Elizabeth v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals Inc.

Citation6 A.3d 502
PartiesElizabeth and Joe COLEMAN, w/h, Appellant v. WYETH PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., et al., Appellee. Patricia Medwid and Richard Medwid, Appellant v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., Appellee. Mary Weinberger, Appellant v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., Appellee. Judy A. Reed and Gerald W. Reed, h/w, Appellant v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., Appellee. Kathleen Taw Stephenson and Michael R. Taw, Appellant v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., Appellee. Diane Morales, Appellant v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., Appellee. Vicki Lenzi and Ronald J. Lenzi, Appellant v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., Appellee. Zanda Schirn and Robert W. Schirn, h/w, Appellant v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., Appellee. Peggy Fleming-Crain, Appellant v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., Appellee. Nancy and Richard Honaker, h/w, Appellant v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., Appellee. Virginia Hansen, Appellant v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., Appellee. Hazel Blaylock, Appellant v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., Appellee. Graciana Manalo and Felipe Manalo, Appellant v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., Appellee. Carol J. Hess, Appellant v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., Appellee.
Decision Date04 November 2010
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania

Howard J. Bashman, Willow Grove, for appellants.

Michael T. Scott and Henry F. Reichner, Philadelphia, for appellee.

BEFORE: STEVENS, BOWES, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.

OPINION BY BOWES, J.:

Elizabeth Coleman and her husband, Patricia Medwid and her husband, Mary Weinberger, Judy A. Reed and her husband, Kathleen Taw Stephenson and her husband, Diane Morales, Vicki Lenzi and her husband, Zanda Schirn and her husband, Peggy Fleming-Crain, Nancy Honaker and her husband, Virginia Hansen, Hazel Blaylock, Graciana Manalo and her husband, and Carol J. Hess (collectively referred to as Appellants1 herein) appeal from the various orders granting summary judgment in favor of Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the other Wyeth parties, and in some cases Pharmacia & Upjohn (hereinafter collectively referred to as Appellees).2 The appeals have been consolidated for purposes of our review. After careful consideration, we reverse the trial court's orders granting summary judgment.

Overview

Appellants are fourteen post-menopausal women who were diagnosed with breast cancer between 1998 and 2002. Prior to their diagnoses, Appellants' physicians prescribed hormone replacement therapy ("HRT" or "HT"), comprising estrogen and progestin in combination, to relieve symptoms associated with menopause such as hot flashes, irritability, and vaginal atrophy. Upjohn manufactured and distributed Provera, a synthetic progestin, until 1995 when it merged with Pharmacia to form the Pharmacia & Upjohn entities. Premarin, a conjugated estrogen drug, and Prempro, a combination of Premarin and a progestin that is the chemical equivalent of Provera, were manufactured and distributed by Wyeth. The combination of estrogen and progestin was used by all Appellants because they had intact uteri and estrogen alone was found to cause endometrial cancer. These appeals arise from Appellants' claims that the pharmaceutical companies failed to adequately warn their physicians that HRT therapy caused or increased the risk of breast cancer.

Appellants Elizabeth and Joe Coleman commenced their lawsuit against Appellees on June 28, 2004, alleging negligent failure to warn, fraud, breach of express warranty, loss of consortium, and a violation of corporate responsibilities. 3 On September 24, 2007, after completion of some discovery, Appellees filed motions for summary judgment asserting that the statute of limitations on the claims began to run on October 20, 2000, when Ms. Coleman was diagnosed with breast cancer. Appellees argued that Ms. Coleman's lawsuit was barred by Pennsylvania's two-year statuteof limitations set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2). That statute provides:

The following actions and proceedings must be commenced within two years:
(1) An action for assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution or malicious abuse of process.
(2) An action to recover damages for injuries to the person or for the death of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another.
(3) An action for taking, detaining or injuring personal property, including actions for specific recovery thereof.
(4) An action for waste or trespass of real property.
(5) An action upon a statute for a civil penalty or forfeiture.
(6) An action against any officer of any government unit for the nonpayment of money or the nondelivery of property collected upon on execution or otherwise in his possession.
(7) Any other action or proceeding to recover damages for injury to person or property which is founded on negligent, intentional, or otherwise tortious conduct or any other action or proceeding sounding in trespass, including deceit or fraud, except an action or proceeding subject to another limitation specified in this subchapter.
(8) An action to recover damages for injury to a person or for the death of a person caused by exposure to asbestos shall be commenced within two years from the date on which the person is informed by a licensed physician that the person has been injured by such exposure or upon the date on which the person knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that the person had an injury which was caused by such exposure, whichever date occurs first.

42 Pa.C.S. § 5524.

Ms. Coleman countered that the facts concerning the cause of her cancer were not known or knowable prior to the publication of the Women's Health Initiative ("WHI") study on July 9, 2002, and that the discovery rule operated to toll the limitations period until that time. The National Institutes of Health ("NIH") commissioned the WHI study to examine whether HRT decreased the risk of cardiovascular disease in post-menopausal women. The study was halted prematurely because an unusually high number of women who were taking HRT medications for purposes of the study developed breast cancer. The WHI study was the first large randomized study establishing a link between HRT medications and breast cancer. Consequently, its report was widely publicized. The trial court rejected Ms. Coleman's position and granted summary judgment for Appellees, holding that the discovery rule was inapplicable and that the two-year statute of limitations barred her claim. Coleman Opinion, 9/24/07, at 25.

The Coleman opinion and reasoning was subsequently adopted by the trial court in each of the remaining thirteen cases consolidated herein. Moreover, commencing with Appellant Medwid, the trial court held that the statute of limitations barred the action on an additional basis: that a response to Fact Sheet Question XI constituted a judicial admission, conclusively establishing that Ms. Medwid knew by June 1998 that there was a correlation between her breast cancer and her use of HRT drugs.4 The same finding was subsequentlymade in the Weinberger, Reed, Stephenson, Morales, Lenzi, Schirn, Fleming-Crain, Honaker, Hansen, Blaylock, and Manalo cases. In Hess, there was no Fact Sheet response that could be construed as a judicial admission because Ms. Hess indicated that she did not recall what she was told.

While substantial discovery was completed in Coleman prior to the entry of summary judgment, virtually no discovery had been undertaken in the remaining cases, other than the completion of Fact Sheets. As the Coleman opinion served as the template for the remaining cases, we focus initially on the facts therein and then turn our attention to issues common to all. To the extent that the remaining cases present unique facts or legal issues, we address them individually.

Questions Presented on Appeal

The following issues have been raised for our review: 5

1. Did the trial court err in holding that whether to apply the discovery rule to postpone the accrual of the statute of limitations applicable to plaintiffs' claims in these 14 cases did not present a question of fact for the jury to decide-notwithstanding Pennsylvania's strong preference for jury resolution of the discovery rules application; the absence of any developed factual record in 13 of these 14 cases; and the existence of genuine issues of material fact governing the discovery rule's application in all 14 cases?
2. Did the trial court err in holding on summary judgment that the statute of limitations applicable to plaintiffs' claims began to run-and in certain of these cases had in fact expired-before generally accepted scientific proof became available which was necessary to establish that ingesting defendants' combination hormone therapy drugs caused breast cancer? 6

Appellants' Consolidated Brief at 4.

In their first issue, Appellants contend that the trial court erred and abused its discretion in granting summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations because there were genuine issues of fact as to when they should have realized the causal connection between HRT and their breast cancer. In asserting such error, they contend that the trial court failed to view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Appellants herein, and to draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. Appellants argue that their actions were not time-barred for two reasons: 1) the discovery rule tolled the limitations period until July 9, 2002, the date that they had reason to believe there was a causal connection between HRT medications and breast cancer, and 2) their causes of action did not accrue until July 9, 2002, because, until then, they could not maintain an action to a successful conclusion.

Our standard of review on an appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment is well-settled:

A reviewing court may disturb the order of the trial court only where it is established that the court committed an
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