Elgin Ry Co v. Burley, No. 160

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtRUTLEDGE
Citation89 L.Ed. 1886,325 U.S. 711,65 S.Ct. 1282
PartiesELGIN, J. & E. RY. CO. v. BURLEY et al
Docket NumberNo. 160
Decision Date11 June 1945

325 U.S. 711
65 S.Ct. 1282
89 L.Ed. 1886
ELGIN, J. & E. RY. CO.

v.

BURLEY et al.

No. 160.
Argued Nov. 15, 1944.
Decided June 11, 1945.
Rehearing Granted Oct. 15, 1945.

See 66 S.Ct. 86.

Mr. Paul R. Conaghan, of Chicago, Ill., for petitioner.

Mr. John H. Gately, of Chicago, Ill., for respondents.

Page 712

Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE delivered the opinion of the Court.

This cause, arising upon an amended complaint,1 brings for decision novel and important questions concerning the authority of a collective bargaining representative, affecting the operation of the Railway Labor Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1185, 45 U.S.C. § 151 ff, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. The ultimate issues are whether such an agent has authority, by virtue of the Act or otherwise, either to compromise and settle accrued monetary claims of ten employees or to submit them for determination by the National Railroad Adjustment Board to the exclusion of their right, after the settlement and after the Board's adverse decision, to assert them in a suit brought for that purpose. The claims are for 'penalty damages' for alleged violation of the starting time provisions of a collective agreement, varying from $3,500 to $14,000, and in the aggregate amounting to $65,274.00.2

The District ourt rendered summary judgment for the carrier, holding that the Board's award was a final adjudication of the claims, within the union's power to seek and the Board's to make, precluding judicial review.3 The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, 7 Cir., 140 F.2d 488, 490, holding that the record presented a question of fact

Page 713

whether the union had been authorized by respondents 'to negotiate, compromise, and settle' the claims. We granted certiorari, 323 U.S. 690, 65 S.Ct. 45, in order to resolve the important questions affecting application and operation of the Act.

A statement of the more important facts will put the issues in sharper perspective. The controversy relates to operations in petitioner's so-called 'Whiting Yard.' Prior to July 24, 1934, respondents, or some of them, were employed by the Standard Oil Company to do private intraplant switching in its Whiting, Indiana, plant. On that date this work was taken over by petitioner. Until then Standard Oil's switching crews began work each day at hours fixed in advance by the management, which varied as plant operations required.

Prior to 1934 petitioner's crews at all yards in Indiana and Illinois began work daily in accordance with starting time provisions contained in Article 6 of a collective agreement made in 1927 between petitioner and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, governing rules, working conditions and rates of pay of yardmen.

Upon transfer of the Whiting yard switching to petitioner, respondents theretofore employed by Standard Oil became employees of petitioner and members of the Brotherhood. On July 24, 1934, company officials conferred with representatives of the engineers, the firemen and the yardmen concerning terms of employment. The Brotherhood acted for the yardmen. Apparently agreement was reached on all matters except starting time but, as to that, versions of what transpired differ. Respondents and the Brotherhood have maintained that the 1927 agreement, including Article 6, became applicable to them upon the transfer. They say, however, that they assented to a suspension of Article 6 for thirty days from July 27, 1934, to enable the company to work out adjustment to the plant's operations, and accordingly it governed their relation with petitioner from August 26, 1934.

Page 714

The company has insisted that Article 6 did not become applicable to respondents upon the transfer and that it made no agreement to apply Article 6, other than to follow it as closely as possible, prior to October 31, 1938, when it and the Brotherhood eventually agreed to place Whiting yard crews on fixed starting time under circumstances to be noted.

Whichever version is true, a long controversy resulted. The carrier continued to follow the former practice, although departures from the schedule were reduced, as it claims, in conformity with the oral undertaking to observe it as far as possible. The work went on without interruption. But numerous complaints on account of departures were made through local officers of the Brotherhood. Time slips were filed by the employees. Frequent negotiations took place. None however resulted in a settlement prior to October 31, 1938.

In this state of affairs, respondents authorized the Brotherhood to file complaint with the National Railroad Adjustment Board for violation of Article 6. This was done on November 23, 1936. The 'statement of claim' was signed and filed by Williams, chairman of the general grievance committee. It asserted that the carrier, having 'placed the employees under the agreement of the yardmen,' had 'failed to put into effect the starting time provisions' o Article 6, and denied that violation was justified either because the carrier had agreed with the Engineers to follow the formerly prevailing practice or by the carrier's claim that the work could be done in no other way. The submission was intended to secure compliance. There was no prayer for money damages. Petitioner maintained that Article 6 was not applicable.

The Board, following its customary procedure,4 docketed the claim as No. 3537, notified the carrier and the

Page 715

union that the case, with many others docketed at the same time, was 'assumed to be complete,' and forwarded to each copies of the other's submissions. The record does not disclose what followed until nearly two years later.

On October 31, 1938, Williams and Johnson, secretary of the Brotherhood, two of the grievance committee's three members, accepted an offer made by petitioner's president, Rogers, to settle the claim. The settlement took the form of a proposal, made in a letter by Rogers to Williams, to settle some 61 different claims, including 'Labor Board Docket No. 3537—Starting time of switch engines in Whiting S. O. Yard.' Williams and Johnson endorsed acceptance for the Brotherhood and the yardmen on the letter. Because of its importance, pertinent portions are set forth in the margin.5 On the day the settlement was concluded

Page 716

Rogers and Williams advised the Board of it by letter and jointly requested that the case be withdrawn from the docket, which accordingly was done.

Notwithstanding the settlement, a further dispute arose. In March, 1939, the Brotherhood, through Williams, requested the carrier to furnish a complete list of crews in the Whiting yard started at times other than those fixed by Article 6 from August 27, 1934, to November 15, 1938, when the settlement became effective. The company declined to furnish the list, stating it was at a loss to understand the reason for the request in view of the settlement.

The upshot of the dispute was the filing of another claim with the Board, Docket No. 7324, on May 18, 1939, by Williams, acting for the Brotherhood. This submission

Page 717

was 'for one day's pay at time and one-half for each foreman and each helper for each day they were required to work in yard service in the Whiting (Standard Oil Company) Yard, in violation of the fixed starting time provided for in Article No. 6 of the Yardmen's Agreement * * * effective January 1, 1927, and applicable to Whiting (Standard Oil Company) Yardmen, July 27, 1934, from dates of August 27, 1934, until November 14, 1938, inclusive.'

The submission not only maintained the applicability of Article 6 and accrual of the individual claims asserted. It also maintained that the settlement of October 31, 1938, was effective only to fix the starting time for the future and had no effect to waive or determine individual claims for penalty damages accrued prior to the settlement.6

The carrier's submission reiterated its position in Case No. 3537. It also relied upon the settlement as precluding later assertion of any claim, individual or collective, based upon occurrences prior to the date of the settlement.

The matter went to decision by the Board. Under the procedure prescribed in case of deadlock, cf. § 3, First (l),

Page 718

a referee was called in. The award was made by the First Division on September 6, 1940. It sustained the Board's jurisdiction,7 found that 'the parties to said dispute were given due notice of hearing thereon,' and held that 'the evidence shows that the parties to the agreement disposed of the claim here made by the letter of carrier dated October 28, 1938, accepted by employees October 31, 1938.' Accordingly the claim was 'denied per findings.'

Thereafter, on November 19, 1940, the present suit was instituted. As has been not d, the case comes here after a summary judgment rendered on the carrier's motion, supported by the affidavit of its vice president. This in effect set up the compromise agreement and the award in Case No. 7324 as bases for the judgment sought.

The range and precise nature of the issues may be summarized best perhaps as they were shaped upon respondents' opposition to the carrier's motion. They denied that either Williams or the union had authority to release their individual claims or to submit them for decision by the Board. They relied upon provisions of the Brotherhood's constitution and rules,8 of which the carrier was alleged to have knowledge, as forbidding union officials to release individual claims or to submit them to the Board 'without specific authority to do so granted by the individual members themselves'; and denied that such authority in either respect had been given.

The validity and the conclusive effect of the award were challenged also upon other grounds, among them that

Page 719

respondents individually received no notice of the submission or the hearing until after the award was made; that since the award denied a claim for money damages, it was within the exception of Section...

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820 practice notes
  • International Association of Machinists v. Street, No. 4
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 19, 1961
    ...and negotiation between the carriers on the one hand and the employees through their unions on the other.' Elgin, J. & E.R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 752—753, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 1303, 89 L.Ed. 1886 (dissenting opinion). Performance of these functions entails the expenditure of considerable f......
  • Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes, No. 86-39
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • April 28, 1987
    ...agreements or efforts to secure them" is a "major dispute" in the parlance of railway labor law, Elgin, J. & E.R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 1289, 89 L.Ed. 1886 (1945), and is governed by the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. Fo......
  • TEXAS INTERN. AIRLINES v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Civ. A. No. H-80-985.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Southern District of Texas
    • June 29, 1981
    ...over proposals to change such agreements as to rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of employees. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-725, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 1289, 89 L.Ed.2d 1886 4. In this action, the plaintiff and defendants are entangled in a "major" dispute arising out......
  • Atlas Air, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, August Term 2018
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • November 21, 2019
    ...the "formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them." CSX Transp ., 879 F.2d at 995 (quoting Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley , 325 U.S. 711, 723, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 89 L.Ed. 1886 (1945) ). These types of disputes arise "where there is no such agreement or where it is sought to change......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
820 cases
  • International Association of Machinists v. Street, No. 4
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 19, 1961
    ...and negotiation between the carriers on the one hand and the employees through their unions on the other.' Elgin, J. & E.R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 752—753, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 1303, 89 L.Ed. 1886 (dissenting opinion). Performance of these functions entails the expenditure of considerable f......
  • Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes, No. 86-39
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • April 28, 1987
    ...agreements or efforts to secure them" is a "major dispute" in the parlance of railway labor law, Elgin, J. & E.R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 1289, 89 L.Ed. 1886 (1945), and is governed by the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. Fo......
  • TEXAS INTERN. AIRLINES v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Civ. A. No. H-80-985.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Southern District of Texas
    • June 29, 1981
    ...over proposals to change such agreements as to rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of employees. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-725, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 1289, 89 L.Ed.2d 1886 4. In this action, the plaintiff and defendants are entangled in a "major" dispute arising out......
  • Atlas Air, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, August Term 2018
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • November 21, 2019
    ...the "formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them." CSX Transp ., 879 F.2d at 995 (quoting Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley , 325 U.S. 711, 723, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 89 L.Ed. 1886 (1945) ). These types of disputes arise "where there is no such agreement or where it is sought to change......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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