Eleazu v. United States Army Network Enter. Ctr. - Natick
| Decision Date | 21 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:20-cv-02576-JMC |
| Parties | Chimaroke Victor Eleazu, Plaintiff, v. United States Army Network Enterprise Center - Natick, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Plaintiff Chimaroke Victor Eleazu (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed an action alleging employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)-(b). (ECF No. 1 at 3.) The matter before the court is a review of the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (“Report”) (ECF No. 20) filed on November 23 2020, recommending this court grant Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12), which would render Plaintiff's Motion for Issuance of Subpoena (ECF No. 17) moot.
For the reasons below, the court ACCEPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 20) GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12) and DISMISSES Plaintiff's Complaint without prejudice.[1]
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Report sets forth the relevant facts and legal standards which the court incorporates herein without full recitation. (ECF No. 20 at 1-4.) On July 10, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Complaint (ECF No. 1) against the Director of the U.S. Army Network Enterprise Center in Natick, Massachusetts, claiming employment discrimination and violations of the ADA, ADEA and § 1981. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed he was continually harassed at his workplace until his employment was wrongfully terminated. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff notes the events leading up to his termination began “after a co-worker went on a loud rant in the office about a murder case in Danvers, M[assachusetts]” on October 7, 2014. (Id. at 2.) Thereafter, he claims he was subjected to “stereotype jokes, ridicule put-downs, interference with work performance, name-calling verbal and nonverbal abus[e], . . . and death threat[s] from co-workers.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff claims his managers failed to address the continued harassment, even after they promised to resolve it. (Id.) This took a physical and psychological toll on Plaintiff's health and affected his ability to perform his job. (Id.) In time, the alleged harassment forced him to “stay out” of the abusive work environment. (Id.) Plaintiff claims his employment was terminated on July 22 2015 (Id. at 2), costing him lost wages and legal fees (Id. at 3). Now, Plaintiff seeks monetary relief to cover lost wages, pain and suffering, legal expenses, and more. (ECF No. 1 at 3, 4.)
Plaintiff contacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regarding this claim on October 31, 2014, alleging he was discriminated against on the basis of National Origin, Race, reprisal, and harassment. (ECF No. 12-3 at 3.)[2] But after Plaintiff failed to respond to the EEO Officer's “fact-finding questions” and an extension form sent as part of the pre-complaint process, he was informed of his “right to file a formal complaint of discrimination within 15 calendar days, ” or by December 20, 2020. (Id.)
On September 15, 2020, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) and 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 12.) Defendant argues Plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed on four separate grounds: (1) the District of South Carolina is not the proper venue, (2) the Director of the U.S. Army Network Enterprise Center in Natick is not the proper defendant, (3) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and (4) Plaintiff's Complaint fails to meet the pleading standards set forth in Rule 8(a) and fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6). (Id. at 1.) In addition, Defendant contends Plaintiff was never “removed from his federal employment.” (Id. at 2, n.4.) Instead, Defendant alleges a Notice of Proposed Removal was filed by Plaintiff's employer and contested by Plaintiff, but no decision was ever reached on the merits of the Notice because “Plaintiff accepted an appointment to a position with another agency.” (Id.)
The Magistrate Judge issued a Roseboro Order on September 15, 2020, explaining the nature of a motion to dismiss and warning Plaintiff that his failure to respond to Defendant's Motion within 31 days, or by October 19, 2021, could result in the dismissal of his case. (ECF No. 14 at 1.) Plaintiff filed a response on October 13, 2020, largely reiterating the facts stated in his original Complaint. (ECF No. 16.)[3] Defendant filed a Reply on October 20, 2020. (ECF No. 18.)
On October 13, 2020, Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena to Newton-Wellesley Hospital, Nicholas M. Satriano, and the Board of Registration in Medicine. (ECF No. 17.) In response, Defendant filed a motion to stay discovery pending the court's “resolution of Defendant's motion to dismiss.” (ECF No. 19.)
The Magistrate Judge issued the Report on November 23, 2020 recommending that the court grant Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 20 at 19.) The Report notified both parties of their right to object to its findings. (Id. at 20.) Plaintiff filed an Objection to the Report on December 4, 2020 (ECF No. 23), to which Defendant filed a Reply (ECF No. 24). Defendant did not file a separate objection.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Magistrate Judge's Report is made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina. The Magistrate Judge only makes a recommendation to this court, and the recommendation has no presumptive weight. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The responsibility to make a final determination remains with the court. Id. at 271. As such, the court is charged with making de novo determinations of those portions of the Report to which specific objections are made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). In the absence of specific objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report, the court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the Report. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Rather, “in the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (). Thus, the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the Magistrate Judge's recommendation or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The court is required to interpret pro se documents liberally and will hold those documents to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. See Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). See also Hardin v. United States, C/A No. 7:12-cv-0118-GRA, 2012 WL 3945314, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 10, 2012). Additionally, pro se documents must be construed in a favorable manner, “no matter how inartfully pleaded, to see whether they could provide a basis for relief.” Garrett v. Elko, No. 95-7939, 1997 WL 457667, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1997). Although pro se documents are liberally construed by federal courts, “[t]he ‘special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.” Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. for Balt., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
To grant a motion under Rule 12(b)(3), the court must find that venue is improper. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). “‘When a defendant objects to venue under Rule 12(b)(3), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that venue is proper.'” Ameristone Tile, LLC v. Ceramic Consulting Corp., Inc., 966 F.Supp.2d 604, 616 (D.S.C. 2013) (brackets omitted) (quoting Butler v. Ford Motor Co., 724 F.Supp.2d 575, 586 (D.S.C. 2010)). However, the plaintiff is obliged “to make only a prima facie showing of proper venue in order to survive a motion to dismiss.” Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., Ltd., 675 F.3d 355, 366 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Mitrano v. Hawes, 377 F.3d 402, 405 (4th Cir. 2004)). “In assessing whether there has been a prima facie venue showing, [the court] view[s] the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (citing Global Seafood Inc. v. Bantry Bay Mussels Ltd., 659 F.3d 221, 224 (2d Cir. 2011)).
Moreover, “[o]n a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3), the court is permitted to consider evidence outside the pleadings.” Id. at 365-66 (citing Sucampo Pharm., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma, Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2006)).
A case filed in an improper venue must be dismissed, or, if in the interests of justice, transferred to a district in which it could have been brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Under the general venue statute, a civil action may be brought, and venue is proper, in:
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
Title VII claims, on the other hand, are governed by a specific venue statute. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), venue is proper in (1) “any judicial district in the State in which the...
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