Eleazer v. Ted Reed Thermal, Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 June 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-128-M,89-128-M |
| Parties | Robert A. ELEAZER v. TED REED THERMAL, INC., et al. P. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This matter is before the Supreme Court following our grant of the plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari. The plaintiff seeks a review of a Superior Court order that denied his motion for leave to propound interrogatories in excess of thirty and granted the defendant's motion for a protective order. The plaintiff also seeks review of an award of attorney's fees to the defendant. We affirm the former order and quash the latter pertaining to attorney's fees.
Robert A. Eleazer, plaintiff below (or petitioner), brought suit on December 2, 1987, seeking damages for a workplace injury he sustained while working on a machine owned and maintained by defendant Ted Reed Thermal, Inc. (or respondent), and manufactured by Niagara Machine Tool Works, Inc., a codefendant. At the time of the accident plaintiff was working for third-party defendant Canonchet Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Olsten Temporary Services, a temporary-employment agency that placed plaintiff with defendant.
The plaintiff below originally requested permission to issue forty-eight interrogatories to defendant on the ground that the case, a "complex products liability" action with multiple defendants, required a broader, more detailed scope of discovery. On September 19, 1988, however, the trial court denied, without prejudice, plaintiff's motion for leave to propound interrogatories in excess of thirty.
Shortly thereafter, on October 7, 1988, plaintiff served upon defendant twenty-nine numbered interrogatories. The defendant then filed a motion for a protective order on grounds that the interrogatories propounded were in excess of the thirty interrogatories permitted by Rule 33 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically the motion alleged that the interrogatories contained numerous subquestions, making a total of 127 interrogatories. In response to the motion for a protective order plaintiff filed an objection to the motion, arguing that the subparts did not constitute additional questions. The plaintiff also filed in the alternative a renewed motion for leave to file interrogatories in excess of thirty. Pending the hearing on the motions, plaintiff alleges that he tried to resolve the matter with defendant by letter and telephone on at least three occasions. He claims that the attempts were unsuccessful and alleges that defendant stated that if plaintiff could not propound only thirty interrogatories, then the court should decide the issue.
The motions were heard on January 17, 1989, and a decision was filed on February 20, 1989. The trial justice granted defendant's motion for a protective order and again denied plaintiff's motion to issue more than thirty interrogatories. The trial justice was of the opinion that the subquestions did in fact inflate the true number of interrogatories. He was also of the opinion that the interrogatories would require extended detail and analysis by defendant and consequently that they would result in the "imposition of a significant burden" upon defendant.
On February 10, 1989, the trial justice heard arguments regarding attorney's fees for the time spent litigating the disputed interrogatories. The defendant did not produce an affidavit or other evidence of the actual time spent in preparing for and arguing the motion. Rather defendant generally categorized the time spent, and through a bench decision the trial justice awarded attorney's fees of $750: ten hours at $75 per hour. Although plaintiff's attorney was afforded an opportunity to question defendant's attorney regarding the actual number of hours spent on the matter, he declined to do so.
An order was entered on February 23, 1989, regarding the decisions of February 10 and February 20. Payment of the attorney's fees, however, was stayed pending appeal to this court. The plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which writ was granted.
The plaintiff asks this court to review several issues. He argues that the trial justice erred both in granting defendant's motion for a protective order and in denying plaintiff's motion to propound more than thirty interrogatories. The plaintiff initially asserts that the multiple subquestions should not be counted as separate interrogatories and claims that the form of questions he asked is standard in this jurisdiction. He also argues that interrogatories provide an efficient and inexpensive means of discovery and as such, specific detailed interrogatories, like the questions at issue, should be permitted because they are less expensive and less onerous to both parties than depositions.
The plaintiff argues in the alternative that if it should be determined that the interrogatories did exceed thirty in number, then the trial justice was in error in not allowing him to propound more than thirty interrogatories. He further contends that defendant should be estopped from challenging the interrogatories both because defendant did not cooperate or act in good faith in trying to resolve the problem and because defendant's own set of propounded interrogatories contained subparts that exceeded thirty in number.
The defendant on the other hand argues that the numerous subquestions do count as independent questions and that, therefore, the total number of interrogatories exceeds thirty. The defendant also asserts that rulings on discovery motions by trial justices are totally discretionary and that the standard of review is whether the trial justice abused that discretion or whether the decision created an unusual hardship for the losing party. Abuse of discretion or prejudice to plaintiff, defendant argues, were never demonstrated by him.
Our discussion in this case begins with Rule 33 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides the framework within which interrogatories may be served. Rule 33(b) reads in part as follows:
"A party shall not serve more than one set of...
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Friedman v. Kelly & Picerne, Inc.
... ... Moore v. Ballard , 914 A.2d ... 487, 489 (R.I. 2007) (citing Eleazer v. Ted Reed Thermal, ... Inc. , 576 A.2d 1217, 1221 (R.I. 1990)). This rule, ... ...
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Friedman v. Kelly & Picerne Inc
...absent statutory authority or contractual liability. Moore v. Ballard, 914 A.2d 487, 489 (R.I. 2007) (citing Eleazer v. Ted Reed Thermal, Inc., 576 A.2d 1217, 1221 (R.I. 1990)). This rule, however, is not without exception. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I. v. Najarian, 911 A.2d 706, 711......
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Shine v. Moreau
...absent statutory authority or contractual liability.” Moore v. Ballard, 914 A.2d 487, 489 (R.I.2007) ; see also Eleazer v. Ted Reed Thermal Inc., 576 A.2d 1217, 1221 (R.I.1990) (“The plaintiff correctly argues that the right to collect attorney's fees did not exist at common law and that, c......
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Kaufman Malchman & Kirby, PC v. Hasbro, Inc., 93 Civ. 4962 (RLC).
...the parties bear their own costs in the absence of a specific statutory or contractual provision to the contrary. Eleazer v. Ted Reed Thermal, Inc., 576 A.2d 1217 (R.I.1990). There was no contract between defendant and plaintiff, so there is no contractual provision that governs here. Nor i......