Ellard v. State
Decision Date | 26 June 1984 |
Docket Number | 3 Div. 927 |
Citation | 474 So.2d 743 |
Parties | Richard Mark ELLARD v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Ira A. Burnim and Ralph I. Knowles of Drake, Knowles & Pierce, Tuscaloosa, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Joseph G.L. Marston III, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant, Richard Mark Ellard, was paroled to the prison authorities of the State of Georgia by the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles (hereinafter referred to as the "Board") to continue serving a Georgia prison sentence. The Board revoked the parole on the grounds that its action in granting it initially violated statutory requirements which were mandatory, rendering its action null and void. Ellard unsuccessfully petitioned the Circuit Court of Montgomery County to declare the action of the Board, in revoking the parole, illegal and unconstitutional, and he now appeals to this court.
The report of investigation in the record shows that on September 4, 1971, Richard Mark Ellard abducted Charlotte Parks and Nancy Conn from a parking lot in Birmingham and forced them to accompany him to a remote area in Blount County, Alabama, where he murdered Charlotte Parks by stabbing her repeatedly with a knife. He beat Nancy Conn, held her head under water in an effort to drown her, and threw her off of a large embankment, leaving her for dead. She survived. In June 1971, prior to the incident involving Charlotte Parks and Nancy Conn, Richard Mark Ellard had abducted Sandra Dee Swisher, a student at the University of Alabama in Birmingham, from the campus of the University and forced her to accompany him to Douglas County, Georgia, where he murdered her by stabbing her with a knife or sharp instrument. There was evidence of rape and mutilation.
On May 9, 1972, Ellard pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court of Blount County to the offense of murder in the first degree in the case involving Charlotte Parks and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He pleaded guilty on the same date to the offense of assault with intent to murder Nancy Conn and was sentenced to 20 years in the penitentiary. It was ordered that the two sentences run concurrently.
On March 26, 1976, Ellard pleaded guilty in the Superior Court of Douglas County, Georgia, to the murder of Sandra Dee Swisher and was sentenced to life imprisonment. It was ordered that the Georgia sentence run concurrently with the Alabama sentences.
After serving the equivalent of ten years in the Alabama prison system, he became eligible for parole consideration in 1980 and was evaluated for that purpose by the Board.
Following a parole hearing in early 1981, and with the consent of two of the three members of the Board, a certificate of parole was issued to Ellard on March 2, 1981. In compliance with a Georgia detainer, Ellard was then transferred to the Georgia penal system, where he was to complete the life sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Douglas County, Georgia. The evaluation report contained in the Board's file indicated that Ellard would become eligible for parole consideration in Georgia in May of 1981.
The certificate of parole contained certain conditions, among which was number eight, which is as follows: "I hereby waive all extradition rights and process and agree to return when said Board directs at any time before expiration of my maximum sentence."
In April 1981, the Board served Ellard with a notice of violation of condition eight of the certificate of parole. The notice is quoted as follows:
The governors of Alabama and Georgia entered into an agreement whereby Ellard was returned to Alabama to attend hearings in reference to the possible revocation of his parole.
A preliminary hearing was held before a hearing officer on May 11, 1982, for the purpose of determining whether there was probable cause for the revocation of the parole. On May 14, 1982, the hearing officer found that sufficient probable cause did exist, and referred the case to the Board for further consideration.
An evidentiary hearing was held before the Board July 7, 1982, and on July 15, 1982, the Board ordered the revocation of the certificate of parole, citing the Attorney General's Opinion of April 17, 1981, and new evidence. Ellard was returned to the Georgia penal system and the Board lodged a detainer with the Georgia authorities requesting that upon his release in Georgia he be returned to the Alabama prison system.
On August 30, 1982, Ellard filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, alleging that the actions of the Board in revoking his parole and filing the detainer with the Georgia penal authorities were illegal. The State of Alabama, the Board of Pardons and Paroles, individual members of the Board, and the Commissioner of the State Department of Corrections of the State of Alabama were made parties respondent to his petition.
On September 8, 1982, the above named respondents moved to dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that it was not an appropriate remedy, since none of the respondents had custody of Ellard, and that Ellard was imprisoned in the State of Georgia. Ellard amended his petition for writ of habeas corpus to ask in the alternative for a common law writ of certiorari to review the legality of the actions of the Board. The record reflects that the parties agreed to treat the proceedings as a petition for writ of certiorari and therefore the trial court did not rule upon the motion to dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus, noting in the case action summary that the motion to dismiss was moot.
The trial court issued the writ of certiorari September 28, 1982, ordering the Board to certify its complete record pertaining to Ellard to the court. The Board filed its return to the writ and the parties stipulated that the complete record of the Board was before the trial court. The case was submitted on the records of the Board, briefs, and arguments of counsel.
The trial court entered its final order on the merits August 31, 1983, holding, inter alia, that at...
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