Eldridge v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 18 November 1912
• Citation: 83 N.J.L. 463,85 A. 179
• Parties: ELDRIDGE v. PHILADELPHIA & R. R. CO. et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

85 A. 179

83 N.J.L. 463

ELDRIDGE

v. PHILADELPHIA & R. R. CO. et al.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Nov. 18, 1912.

Error to Supreme Court.

Action by Sidney W. Eldridge against the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company. From a judgment of the Supreme Court 80 N. J. Law, 478, 79 Atl. 423) upon demurrer, plaintiff brings error. Reversed, and judgment entered for plaintiff.

C. McK. Whittemore, of Elizabeth, for plaintiff in error. George Holmes, of Jersey City, and John F. Reger, of Somerville, for defendants in error.

GARRISON, J. Briefly stated, the question is whether the one-year limitation for actions for death contained in the fifty-eighth section of the General Railroad Law (Pamphlet Law 1903, p. 674) is superseded by the Death Act (Pamphlet Law 1907, p. 386), by which actions for death may be brought at any time within two years.

This question is we think controlled by the rule that, "When the Legislature frames a new and general rule covering an entire subject-matter, all earlier and different rules touching the same matter are to be discarded in favor of such later rule." Harrington's Sons Co. v. Jersey City (1909) 78 N. J. Law, 610, 75 Atl. 943.

In an earlier case the same rule is thus stated by Chancellor Magie: "It is the settled doctrine of our courts that general laws, passed in compliance with the constitutional mandate, are to be construed as repealing inconsistent provisions of previous local or special laws, whether they contain an express repealer or not, and, if they deal with the subject-matter of such previous laws, a legislative intent is disclosed to supersede and abrogate the latter." Smith v. Hightstown, 71 N. J. Law, 536, 60 Atl. 393.

We have many other decisions to the same effect.

The application of this rule to the present case does not admit of the slightest doubt in the Death Act of 1907 (P. L. 386) the Legislature by a general law framed a new and different rule covering an entire subject-matter which consisted in the giving of a right of action and of the right to bring such action at any time within the period of two years. That this is a general law covering the entire subject-matter with which it deals cannot be questioned any more than that it lays down a new and different rule from that contained in earlier statutes; and, when these two things concur, "all earlier and different rules touching the same subject-matter are," in the language of our decisions, "to be discarded in favor of such later rule." One earlier and different rule is that contained in section 58 of the Railroad Act by virtue of which, if effect be given to it, the right to bring the action within two years given by the Death Act of 1907 is curtailed to one year. This is repugnant to the rule we have adopted.

In the Supreme Court the case was thought to be controlled by the decision of that court in Vail v. Easton & Amboy R. R. Co., 44 N. J. Law, 237, in which it was held that the provision of the special charter of the Railroad Company that actions for fire damages must be brought in one year was not affected by the subsequent reenactment of the general statute of limitations. The principle applied was that, where the Legislature has taken a special class out of the operation of a general law, such class is not affected by the subsequent reenactment of the law to which they had been made an exception. "This decision," in the language of the opinion below, "controls the present case."

This conclusion fails to note that in the Vail Case the special limitation granted to the Railroad Company was for a less period than that allowed for other...