Elg v. Whittington
| Decision Date | 16 November 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 64396,64396 |
| Citation | 119 Ill.2d 344,518 N.E.2d 1232,116 Ill.Dec. 252 |
| Parties | , 116 Ill.Dec. 252 Curtis J. ELG et al. v. Jon A. WHITTINGTON et al. (Walter Skeistaitis, Jr., et al., Appellants; First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Champaign, Appellee). |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
John E. Maloney, Maloney & Davis, Urbana, for appellants.
Gary R. Lietz, Franklin, Flynn & Palmer, Champaign, for First Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Champaign, defendant/appellee.
This appeal addresses the question of whether a motion which is directed against an appealable circuit court judgment concerning one party or claim in a multiparty or multiclaim litigation will toll the running of the period for filing a timely notice of appeal. The circuit court dismissed the third-party complaint of the appellants, Walter Skeistaitis, Jr., and Aldona V. Skeistaitis. In the appellate court, appellants' appeal from this judgment was dismissed as untimely. (149 Ill.App.3d 307, 102 Ill.Dec. 675, 500 N.E.2d 568.) We granted appellants' petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill.2d R. 315).
The plaintiffs-counterdefendants in this lawsuit, Curtis Elg and Hilde Trieglaff, filed a complaint in the circuit court of Champaign County against the defendants-counterplaintiffs, Jon and Penny Whittington, and the defendants-third-party plaintiffs, Walter and Aldona Skeistaitis, the appellants here. Count I of Elg and Trieglaff's complaint alleged that the Whittingtons breached a contract to buy certain described real property from Elg and Trieglaff. Elg and Trieglaff sought specific performance or, in the alternative, damages from the Whittingtons. Count II of their complaint alleged that the appellants had breached a contract to sell the same real property to Elg and Trieglaff by failing to remove an encumbrance from the property's title. This count sought damages from the appellants.
The Whittingtons filed an answer to the complaint and a counterclaim against Elg and Trieglaff. The counterclaim alleged that since Elg and Trieglaff were unable to provide them with marketable title, the Whittingtons were entitled to the return of their earnest money, which had been deposited in escrow. Elg and Trieglaff filed an answer to this counterclaim.
The appellants filed an answer to the complaint, pleading as an affirmative defense that the appellants' inability to remove the encumbrance on the property's title stemmed from the refusal of the appellee, First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Champaign, to release a lien on the property despite an attempt by the appellants to satisfy the lien.
At the same time, appellants also filed a third-party complaint against the appellee. Count I of the third-party complaint alleged that the appellee had refused to accept appellants' tender of an amount sufficient to satisfy their debt to the appellee or to release its lien on their property. This count sought from appellee an indemnity for any judgment entered against the appellants on the Elg and Trieglaff complaint, as well as the costs of appellants' defense against that complaint. Count II of the appellants' third-party complaint alleged that the appellee's refusal to release the lien was willful, malicious, and intentionally designed to hinder appellants' sale of the property. In this count, appellants sought statutory damages (see Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 95, pars. 52 through 54), punitive damages, and an order directing the appellee to release its lien on the subject property. Because of the many different parties involved in this litigation, the following diagram may be helpful:
counterclaim
Elg & Trieglaff Whittingtons
and
claim Skeistaitises
(appellants)
Third-party
claim
First Federal
Savings & Loan
(appellee)
On November 21, 1984, the appellee filed an answer to the third-party complaint which pleaded three affirmative defenses. The first affirmative defense alleged that the third-party complaint and the relief requested were barred by res judicata. The second affirmative defense alleged that another cause of action was pending between the parties for the same cause. The third affirmative defense alleged that the appellants' claim was barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of, or defeating, the claim. The appellee also filed a motion to dismiss count II of the third-party complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 110, par. 2-615).
The circuit court dismissed count II of the third-party complaint, and the appellants filed an amended count II. Shortly thereafter, the Whittingtons filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by affidavits and other materials. In response, Elg and Trieglaff filed affidavits and other documents.
On March 11, 1985, the appellee filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion alleged that the appellants had failed to reply to the affirmative defenses, and that they had therefore admitted the factual allegations contained in the defenses. The motion further alleged that the defenses were legally sufficient to defeat the third-party complaint. On the same date, the appellee filed a motion under section 2-615 of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 110, par. 2-615) to dismiss amended count II of the third-party complaint.
On May 2, 1985, the circuit court made the following docket entry:
"Hearing on Third Party Defendant, First Federal's motion to dismiss amended Count II and Motion for Judgment on pleadings resumed. Motion for judgment on pleadings allowed. Judgment on pleadings entered in favor of Third Party Defendant, First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Champaign and against Third Party Plaintiffs Walter Skeistaitis, Jr. and Aldona V. Skeistaitis and in bar of the causes of action sought to be stated in Count I and amended Count II of the Third Party Complaint. No just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the order.
By reason of ruling on Motion for Judgment, Motion to dismiss not reached.
Hearing resumed on motion for summary judgment on Defendants/Counterplaintiffs Whittington. Court finds that motion and supporting affidavits do no [sic ] demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and accordingly the motion for summary judgment is denied."
Neither party had moved the court to make a finding that there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the order.
On May 24, 1985, the appellants filed a "motion to vacate a summary judgment and for leave to reply to affirmative defenses." In the motion, appellants expressed their view of the prior and pending proceedings and requested that the order granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of appellee be vacated and that they be given leave to reply to the affirmative defenses.
On June 28, 1985, the circuit court made the following docket entry:
On July 24, 1985, 26 days after the June 28 docket entry but over two months after the May 2 docket entry, the appellants filed a notice of appeal from "the judgment in this case in favor of [the appellee] entered on May 2, 1985, granting [the appellee's] Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings." The appellate court majority dismissed appellants' appeal as untimely, holding that the notice of appeal had not been filed within 30 days of the May 2 order, as required under Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) (107 Ill.2d R. 303(a)(1)). In so holding, the appellate court rejected appellants' contention that the filing of their May 24 motion to reconsider, 22 days after the May 2 order, tolled the time to file a notice of appeal.
Thus we are confronted on this appeal with a single issue: whether a timely motion to reconsider a piecemeal judgment which the trial court has found to be appealable and enforceable will toll the period for filing a timely notice of appeal from that judgment. The resolution of this issue turns upon analysis of three pertinent provisions: Supreme Court Rules 303(a)(1) (107 Ill.2d R. 303(a)(1)) and 304(a) (107 Ill.2d R. 304(a)), and section 2-1203 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 110, par. 2-1203).
Rule 303, which is entitled "Appeals from Final Judgments of the Circuit Court of Civil Cases," provides, in pertinent part that "the notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from, or, if a timely post-trial motion directed against the judgment is filed, * * * within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending post-trial motion." (107 Ill.2d R. 303(a)(1).) Rule 303 is consistent with section 2-1203(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that "[i]n all cases tried without a jury, any party may, within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or within any further time the court may allow within the 30 days or any extensions thereof, file a motion for a rehearing, or a retrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate the judgment or for other relief." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 110, par. 2-1203(a).) Section 2-1203(b) of the Code further provides that "a motion filed in apt time stays enforcement of the judgment." (...
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