Elizabeth v. State

Citation27 Tex. 329
PartiesELIZABETH, A SLAVE, v. THE STATE.
Decision Date01 January 1863
CourtSupreme Court of Texas
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Quære. Whether the common law rule with reference to the admission in evidence of confessions elicited by promises of threats, when such confessions are corroborated by facts discovered by means of the confessions themselves, is wholly abrogated in prosecutions against slaves by art. 663 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?

All material facts are admissible in evidence, whatever may have been the source from which emanated the information leading to the discovery.

The accused, who was a slave indicted for the murder of a child, confessed, after the infliction of chastisement, that she knew where the deceased was, and thereupon conducted the witnesses to a pool of water, into which she walked, and thence brought out the body of the deceased. Held, that, independent of the confession, the acts of the accused in going to the pool of water and bringing from it the body, were admissible in evidence against her.

Even if her confession, to the effect that she knew where the body of the deceased was, was inadmissible, yet as it gave no legal significance to her acts, and was allowed to go to the jury without objection, the conviction could not be disturbed on account of its inadmissibility.

But, although the evidence above indicated demonstrated that the accused was cognizant of the murder, yet it did not prove that she committed the homicide, or was an accomplice therein. It was circumstantial evidence tending to prove her guilty of the murder, but was not conclusive enough to exclude any other reasonable hypothesis than her guilt.

Such evidence was as consistent with the assumption that the accused was only an accessory, as that she was guilty of any higher grade of offense; and there being no other evidence implicating her, the verdict of guilty on an indictment charging her as a principal is not sustained by the evidence; and it was error, therefore, to overrule her motion for a new trial.

To support a verdict of guilty upon circumstantial evidence alone, it is essential that no other conclusion than that of guilt be fairly and reasonably deducible from the evidence.

In the absence of proof that the accused and the deceased had been together within a reasonable time before the homicide, and in default of other proof pointing to the accused as the guilty party, the evidence above indicated did not raise the presumption that she was guilty as principal or accomplice, so as to make it incumbent on her to repel it.

APPEAL from Robertson. Tried below before the Hon. James C. Walker.

At the fall term, 1863, of the district court of Robertson county, an indictment was returned against Ned and the appellant, both slaves, for the murder of Daniel Threatt, male child of James Threatt. Ned was charged in the indictment with the actual commission of the offense, and the appellant as being present, aiding, abetting, and counseling him therein. The district attorney having suggested the death of Ned, the indictment abated as to him, and the appellant was placed upon her trial.

From the evidence it appeared that the deceased, who was a child about three years of age, was missed from his home on the evening of the 29th of June, 1863, occasioning great anxiety and distress to his family. Neighbors being sent for, they arrested the two negroes, Ned and Elizabeth, who belonged to Mr. Threatt, who inflicted punishment upon them with a rope, for the purpose of obtaining a disclosure of the fate of the child. Both before and for a time after their punishment, the girl Elizabeth persistently denied any knowledge upon the subject. But upon Ned's stating that Elizabeth had put the child in the well, she tapped one of the witnesses upon the shoulder and said, he (meaning Ned) tells a lie; I can show you the child.” Witness replied that that was what they wanted, and Elizabeth then walked up a ravine which was close to Mr. Threatt's house. Passing one hole of water, she said, “it is not in here,” and walked on to another one close by, which was larger and deeper than the first, and there said, “it is in here;” and thereupon she walked into the water and brought out the child. She walked straight to the spot in the water where she picked the child up. The child was greatly bruised, and had a hurt on the neck and side of the head, from which the witnesses present thought it might have been killed before having been thrown into the water; but its limbs were stretched out as though it had struggled after being thrown in. The boy Ned had belonged to Mr. Threatt only some two or three weeks; the girl...

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3 cases
  • Geesa v. State, 290-90
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • November 6, 1991
    ...analytical construct", we revisit its history and source. 1 I. History of the "Analytical Construct" At least as early as Elizabeth v. State, 27 Tex. 329 (1863), juries in Texas courts have been instructed on the law of circumstantial evidence. 2 However, that instruction was repudiated in ......
  • Reyes v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • October 30, 1996
    ...analytical construct and, in so doing, rejected more than one hundred years of established precedent. See, Elizabeth v. State, 27 Tex. 329 (1863). 6 However, the abrogation of the analytical construct required the adoption of an instruction on reasonable On direct appeal, appellant contende......
  • Housewright v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • November 23, 1949
    ...the latter are not, unless coming strictly within the letter of the statute. This distinction was clearly drawn in the case of Elizabeth v. State, 27 Tex. 329, 'wherein it was held that, independent of the confession, the acts of the accused in going to the pool of water and bringing from i......

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