ELECTRICAL CONT. ASSOC. OF GR. BOSTON, INC. v. Local Union 103, Civ. A. No. 71-967.
| Decision Date | 11 June 1971 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 71-967. |
| Citation | 327 F. Supp. 1177 |
| Parties | ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION OF GREATER BOSTON, INC., Plaintiff, v. LOCAL UNION 103, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Harold Rosenwald, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.
Timothy J. Murphy, Boston, Mass., for defendant.
Plaintiff, Electrical Contractors Association of Greater Boston, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the Association) brought this action against defendant Local Union 103, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (hereinafter referred to as the Union) under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) for a declaratory judgment under the collective bargaining contract between the Association and the Union that (1) the "assignment of men to core drilling equipment is the prerogative of the employer, except where the safety of men is involved, as determined by the Joint Safety Committee" and that (2) the failure and refusal of defendant to abide by the decision of the Joint Conference Committee constitutes a breach of the contract; and for an injunction enjoining the Union from requiring the assignment of two or more employees of any member of the Association to core drilling equipment unless and until the Joint Safety Committee determines that the safety of men is involved. An evidentiary hearing was held on May 20 and 21 on plaintiff's prayer for a preliminary injunction. At its conclusion plaintiff expressed a willingness to have the case decided on the merits on the basis of the evidence offered at the hearing. Defendant reserved the right to introduce further evidence at a later hearing on the merits. However, no useful purpose would be served by hearing further testimony on this matter,1 and the court has treated the May 20-21 hearing as a consolidated trial on the merits in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a) (2). On the basis of evidence adduced at this trial and memoranda of the parties, the court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
1. Plaintiff is an association of employers engaged in the electrical contracting business in Boston and vicinity. Defendant is a labor organization representing employees in the electrical contracting industry, an industry affecting commerce.
2. In August 1970 a dispute arose between the Association and the Union. The Union took the position that the use of a single employee on most core drilling operations was a safety hazard and recommended to its members that two men should be used on such operations. The Association insisted that the determination of whether one or two men should be used on a particular core drilling operation was a prerogative of management.
3. The local shop stewards interpreted the Union's recommendation to mean that no core drilling would be carried on unless two men were assigned to such work. Since the core drilling operation is critical to the progress of the electrical contracting job, the employer members of the Association acceded to the Union's recommendation, but only under protest.
4. The Joint Conference Committee, authorized under Article 1-3(b) of the collective bargaining contract between the parties consists of three Union and three employer members. At the August 24, 1970 meeting of the Joint Conference Committee, several employer members of the Association protested the use of two men on core drilling machines. After a lengthy discussion by both sides, a motion to refer the dispute to the Joint Safety Committee, authorized by Article 6-17 of the collective bargaining contract, for a ruling on safety, was proposed and voted on. A deadlock resulted, three for and three against.
5. On October 27, 1970 a meeting of the Joint Safety Committee, which also contains three union and three employer members, was held. After some discussion of the core drilling dispute, a motion was made, seconded and passed to suspend any action for one month while all members became familiar with the situation and machines. On January 7, 1971, at another meeting of the Joint Safety Committee, the members discussed their personal observations of the operation of core drilling machines, but no action was taken.
6. On February 23, 1971 the Joint Conference Committee met. The subject of the core drilling controversy was brought up at the end of the meeting. A management representative moved that "the assignment of men to core drilling equipment is the prerogative of the employer." A union representative inserted the following amendment: ", except where safety of men is involved." Another company representative added a third clause: ", as determined by the Joint Safety Committee." This motion as amended was voted on and passed unanimously. The whole process, including discussion, took five or ten minutes. The minutes of the meeting read as follows:
"Moved and voted that the assignment of men to core drilling equipment is the prerogative of the employer, except where safety of men is involved, as determined by the Joint Safety Committee."
7. After the passage of this resolution, the Union continued to "recommend" two men on core drilling operations; and the employers continued to use two men under protest. The Joint Safety Committee was not convened to determine safety standards. In fact, the only change from the status quo ante was the institution of this lawsuit.
8. The employers have suffered and are suffering substantial damage in increased labor costs as a result of the use of two men instead of one on core drilling operations.
This case presents the persistent and abiding problem of reconciling the conflicting policies of the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104, and § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), which provides for suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization. In the area of labor injunctions, the anti-injunction policy of Norris-LaGuardia is deemed to be the rule and the exceptions to this policy to be narrow, see Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Union, 1970, 398 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199. With respect to its claim for injunctive relief, i. e., that the defendant union be enjoined from requiring employers to use two men on core drilling operations, plaintiff contends that the decision of the Joint Conference Committee on February 23 was an "award" enforceable by court order.
Under United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 1960, 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424, it is clear that an arbitration award is enforceable by court order despite the strictures of Norris-LaGuardia. Plaintiffs do not argue that the February 23 decision of the Joint Conference Committee was an arbitration award. However, the Supreme Court has held that compliance with an award of a joint employer-union committee may be compelled if the decision of such a committee is made "final and binding" by the grievance provisions of the collective bargaining contract. General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 89 v. Riss & Co., 1963, 372 U.S. 517, 83 S.Ct. 789, 9 L. Ed.2d 918. Thus, the primary question before this court is whether the February 23 decision of the Joint Conference Committee was an enforceable award within the meaning of the General Drivers case.
Article 1-3(b)2 of the contract states in part that the Joint Conference Committee "shall sit in judgment on all complaints and on all interpretations of this Agreement" and that "its decision shall be final and binding upon both parties hereto." Thus it is clear that the Joint Conference Committee has the power under the contract to render...
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