Eldridge v. Idaho State Penitentiary

• Decision Date: 06 March 1934
• Docket Number: 5982
• Parties: FRANK ELDRIDGE, Appellant, v. IDAHO STATE PENITENTIARY, Employer, and STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety, Respondents
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

30 P.2d 781

54 Idaho 213

FRANK ELDRIDGE, Appellant, v. IDAHO STATE PENITENTIARY, Employer, and STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety, Respondents

No. 5982

Supreme Court of Idaho

March 6, 1934

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-SUMMARY AWARD-CLAIM FOR ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION - LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - TOTAL DISABILITY-SPECIFIC INDEMNITIES.

1. Injured employee's claim for additional compensation after cessation of payments, made after filing of previous claim without further proceedings, held not barred by statute as based on changed conditions (I. C. A., sec. 43-1407).

2. Injured employee's application to Industrial Accident Board over sixty days after accident for hearing and award of additional compensation after cessation of payments was too late, if it was notice required by statute (I. C. A., sec 43-1202).

3. Injured employee's claim for additional compensation after cessation of payments under alleged summary award held barred by limitations, in absence of appeal therefrom within thirty days (I. C. A., secs. 43-1404, 43-1408).

4. General three-year statute of limitations held inapplicable to injured employee's claim for additional compensation after cessation of payments under alleged summary award (I C. A., sec. 5-218 (1).

5. Employer and insurer, urging that injured employee's claim for additional compensation is barred by general statutes of limitations, must accept construction thereof as applied to court action (I. C. A., sec. 5-218 (1).

6. Filing of complaint or similar pleading and service of process stops running of general statute of limitations, and actions are not required to be finally disposed of or heard within limitation period (I. C. A., sec. 5-218 (1).

7. Statute of limitations, fixing time for commencement of action, does not apply to prosecution thereof to judgment (I C. A., sec. 5-218 (1).

8. Employer and insurer, setting up laches as defense against injured employee's claim for additional compensation must accept concomitant constructions of application of laches in ordinary actions.

9. Lapse of time alone is insufficient to justify dismissal of action for laches; such defense being sustainable only on theory that delay, with other circumstances, is satisfactory evidence of abandonment of cause of action or resulted in injury to one not responsible therefor.

10. Laches will not bar recovery, unless necessary to protect rights of party urging it.

11. Injured employee's claim for additional compensation held not barred by laches because of his failure to request hearing until over eight years after cessation of previous payments, in absence of evidence that insurance carrier was injured thereby.

12. Employee, suffering loss of bone of skull, held properly awarded compensation for total temporary disability on showing of justifiable disability to work, though such injury was not within classes specified by statute fixing indemnities (I. C. A., secs. 43-1110, 43-1112, 43-1113).

13. Employee's intermittent employment after accidental injury does not bar compensation for permanent partial disability.

14. Employee permanently injured, not improving after date to which he was awarded compensation for total temporary dis- ability, and released from employment several times because of injury's effects, held entitled to compensation for full statutory period of 150 weeks (I. C. A., sec. 43-1112).

APPEAL from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, for Ada County. Hon. Charles E. Winstead, Judge.

Respective appeals from compensation award. Reversed in part and affirmed in part.

Judgment reversed, with directions; costs awarded to appellant. Petition for rehearing denied.

C. J. Schooler and Oppenheim & Lampert, for Appellant.

Upon the filing of the claim the Industrial Accident Board acquired jurisdiction and its jurisdiction continued during the pendency of the claim until the board's final adjudication.

The general statute of limitations does not apply to proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act. (Idaho Code, sec. 43-902; Employers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 65 Colo. 283, 176 P. 314; Federal Rubber Co. v. Industrial Commission et al., 185 Wis. 299, 201 N.W. 261, 40 A. L. R. 491; Buzzn v. Muncey Cartage Co., 248 Mich. 64, 226 N.W. 836.)

Thos. J. Jones, Jr., for Respondents.

That the Workmen's Compensation Law is a statutory enactment cannot be resisted in view of section 43-902, I. C. A. Nowhere in the Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act is there found a specific statute of limitations other than section 43-1407, and that is a statute of limitations in regard to modification of awards and agreements.

As a further note of explanation, counsel states at this instance that the State Insurance Fund has paid claimant herein sixty-three weeks' compensation after the time of the accident, and before the summary and award was entered in this case.

In the following cases herein cited, this very question of limitations has been adjudicated upon, and these cases, counsel submits, are analogous to the case herein at bar.

In the case of the Federal Rubber Co. v. Industrial Commission of the State of Wisconsin, 185 Wis. 299, 201 N.W. 261, 40 A. L. R. 491, the Wisconsin supreme court held that the general statute of limitations did apply. (Cooke v. Holland Furniture Co., 200 Mich. 192, 166 N.W. 1013, L. R. A. 1918E, 552; Ehrhardt v. Industrial Acc. Com., 172 Cal. 621, 158 P. 193, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 465; Utah Consolidated Min. Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah 57 Utah 279, 194 P. 657, 16 A. L. R. 458.)

GIVENS, J. Budge, C. J., and Holden and Wernette, JJ., concur.

OPINION

GIVENS, J.

August 5, 1922, appellant while employed as a guard at the Idaho State Penitentiary, was struck on the head with a stone, by a convict, fracturing his skull, necessitating a decompression operation for the removal of a piece of his skull, and leaving an opening therein through which the pulsations from the brain could be felt. August 9, 1922, notice of the accident and claim for compensation was properly made and served upon the Idaho State Penitentiary, the employer, the State Insurance Fund, the insurance carrier, and filed with the Industrial Accident Board. Thereafter without further proceedings compensation in the amount of $ 756, for sixty-three weeks, to October 26, 1923, and hospital, medical, surgical and nursing charges in the sum of $ 465.25 were paid.

May 5, 1932, appellant requested the board to fix a time and place for hearing and that upon such hearing, an order or award be made by the board granting such relief as petitioner might be entitled to.

The fund's answer to such application admitted the employment, the circumstances of the accident, serving and filing of notice of the accident, and claim for compensation; that the state fund was the insurance carrier; that no compensation agreement had been reached between appellant and the employer or the fund; but denied that appellant was totally disabled after October 26, 1923; and further, by way of special defense, details the residence and employment of appellant for a time in Idaho and in California and his return to Idaho; his re-employment at the penitentiary; and that on October 26, 1923, a claimed summary and award was made by the board; and emphasized appellant's dereliction in seeking compensation after payments ceased, and on the basis of such allegations contended that appellant's claim was barred by sec. 6269, I. C. S., now sec. 43-1407, I. C. A., which statute is clearly inapplicable because no claim was or is made, nor was a hearing asked by appellant on the ground of change of condition.

The fund also urges the claim is barred by sec. 6611, I. C. S., now sec. 5-218, I. C. A., subd. 1, which requires an action on a statutory liability to be brought within three years, evidently on the theory that appellant's application for hearing May 5, 1932, was a claim for compensation or that a hearing should have been had within three years of August 9, 1922. If the application for a hearing was the notice required by sec. 43-1202, I. C. A., it was too late because made sixty days after the accident, and if the above so-called summary award was such, and complied with sec. 43-1404, I. C. A., sec. 43-1408, I. C. A., bars relief because no appeal was taken within thirty days thereafter, which sections are concededly the only statutes of limitation in the Workmen's Compensation Law.

If there be occasion to apply the general statute of limitations, sec. 5-218, I. C. A., and none appears, respondents must accept the construction placed upon such statutes of limitations as applied to court actions ( McNeil v. Panhandle Lumber Co., 34 Idaho 773, at 786, 203 P. 1068; Ybaibarriaga v. Farmer, 39 Idaho 361, at 368, 228 P. 227; In re Larson, 48 Idaho 136, at 145, 279 P. 1087; Brown v. Hardin, 31 Idaho 112, at 115, 169 P. 293; Hindman v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., 32 Idaho 133, at 136, 178 P. 837; Chamberlin v. Ivens, 36 Idaho 235, at 242, 210 P. 580) to the effect that the filing of the complaint or other similar pleading and service of process, if the filing of the complaint alone be not sufficient, stops the running of the statute, and actions are not required to be finally disposed of or heard within the period of limitations. (37 C. J. 1051-6; Idaho Trust etc. Bank v. Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist., 29 Idaho 658, at 660, 161 P. 872; Muir v. City of Pocatello, 36 Idaho 532, 212 P. 345.)

Respondents' answer admitted:

"That the employer was notified of said accident on the 9th day of August, 1922, and that claim in writing, containing the name and address of the employee and the time, place, nature and cause of injury, signed by claimant, . . . . was made on the 9th day of August, 1922; and filed with the Industrial...