Eldridge v. State

• Decision Date: 23 March 1982
• Docket Number: 4 Div. 943
• Citation: 415 So.2d 1190
• Parties: Earnest ELDRIDGE v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 1190

415 So.2d 1190

Earnest ELDRIDGE v. STATE.

4 Div. 943.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

March 23, 1982.

Rehearing Denied April 20, 1982.

Certiorari Denied, June 25, 1982

Alabama Supreme Court 81-634.

Kenneth L. Funderburk and Robert P. Lane of Phillips & Funderburk, Phenix City, for appellant.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Thomas R. Allison, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

BOWEN, Judge.

The defendant was indicted and convicted for receiving stolen property in the second degree. Alabama Code 1975, Section 13A-8-16 (Amended 1977). Sentence was two years' imprisonment.

I

The defendant contends that Section 13A-8-16(b)(2) creates a new crime and unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof from the State to the accused.

Section 13A-8-16(b)(2) provides that if a person "(p)ossesses goods or property which have been recently stolen * * * this shall be prima facie evidence that he has the requisite knowledge or belief." In the crime of receiving stolen property, the "requisite knowledge or belief" is that the accused knows that the property has been stolen or has reasonable grounds to believe it has been stolen and does not have the intent to restore the property to the owner. Section 13A-8-16(a).

The inference ¹ of guilty knowledge which may be drawn from the unexplained possession of recently stolen property is a "traditional common-law inference deeply rooted in our law." Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 2362, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973); Malachi v. State, 89 Ala. 134, 141-2, 8 So. 104 (1889). In dealing with the related concept that the unexplained possession of goods recently stolen is a fact from which the jury may infer that the possessor is guilty of larceny, Wigmore states that the "use of this sort of evidence goes back as far as any in our law." 1 Wigmore, Evidence, Section 152 (Chadbourn rev. 1981).

This inference comports with due process of law and satisfies the "reasonable-doubt standard" because the evidence necessary to invoke the inference is sufficient for a rational juror to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Barnes, 412 U.S. at 846, 93 S.Ct. at 2363. "There has never been any question on this." Wigmore, section 152. "There is no unfairness in the presumption; it is reasonable." Martin v. State, 104 Ala. 71, 78, 16 So. 82 (1893).

This evidentiary rule has been recognized by the Supreme Court of this state as "sound law." Buckles v. State, 291 Ala. 352, 356, 280 So.2d 814 (1972). The doctrine is of "crucial" importance in "bringing about the conviction and punishment of guilty possessors of stolen goods" where A portion of the defendant's objection to Section 13A-8-16(b)(2) lies in the fact that the statute omits the term "unexplained" in making the possession of recently stolen property prima facie evidence of the guilty intent and knowledge. At first reading, this argument would appear to have some merit as it is well settled that, whenever there is evidence tending to explain the possession, it is error to charge the jury that the possession of property recently stolen is prima facie evidence of guilt without the qualification "unexplained". Orr v. State, 107 Ala. 35, 39, 18 So. 142 (1895).

direct evidence of actual knowledge or belief in the stolen character of the property is rarely going to be available. Buckles, supra.

However, if the statute is examined carefully and strictly construed as criminal statutes must be, Robinson v. State, 361 So.2d 1113 (Ala.1978), the apparent omission of the term "unexplained" from the statute does not vitiate the inference or create any "new" crime as argued by the defendant.

The defendant's question of the statute is answered when the term "prima facie" is defined. This term has a definite and specific meaning. In view of the historical and common law existence, application and purpose of the inference itself, we must assume that the legislature was aware of that meaning in enacting the statute. Ex parte Vincent, 26 Ala. 145, 62 Am.Dec. 714 (1855). It is not disputed that the legislature may provide by statute that certain facts are prima facie evidence of other facts, providing reason and experience connect the ultimate fact inferred with the facts proved. Wells v. State, 378 So.2d 747, 750 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, Ex parte Wells, 378 So.2d 756 (1979). See Tolbert v. State, 294 Ala. 738, 321 So.2d 227 (1975); Ex parte Woodward, 181 Ala. 97, 61 So. 295 (1912); Aldridge v. State, 351 So.2d 656 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, Ex parte Aldridge, 351 So.2d 658 (Ala.1977); Dees v. State, 16 Ala.App. 97, 75 So. 645 (1917).

The term "prima facie evidence" has been defined by the courts of this state.

" 'Prima facie evidence' means that which brings about a measure of proof which, unless it is self contradictory or is contradicted by the defense, would support the jury's inferring the existence of one or more elements of a crime." Kizziah v. State, 42 Ala.App. 303, 305, 162 So.2d 889 (1964) (unexplained possession of part of a still prima facie evidence of violation of statute).

Briggs v. State, 375 So.2d 530, 534 (Ala.Cr.App.1979); Stiles v. State, 55 Ala.App. 374, 376, 315 So.2d 609 (1975); Sheppard v. State, 49 Ala.App. 400, 272 So.2d 605 (1973); Cunningham v. State, 47 Ala.App. 730, 734, 261 So.2d 69 (1972).

In Tittle v. State, 252 Ala. 377, 379, 41 So.2d 295 (1949), it was held:

"Prima facie evidence is 'evidence which suffices for the proof of a particular fact until contradicted or overcome by other evidence.' * * * An inference or presumption of law, affirmative or negative of a fact, in the absence of proof, or until proof can be obtained or produced to overcome the inference. Black's Law Dictionary, 3d Ed., p. 700.

"Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines the term as 'such evidence as, in judgment of law, is sufficient to establish the fact; and, if not rebutted, remains sufficient for the purpose. In a legal sense, such prima facie evidence, in the absence of all controlling evidence, or discrediting circumstances, becomes conclusive of the fact.' P. 1009."

The defendant cannot argue that we have given the term a highly technical meaning rather than one that is natural, plain, ordinary and commonly understood. Webster's Third International Dictionary (1971) defines prima facie evidence: "evidence sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted." The American Heritage Dictionary of The English Language (1969) defines it: "Evidence that would, if uncontested, establish a fact or raise a presumption of a fact."

Thus, the statutory inference does not create a new crime and authorize the This is merely a rule of evidence fixed by the legislature in its efforts to suppress crime. It simply fixes what will be prima facie evidence of a violation when certain facts have been proven. Little v. State, 27 Ala.App. 119, 120, 166 So. 618 (1936).

conviction of an accused for receiving stolen property simply upon proof of the possession of recently stolen property as argued by the defendant.

"The unexplained possession, ... looks to and calls on the possessor for an explanation of how he came by the recently stolen goods, for otherwise, an inference arises out of an incriminating circumstance from which the accused may be found guilty and convicted."

Buckles, 291 Ala. at 354, 280 So.2d 814.

See also Martin v. State, 104 Ala. 71, 78, 16 So. 82 (1893) (Possession of recently stolen property imposes on the possessor the "onus" of explaining the possession). "It is the 'unexplained' recent possession of stolen property that authorizes the inference of guilt. Whether the explanation offered is credible or satisfactory is a question for the jury." Orr, 107 Ala. at 39, 18 So. 142.

The effect of establishing a prima facie case is stated in Ogletree v. State, 28 Ala. 693, 702 (1856).

"In a criminal case, the establishment of a prima facie case does not, as in a civil case, take away from the defendant the presumption of innocence, or change the burden of proof. A solid reason for the distinction is, the well known difference in the measure of proof in the two classes of cases. In a civil case, the plaintiff is not required to prove, beyond all reasonable doubt, the facts on which he relies for a recovery; and therefore, when he establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proof is thereby shifted, and the prima facie case so established entitles him to recover, unless it is destroyed by proof from the other party. But in a criminal case, the State is required to prove, beyond all reasonable doubt, the facts which constitute the offense. The establishment, therefore, of a prima facie case merely does not take away the presumption of innocence from the defendant, but leaves the presumption to operate, in connection with, or in aid of, any proofs offered by him to rebut or impair the prima facie case thus made out by the State. A circumstance, aided by that presumption, may so far rebut or impair the prima facie case, as to render a conviction upon it improper." (Emphasis in original)

"Prima facie evidence of guilt does not shift the burden of proof." Hurston v. State, 235 Ala. 213, 215, 178 So. 223 (1938). "Until the State proves, in the first instance, beyond a reasonable doubt, the facts which constitute the offense, the accused is not required to establish his innocence by exculpatory evidence." Segars v. State, 86 Ala. 59, 60, 5 So. 558 (1888); Hodges v. State, 42 Ala.App. 147, 148, 155 So.2d 533 (1963).

This statutory inference does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Coats v. State, 257 Ala. 406, 60 So.2d 261 (1952). See also United States v. McGlamory, 441 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1971). There is a manifest distinction between the burden of proof and the burden of adducing evidence or the burden of explanation. Buckles, 291 Ala. at 357, 280 So.2d 814; C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, Section 444.01 (3rd ed. 1977). Even where a...