California statute, challenged in Edwards, declared it a misdemeanor for any person to bring or assist in bringing, into the state, any nonresident of the state, knowing him to be an indigent person. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 62 S.Ct. 164, 86 L.Ed. 119 (1941). This type of explicit restriction on travel is the type of situation to which the language in Soto-Lopez refers when it states that "a state law implicates the right to travel when it actually deters such right...." Soto-Lopez, 106 S.Ct. at 2321. Because the pay differential does not explicitly limit or restrict travel, it does not "actually deter travel."

The other two considerations, whether the challenged action has as its primary objective to impede travel and whether the challenged action uses a classification which penalizes the exercise of the right to travel, require looking to the purpose and effect of the action rather than looking only at the statute itself. Therefore, the court will address the remaining consideration with the same analysis.

The Supreme Court has consistently recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel. While this fundamental right developed primarily from Equal Protection analysis, the right of interstate travel also has traces of Privileges and Immunities clause analysis. The Supreme Court recognized this fundamental right in order to prevent a state from...