Elizabeth Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Howell

• Decision Date: 17 June 1959
• Docket Number: No. A--129,A--129
• Citation: 30 N.J. 190,152 A.2d 359
• Parties: ELIZABETH FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION et al., and City Federal Savings and Loan Association, Appellant, v. Charles R. HOWELL, Commissioner, etc., et al., Respondents.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 190

30 N.J. 190

152 A.2d 359

ELIZABETH FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION et al., and City Federal Savings and Loan Association, Appellant, v. Charles R. HOWELL, Commissioner, etc., et al., Respondents.

No. A--129.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued June 1, 1959.

Decided June 17, 1959.

Fred G. Stickel, Jr., Newark, and William B. Kaufman, Elizabeth, for appellant (Stickel & Stickel, Newark, attorneys; Fred G. Stickel, Jr., Newark, of counsel; William B. Kaufman, Elizabeth, on the brief).

David Landau, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent Charles R. Howell (David D. Furman, Atty. Gen., attorney; David Landau, Newark, of counsel).

Richard V. Stein, Elizabeth, for respondent Colonial Savings & Loan Ass'n (Stein, Stein & Hughes, Elizabeth, attorneys; Richard V. Stein, Elizabeth, of counsel).

John J. Clancy, Newark, for New Jersey Savings & Loan League, amicus curiae (Clancy & Hayden, Newark, attorneys; John J. Clancy, Newark, of counsel).

The opinion was delivered

PER CURIAM.

This matter first came before us in Elizabeth Federal S. & L. Ass'n v. Howell, 24 N.J. 488, 132 A.2d 779 (1957). We there held that although the appellants were not parties to the application to establish a branch office under N.J.S.A. 17:12A--21, subd. B, yet they had sufficient status to attack the Commissioner's grant of approval on the ground that it 'exceeded his power or constituted an arbitrary exercise of it? (24 N.J., at page 505, 132 A.2d at page 789). Appellants having misconceived their status and the nature of their burden, we concluded they should be permitted to make a further record upon the approach just stated. To that end we remanded the matter to the Commissioner 'for completion of the record and such further findings and determination as the Commissioner may make.' We retained jurisdiction, and by an order later made upon motion we directed City Federal Savings and Loan Association (the other appellants at some point abandoned the cause) to 'proceed under the rules to present to the Court for determination the issues not concluded by the last opinion of the Court.'

Upon the remand, the Commissioner made available to appellants all of the data upon which he had acted. There were further hearings consuming some 11 days. Upon conclusion of the hearings, the Commissioner adhered to his action in a comprehensive statement of his findings and reasons.

As we understand the position of the City Federal, it does not seriously contend the Commissioner's exercise of authority was arbitrary if the standard he used was legally correct. In any event, if such is the purport of the attack, we find no basis for it. Rather the claim advanced is that there was a lack of statutory authority upon the interpretation of the act which City Federal urges. It would interpret section 21, subd. B, to empower the Commissioner to approve the maintenance of the office of the acquired association as a branch office only if a denial would 'denude' the area of savings and loan facilities, and to approve a substitute office only if a 'vacuum' of such facilities exists at the new location. The statute does not so provide, and we see no ground upon which the suggested restriction could be read into it. Nor does the record support the claim that the Commissioner has heretofore so construed the section.

The remaining question is whether section 21, subd. B offends due process of law because of alleged inadequacy of standards. That contention should have been urged upon the initial review, but nonetheless we will accept it. Section 21, subd. B reads:

'Notwithstanding any of the other provisions or limitations of this section, any association into which another association has been merged or which has acquired, by purchase, reorganization, or in any other manner, all or a substantial portion of the assets of another association, may, with the permission of the commissioner, and under such terms and conditions as he may prescribe, maintain the office previously maintained by such other association, or a suitable substitute therefor, as a branch office; Provided,...