Eliopulos v. City of Palmdale, B198084 (Cal. App. 3/25/2008)

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Turner
• Decision Date: 25 March 2008
• Docket Number: B198084
• Citation: Eliopulos v. City of Palmdale, B198084 (Cal. App. 3/25/2008) (Cal. App. 2008)
• Parties: ANDREW J. ELIOPULOS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE CITY OF PALMDALE et al., Defendants and Respondents.

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ANDREW J. ELIOPULOS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE CITY OF PALMDALE et al., Defendants and Respondents.

B198084

Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Five

March 25, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. BS085069, Victor H. Person, Judge. Affirmed.

Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, Scott A. Sommer, Todd W. Smith and Amy E. Gaylord for Plaintiff and Appellant.

William Matthew Ditzhazy, City Attorney (Palmdale); Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver & Wilson, Deborah J. Fox, Philip A. Seymour and Dawn A. McIntosh for Defendants and Respondents.

TURNER, P. J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Andrew J. Eliopulos, appeals from an order awarding $101,600 in attorney's fees to defendants, the City of Palmdale (the city) and the City Council of the City of Palmdale (city council). We affirm the order.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Acquisition Of The Property

On August 16, 1991, Rancho Vista Development Company (the developer) entered into a development agreement with the city. The developer planned to develop approximately 1,300 acres for residential, commercial, and golf course uses consistent with the Rancho Vista Specific Plan. The Rancho Vista Specific Plan set forth the applicable zoning. The development agreement outlined the developer's responsibilities. The development agreement ran with the land and was binding on successors and assigns. Section 23 of the development agreement stated, "This Agreement shall run with the land and shall inure to the benefit of, and shall be binding upon, all successors and assigns of the Developer and the City." Section 19 of the development agreement provided for attorney fees in the case of suit, "In any action brought for breach of this Agreement or to enforce the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its costs and reasonable attorney's fees." In 2001, J.P. Eliopulos Enterprises, Inc. (the corporation) acquired a six-acre portion of the Rancho Vista property. Plaintiff is the president of the corporation. Plaintiff, acting on the corporation's behalf, applied to develop a 90-unit apartment complex on the site. The city planning commission approved the plan. But on May 14, 2003, the city council reversed that decision. This action followed.

B. The Initial Complaint and the Mandate Petition

On August 12, 2003, plaintiff filed his initial complaint and mandate petition. The complaint contained ten causes of action for: administrative and traditional mandate; breach of the development agreement; specific performance; deprivation of First Amendment, substantive due process, and equal protection rights in violation of the state and federal Constitutions and title 42 United States Code section 1983 (section 1983); inverse condemnation; declaratory relief; and intentional prospective economic relations interference. Plaintiff alleged generally: he had a vested right to develop the apartment complex at the densities specified in the development agreement and the Rancho Vista Specific Plan; in denying approval of the project, defendants ignored the development agreement, interfered with plaintiff's vested rights thereunder, and breached their contractual obligations; defendants' findings were not based on substantial evidence; defendants violated provisions of the Government Code with respect to allowable densities, the city's general plan housing element, and regional housing needs; the project was deemed approved pursuant to the Permit Streamlining Act; and defendants discriminated against plaintiff and violated his constitutional and civil rights when they denied the project and took his property without just compensation.

In his first cause of action, plaintiff sought a writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiff alleged: the city council's failure to approve the project was arbitrary and capricious; the city planning director failed to review the project as required under the city's municipal code; and the project was not disapproved within 60 days after the planning commission action as mandated by the Government Code. In addition, plaintiff alleged the following city council findings were deficient because they were not supported by substantial evidence or for other reasons: the site was too small; the project would have substantial adverse effects on adjoining properties; the noise and traffic hazards could not be mitigated; the site was inappropriately zoned for multi-family uses; the project site was not adequate in size or shape; the project had inadequate access; and adjoining property owners had been misled by a sign on the property stating that a "senior-assisted living facility" would be built. Plaintiff also alleged the following California Environmental Quality Act findings were not supported by substantial evidence: line of sight constraints would worsen traffic safety; the noise study was inadequate; the project would have significant adverse impacts on police services; and there was no feasible way to satisfactorily mitigate or avoid the project's adverse impacts. Finally, plaintiff alleged the city failed to make statutorily mandated findings as to adverse public impacts.

The second cause of action of the initial complaint was for traditional mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. According to the second cause of action: the city was obligated to maintain an adequate inventory of housing to meet regional needs; in refusing to approve the project, the city council failed to make findings mandated by the Government Code; the city council violated the city's housing element by failing to approve the project; and the city had failed to approve or disapprove the project within 60 days after the planning commission certified the mitigated negative declaration thereby violating the Government Code. On December 22, 2003, defendants demurred to plaintiff's third through tenth (non-mandate) causes of action. The hearing on the demurrer was delayed pending a decision on plaintiff's writ based causes of action.

Plaintiff filed a brief in support of his mandate claim. Plaintiff sought to compel defendants to set aside the project denial and reinstate the planning commission's approval. Plaintiff asserted: he had a vested right under the development agreement to build an apartment complex on his land; but the neighbors, who owned single-family homes, did not want apartments there; the neighbors convinced the city council to deny the project approval request; the city council found the zoning was inappropriate; and it denied the project approval request on the pretext, unsupported by the evidence, that it violated various requirements as to noise effect, traffic, zoning, size and shape, open space, setbacks, and crime, none of which could be mitigated. In their opposition, defendants argued plaintiff's planning problems grew out of his predecessor's voluntary actions—the developer had obtained city approval for a senior assisted living residential facility on the property plaintiff now sought to develop. Also, the adjacent property had been down-zoned to single family residences at the developer's request. Defendants contended: plaintiff had no vested right to approval of any particular site plan; substantial evidence supported the city council's findings; and the city council was not required to make additional special findings under the Government Code.

On July 19, 2004, plaintiff's writ petition was denied. Retired Judge Robert H. O'Brien found: "The Court finds that this is a [Code of Civil Procedure section] 1094.5 petition in which [plaintiff] asserts prejudicial abuse of discretion; to wit, [defendants'] decision is not supported by the findings, nor are the findings supported by evidence. [¶] [Plaintiff] argues that he has a fundamental vested right emanating from the Development Agreement; thus, the court is to review [defendants'] decision by the independent judgment test. [¶] The court finds that [plaintiff] does not have a `fundamental vested right' to have the application approved as submitted. Accordingly, the standard of review is `substantial evidence.' [¶] The court finds that there is substantial evidence to support [defendants'] findings and substantial evidence to support the findings. [Sic.] Therefore the petition is denied." Plaintiff appealed from the order denying his writ petition, but later abandoned that appeal. (Eliopulos v. City of Palmdale (Sept. 29, 2004, B178204) [abandoned Oct. 8, 2004].)

B. The First Amended Complaint

Rather than oppose defendants' demurrer to his initial complaint, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint and writ petition on November 12, 2004. The first amended complaint asserted six causes of action for: administrative and traditional mandate; breach of the development agreement; denial of substantive due process and equal protection rights in violation of the state and federal Constitutions and section 1983; and inverse condemnation. Plaintiff alleged generally he had a vested right pursuant to the development agreement to develop his property at or below the maximum density set forth in that contract. Further, he alleged the city council had refused to honor the development agreement because, "[A] small, but highly-determined and very aggressive group of nearby homeowners . . . [had] waged an ugly campaign of fear-mongering and class prejudice (apartments will bring in a `criminal element') . . . ."

The first cause of action sought a writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. The second cause of action was for traditional mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. The allegations paralleled those in the initial complaint, as to which the trial court had already ruled. The third cause of action sought damages for contract breach. Plaintiff alleged defendants had...