Eleopoulos v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency

Decision Date20 November 1972
Docket NumberNo. 72-1012.,72-1012.
Citation351 F. Supp. 63
PartiesMichael ELEOPOULOS et al., Plaintiffs, v. RICHMOND REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY and the City of Richmond, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of California

Bold & Polisner, Jeffrey D. Polisner, Richmond, Cal., and Jackson, Turner, Endeman & Mulcare, with Wm. J. Turner, Burlingame, Cal., for plaintiffs.

Fitzgerald & Johnson, Herman H. Fitzgerald, San Francisco, Cal., for defendants.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

WOLLENBERG, District Judge.

Plaintiffs have filed an action alleging a de facto taking of their property by defendants without just compensation in violation of the 5th and 14th Amendments. Jurisdiction is alleged under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The major actions which allegedly constitute a taking are as follows: On September 8, 1959, the City Council of Richmond, California adopted Resolution No. 7092. That resolution designated Redevelopment Area No. 10, which includes plaintiffs' two-story commercial building, declared that the area was blighted, and stated that redevelopment was necessary. Adoption of that resolution and attendant publicity, as well as direct notices, informed all owners and users of property in the area that public acquisition was imminent and demolition probable.

On December 27, 1962, on request of the Redevelopment Agency, the City Council adopted Resolution No. 8027. Under that Resolution, the Redevelopment Agency was given authority to review all applications for building construction or improvement permits in the redevelopment area. If such a proposed improvement did not conform with the preliminary redevelopment plan, the permit would be refused unless the City Council voted to issue it. In January, 1964, plaintiffs applied for remodelling permits. These permits were denied allegedly because they would have increased the value of plaintiffs' property; defendants allegedly refused to allow any remodelling costing more than $1,000.

On May 23, 1966, the City Council enacted Ordinance No. 169 N.S., which adopted the redevelopment plan, declared that the project area was blighted, and that condemnation would be necessary. Although plaintiff's property was designated for acquisition or condemnation, no condemnation action had been instituted when this suit was filed; to the Court's knowledge, none has been filed yet, although in a letter to plaintiffs dated November 15, 1966, defendants indicated an intent to acquire the property by November 15, 1967.

In addition, plaintiffs allege that defendants have acquired and demolished many buildings near their property; that other buildings have been boarded up and subjected to vandalism; that streets have been closed in the area. As a result, they claim that a substantial interference, amounting to a taking, has occurred. They further allege that contrary to the requirements of Ordinance No. 169 N.S., they have not and will not receive just compensation for the taking of their property.

These allegations raise a serious constitutional question which confers jurisdiction on this Court and states a claim upon which relief could be granted. Foster v. Herley, 330 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1964); Foster v. City of Detroit, D.C., 254 F.Supp. 655, aff'd 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968); Ballard Fish & Oyster Co. v. Glaser Constr. Co., 424 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1970); Sayre v. United States, 282 F.Supp. 175 (N.D.Ohio 1967); Haczela v. City of Bridgeport, 299 F.Supp. 709 (D.Conn.1969).

The most serious challenge defendants make to this cause of action is that an adequate remedy exists under California law, and that consequently, no federal constitutional question is presented. See, e. g., Jimmie's Inc. v. City of West...

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4 cases
  • Muskegon Theatres, Inc. v. City of Muskegon
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • 5 Diciembre 1974
    ...Amendments presents a 'serious constitutional question,' Foster v. Herley,330 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1964), Eleopoulos v. Richmond Development Agency,351 F.Supp. 63, 64 (N.D.Cal.1972), clearly within the district court's 'federal question jurisdiction.' 28 U.S.C. 1331 (1970). 2 Even so, the dist......
  • DONOHOE C. CO., INC. v. Maryland-National CP & P. Com'n
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • 29 Julio 1975
    ...context and concluded that abstention was not required. See 507 F.2d at 203. Of the three cases, one, Eleopoulus v. Richmond Development Agency, 351 F.Supp. 63 (N.D.Cal. 1972), was distinguished as being akin to the Sixth Circuit's Foster decisions. See id. The Muskegon court had somewhat m......
  • Dahl v. City of Palo Alto
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
    • 19 Marzo 1974
    ...330 F.2d 87, 90-91 (6 Cir. 1964); Amen v. City of Dearborn, 363 F.Supp. 1267, 1270 (E.D. Mich.1973); Eleopoulos v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency, 351 F.Supp. 63, 64 (N. D.Cal.1972). 8 The required amount in controversy was originally ...
  • City of Chicago v. Loitz
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 2 Junio 1975
    ...424 F.2d 574, 191 Ct.Cl. 389; R. J. Widen Co. v. United States (1966), 357 F.2d 988, 174 Ct.Cl. 1020; Eleopoulos v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency (N.D.Cal.1972), 351 F.Supp. 63; Haczela v. City of Bridgeport (D.Conn.1969), 299 F.Supp. 709; Inmobiliaria Borinquen, Inc. v. Garcia Santiago (D.......

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