Elftmann v. Vill. of Tinley Park

Decision Date09 June 2016
Docket NumberNo. 15 C 10585,15 C 10585
Citation191 F.Supp.3d 874
Parties Norman W. ELFTMANN III, et al., Plaintiffs, v. VILLAGE OF TINLEY PARK, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Gerardo Solon Gutierrez, Attorney at Law, Chicago, IL, Stephen E. Eberhardt, Law Offices of Stephen E. Eberhardt, Tinley Park, IL, for Plaintiffs.

Brandon K. Lemley, Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Rubén Castillo, Chief Judge

Norman W. Elftmann III ("Elftmann") and Jennifer Musser ("Musser") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed an action on behalf of a putative class in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, challenging the red light camera ordinance adopted by the Village of Tinley Park ("the Village"). (R. 1-1, State Compl.) Plaintiffs assert both state-law claims and federal constitutional claims. (Id. ¶¶ 61-100.) The Village removed the action to this Court on federal question grounds. (R. 1, Notice of Removal.) Plaintiffs now move to remand. (R. 9, Mot. to Remand.) For the reasons stated below, the motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

In 2006, the State of Illinois passed legislation that granted municipalities authority to install and maintain "automated traffic law enforcement systems," commonly known as red light cameras. (R. 1-1, State Compl. ¶ 24 (citing 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11–208.6 ).) Municipalities who wish to maintain a red light camera system must pass an ordinance that imposes liability on vehicle owners caught violating traffic laws. (Id. ¶ 25.) The statute also requires that municipalities issue written notices to vehicle owners for each violation. (Id. ¶ 26.) The notice must include a statement informing the owner that he or she "may elect to proceed by: (A) paying the fine, completing a required traffic education program, or both; or (B) challenging the charge in court, by mail, or by administrative hearing." (Id. (quoting 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11–208.6(d)(10).)) The statute also authorizes, but does not require, municipalities to create a system of administrative adjudication for red light camera violations. (Id. ¶ 27 (citing 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11–208.3 ).) Where a violation is challenged through a municipal adjudication process, the hearing officer's decision is still subject to judicial review through the state's Administrative Review Law. (Id. ¶ 15 (citing 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11–208.3(d) ; 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3–101 et seq. ).) The enabling legislation also requires that red light camera laws be uniformly applied and enforced by "all units of local government." (Id. ¶ 28 (quoting 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11–208.1 ).)

On April 1, 2008, the Village passed an ordinance pursuant to the state's enabling statute authorizing the installation and use of red light cameras within the Village. (Id. ¶ 39.) Elftmann and Musser have both been cited for violating the ordinance. (Id. ¶¶ 46-48, 51-53.) Elftmann simply paid the $100 fine, whereas Musser chose to challenge it; she was afforded an administrative hearing but was found guilty. (Id. ¶¶ 49-57.) Plaintiffs later discovered (through Freedom of Information Act requests) that the Village had on multiple occasions voided red light camera citations for certain individuals through a process known as "police discretion." (Id. at ¶¶ 5-7; id. , Exs. C-F.) Plaintiffs allege that the "police discretion" process was used to benefit politically connected individuals, including "the landscaper who cuts former Mayor Edward Zabrocki's grass," employees of a corporation that was "a substantial campaign contributor" to Zabrocki, the wives of Tinley Park police officers and firefighters, and the owner of a local car dealership who served as "Inaugural Committee Chairman" for Zabrocki during the last election. (Id. ¶ 7.) All of these individuals allegedly triggered the red light cameras but were not given a citation. (Id. )

On November 3, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in state court on behalf of themselves and a putative class of approximately 24,000 individuals who have been found guilty of red light camera violations since the Village ordinance was enacted. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 19.) In Count I, they allege that the Village violated their Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights "by authorizing rejection of certain person(s) [sic] tickets for ‘police discretion’ while denying that option to Plaintiffs and others similarly situated." (Id. ¶ 64.) Within this count, they also allege that the Village violated their Fourteen Amendment due process rights through its "arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable" enforcement of the ordinance. (Id. ¶¶ 66, 68.) In Count II, they seek "a declaratory judgment" that the Village's red light camera ordinance is "unconstitutional, unlawful, void ab initio , and unenforceable" under state law and the federal Due Process Clause. (Id. ¶ 75.) They allege that the ordinance fails to offer violators the opportunity to challenge the violation in court, which in their view is a requirement of the state's enabling statute. (Id. ¶ 76.) In Count III, Plaintiffs allege "unjust enrichment"; they claim that "[b]ecause of the unconstitutional applications and unlawful terms and enforcement" of the ordinance, the Village "has never been legally entitled to collect any sums from Plaintiffs, or any members of the Plaintiff Class, for photo red light violations." (Id. ¶ 97.) Among other relief, they seek a determination that "Defendant's passage, enforcement and practices under the Ordinance are unlawful as well as enforceable as violative of the Constitution of the United States," (id. at 15), a full refund "of all sums they have paid in fees, fines, taxes or penalties," an award of other damages, court costs, attorneys fees, and "other relief as the Court deems just, fair and equitable." (Id. at 21.)

On November 24, 2015, the Village removed the case to this Court. (R. 1, Notice of Removal.) After a preliminary review, the Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice and afforded Plaintiffs an opportunity to either file an amended federal complaint or move to remand. (R. 4, Min. Entry.) On December 22, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand. (R. 9, Mot. to Remand.) The motion is somewhat difficult to parse, but Plaintiffs appear to raise three separate arguments in support of their requested relief. First, they request that the Court abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the entire case, or at least the state law claims, pursuant to Texas Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co. , 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). (R. 9, Mot. to Remand at 2.) Second, they argue that this Court should "sever" and remand the state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). (Id. ) Finally, they request that the Court exercise its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) to relinquish jurisdiction over the state-law claims. (Id. at 3–4.) The Village opposes the motion, arguing that this case was properly removed and that there is no basis to remand or stay any portion of the case. (R. 12, Resp.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A defendant can remove "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction."

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The Court has original jurisdiction over claims arising under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."). "[T]he presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Citadel Sec., LLC v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc. , 808 F.3d 694, 701 (7th Cir.2015) (citation omitted). A notice of removal must be filed "within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).

Within 30 days thereafter, a plaintiff can move to remand. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). "In considering a motion for remand, the court must examine the plaintiffs' complaint at the time of the defendant's removal and assume the truth of all factual allegations contained within the original complaint." Scouten v. MNL FTS, LLC , 708 F.Supp.2d 729, 731 (N.D.Ill.2010) (citation omitted). "The well-established general rule is that jurisdiction is determined at the time of removal, and nothing filed after removal affects jurisdiction." In re Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co. , 606 F.3d 379, 380 (7th Cir.2010). The removing party has the burden of establishing that federal jurisdiction exists. Morris v. Nuzzo , 718 F.3d 660, 668 (7th Cir.2013). The Court must "interpret the removal statute narrowly, resolving any doubt in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum in state court." Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc. , 577 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir.2009).

ANALYSIS

Before turning to Plaintiffs' arguments, it is important to note that Plaintiffs do not challenge the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Nor would such an argument have any merit. As the Village points out, the complaint blurs together various state and federal legal principles within each count, but it is apparent from the face of the complaint that Count I invokes the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. (R. 1-1, State Compl. ¶¶ 64, 68.) In fact, Plaintiffs label these claims as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. ¶¶ 63, 68.) Count II, which is partly based on state law, also invokes the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. (Id. ¶ 74.) These federal claims fall within the Court's original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Therefore, this action was properly removed to this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). With this understanding, the Court turns to Plaintiffs' arguments.

I. Pullman Abstention

Plaintiffs first argue that ...

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