Eldridge v. Thaler

Decision Date31 January 2013
Docket NumberCIVIL NO. H-05-1847
PartiesGERALD CORNELIUS ELDRIDGE, Petitioner, v. RICK THALER, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Gerald Cornelius Eldridge is a Texas death-row inmate who has challenged his conviction and his sentence for years. His earlier challenges to his death sentence, based on arguments that he is mentally retarded and could not be constitutionally convicted under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), failed. His present challenge is that he is mentally ill and therefore cannot be constitutionally executed under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 948 (2007). Although this case arises out of murders committed years ago and follows other arguments about his death-eligibility, it is undisputed that Eldridge raised this claim at the earliest opportunity under the Supreme Court's case law.

Both sides filed extensive briefs and exhibits. The record includes medical and mental-health records, psychological testing performed by the State of Texas after Eldridge was arrested and during his long imprisonment, and testing performed by experts retained for this litigation. This court held a five-day evidentiary hearing at which Eldridge presented testimony from mental-health experts and his treating psychiatrist, and the respondent presented similar testimony.

Having carefully considered the petition, the parties' submissions, the evidence presented, and the applicable law, this court finds that Eldridge fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is incompetent to be executed. The stay of execution is lifted, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied, and final judgment is entered by separate order. The reasons for this ruling are set out in detail below.

I. The Legal Standards

"'The Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane.'" Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 934 (2007); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986). This prohibition applies even if a prisoner was earlier found competent to be tried and convicted for the crime that resulted in the death sentence. Once a prisoner makes a "preliminary showing that his current mental state would bar his execution, the Eighth Amendment . . . entitles him to an adjudication to determine his condition." Panetti, 551 U.S. at 934-35.

A prisoner is incompetent to be executed when his "mental illness prevents him from comprehending the reasons for the penalty or its implications." Ford, 477 U.S. at 417. A prisoner must be able to understand "the fact of his impending execution and the factual predicate for the execution." Panetti, 551 U.S. at 942, 954-55 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "Gross delusions stemming from a severe mental disorder may put an awareness of a link between a crime and its punishment in a context so far removed from reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose." Id. at 960. The prisoner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is incompetent to be executed. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 355 (1996); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449 (1992).

II. Background

On January 4, 1993, Eldridge went to the apartment of his former girlfriend, Cynthia Bogany. Ms. Bogany lived in the apartment with her daughter, Chirissa, age nine, and the son she had borne Eldridge, Terrell, age seven. Eldridge kicked in the door of the apartment and shot Chirissa between the eyes at point-blank range. He shot a man in the apartment, Wayne Dotson. He shot his son, Terrell. Eldridge then pursued Bogany, who had fled the apartment. Eldridge caught her when she tripped and fell on the stairs. Despite her pleas for her life, Eldridge shot her twice in the side of the head. Cynthia Bogany and Chirissa died instantly. Dotson and Terrell Eldridge survived. See Eldridge v. State, 940 S.W.2d 646, 649 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). Eldridge was then 28 years old.

A jury convicted Eldridge of capital murder on April 14, 1994. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Eldridge's conviction and sentence. Id. On March 30, 1998, Eldridge filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in state court. That application was pending when the Supreme Court of the United States decided Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally retarded offenders. On June 20, 2003, while his first habeas application was still pending, Eldridge filed a second state habeas corpus petition raising the claim that he could not be executed under Atkins because he is mentally retarded. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Eldridge's initial habeas application on February 9, 2005. Ex Parte Eldridge, No.60,478-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb, 9, 2005). On the same day, the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Eldridge's second application as an abuse of the writ. Ex Parte Eldridge, No. 60,478-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 9, 2005).

Eldridge filed a skeletal petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court on May 23, 2005 and filed an amended petition on May 26, 2006. The amended petition raised only one claim forrelief: that the Eighth Amendment prohibits Eldridge's execution because he is mentally retarded under the Atkins standard.

This court held an extended evidentiary hearing and issued a detailed opinion denying the relief Eldridge sought. In that opinion, issued on March 13, 2008, this court made extensive findings that Eldridge was not mentally retarded as he claimed and instead was competent to be sentenced to death. The Fifth Circuit denied Eldridge's request for a certificate of appealability. Eldridge v. Quarterman, No. 08-70012 (5th Cir. April 28, 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 536(2009). On August 5, 2009, the State of Texas set an execution date of November 17, 2009.

Although there is some overlap between questions of mental retardation and questions of mental illness, a claim of incompetency to be executed does not become ripe until execution is imminent. See Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 644-645 (1998); see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 406 (1993) ("[T]he issue of sanity is properly considered in proximity to the execution."). The Atkins hearing did not focus on Eldridge's sanity. Instead, the focus was on mental retardation, not mental illness.

On August 19, 2009, Eldridge filed a motion in the state trial court for appointment of a mental-health expert to make a preliminary evaluation of his competence to be executed. Eldridge sought the expert in preparation for moving under Article 46.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure for a determination of whether he is competent to be executed. The state trial court granted funding for Dr. Mary Alice Conroy to conduct a preliminary competency evaluation. On September 4, 2009, Dr. Conroy interviewed Eldridge for two hours. She found that he appeared to suffer from a psychotic disorder marked by hallucinations and delusions.

On September 17, 2009, the trial court granted the State's motion to have its expert, Dr. Mark S. Moeller, evaluate Eldridge. Dr. Moeller conducted an evaluation and filed a written report on October 8, 2009. Dr. Moeller concluded that Eldridge was feigning mental illness to avoid execution.

Eldridge requested funding to retain a mental-health expert to conduct a comprehensive competency evaluation. He also sought an evidentiary hearing. The trial court denied these requests and denied relief, signing the proposed findings of fact prepared and submitted by the State. Under those findings, Eldridge was competent to be executed. On November 16, 2009, a majority of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the trial court's findings and denied relief in a two-page per curiam opinion. Eldridge v. Texas, No. AP-76,256 (Tex.Crim.App. Nov. 16, 2009). One member of the court dissented without written opinion. This federal petition followed.

This court stayed Eldridge's execution to allow both sides to develop the necessary evidence to permit a reasoned and fact-based determination of whether his mental illness made him incompetent to be executed. Eldridge has since been evaluated by experts for both sides. He has been subjected to a variety of tests. The information about Eldridge includes those test results, observations about him over the years, and opinions based on those results and observations. The information also includes the records of his years in prison as well as records of his education, work, and social history.

In the memorandum and order denying relief on Eldridge's Atkins claim, this court discussed Eldridge's background in detail. See Eldridge v. Quarterman, H-cv-1847 (S.D. Tex. March 13, 2008). Eldridge graduated from high school in the seventieth percentile of his class. After graduation, he joined the pipefitters' union, which required him to pass a written test that includedmath problems described as being at a sixth-grade level of difficulty. He had a driver's license and regularly drove. He repaired automobiles. He had a bank account that he used when he was working, and he performed well at his job as a pipefitters' apprentice. Despite his claims of low IQ, functional illiteracy, and an inability to carry out many functions of daily living, this court found that he functioned normally and had the intellectual ability to graduate from high school, pass the pipefitters' union exam, and perform ably as a pipefitters' apprentice. Evidence presented in the Atkins proceeding also showed that, while in pretrial detention, Eldridge played chess, read the Bible, and wrote letters.

The parties presented extensive additional evidence in a five-day evidentiary hearing on Eldridge's competency to be executed. Counsel submitted pre- and post-hearing briefs and argument. Based on...

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