Ellefson v. Palmer

• Decision Date: 30 June 2017
• Docket Number: Docket No. 43712
• Citation: 397 P.3d 1152,162 Idaho 393
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: Lisa A. ELLEFSON, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, v. Ashley PALMER, a minor; and Stephen Palmer, Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondents.

162 Idaho 393

397 P.3d 1152

Lisa A. ELLEFSON, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant,

v.Ashley PALMER, a minor; and Stephen Palmer, Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondents.

Docket No. 43712

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, April 2017 Term.

Filed: June 30, 2017

Carey Perkins, LLP, Boise, for appellant. David S. Perkins argued.

Comstock & Bush, Boise, for respondent. David E. Comstock argued.

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

Ashley Palmer (Palmer) and Stephen Palmer appeal the Ada County district court's order granting Lisa A. Ellefson's motion for a new trial under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6).¹ Ellefson was involved in an automobile accident caused by Palmer. A jury found that Ellefson was not injured in the accident. However, the district court determined that the jury verdict of "no injury" was against the clear weight of evidence and granted a new trial subject to an additur in the amount of $50,000. On appeal, Palmer argues that the district court abused its discretion in granting the new trial and in setting additur at $50,000. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 1, 2012, while stopped in a turning lane on southbound Broadway Avenue at the intersection with Beacon Street, Ellefson's vehicle was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Palmer. Ellefson's vehicle was pushed into the vehicle in front of it, and that vehicle was pushed into the next. However, Ellefson's airbag did not deploy, and no one complained of any injuries. There was little damage to either Ellefson's or Palmer's vehicles, and the police officer who responded to the accident did not conduct an accident investigation or issue a citation.

On June 4, 2014, Ellefson filed a personal injury action against Palmer. At trial the evidence showed that Ellefson left work early on October 3, 2012, complaining of a headache and nausea. That same day, Ellefson went to see her health care provider at St. Luke's internal medicine group where she was treated by nurse practitioner Tyley Nelson, and later by Dr. Leslie Nona. Based on the symptoms Ellefson reported, Nelson determined that she "most likely" suffered a concussion and ordered a CT scan. The CT scan showed "no acute intracranial process." Ellefson also complained of memory problems, word searching problems, fatigue and sensitivity to light and sound. On October 8, 2012, Nelson discussed Ellefson's status with Dr. Nona, and Dr. Nona referred Ellefson to Elks Rehab Hospital for physical and occupational therapy.

In November 2012, Elks Rehab Hospital referred Ellefson to Dr. Nancy Greenwald and the outpatient brain injury program at Idaho Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation. Dr. Greenwald found that Ellefson had suffered a concussion but that her poor neuropsychological testing "does not fit the injury." In December 2012, Dr. Greenwald referred Ellefson to Leigh Beglinger, PhD, for a neuropsychological evaluation. Dr. Beglinger found that Ellefson was suffering from "cognitive impairments in all domains tested." However, she concluded that Ellefson's cognitive impairments were "not consistent with a concussion and would be more consistent with dementia of moderate severity."

Craig Beaver, PhD, a neuropsychologist, performed a neuropsychological evaluation of Ellefson in October 2013 and testified at trial that Ellefson sustained a mild traumatic brain injury in the car accident. Robert Calhoun, PhD, also a neuropsychologist, performed a neuropsychometric evaluation of Ellefson in February of 2014. Dr. Calhoun testified at trial that Ellefson did not sustain a mild traumatic brain injury in the accident. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury was given a special verdict form. Question No. 1 on the form read: "Was Plaintiff Lisa Ellefson injured in the collision?" The jury answered "No."

Following the trial, Ellefson moved for j.n.o.v. or, in the alternative, a new trial. The district court denied the motion for j.n.o.v. but granted the motion for new trial. In ruling on the motion for j.n.o.v., the court found that because there was contradicting evidence about whether or not Ellefson had suffered an injury, the jury was "entitled to determine whether Ellefson was credible" and "that there was substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict." In ruling on the motion for new trial, the court found that the verdict of no injury was against "the clear weight of the evidence" and granted the motion for a new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6). However, the court excluded the issue of cognitive impairment from the new trial and limited the scope of damages from the date of the accident on October 1, 2012, to January 2013. Palmer timely appealed, and Ellefson timely cross-appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Blizzard v. Lundeby , 156 Idaho 204, 206, 322 P.3d 286, 288 (2014). When reviewing the trial court's discretionary decision to grant a new trial, we consider:

(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standard applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

E.g. , Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr. , 135 Idaho 775, 780, 25 P.3d 88, 93 (2001). "Although this Court necessarily must review the evidence, it primarily focuses on the process by which the district court reached its decision, not on the result of the district court's decision." Karlson v. Harris , 140 Idaho 561, 568, 97 P.3d 428, 435 (2004).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Whether the district court abused its discretion in granting a new trial subject to a $50,000.00 additur.

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in granting a new trial under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6).

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6) provides that a trial court may grant a new trial "to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues in an action for any of the following reasons: .... (6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against the law." In determining whether a new trial should be granted under Rule 59(a)(6), "the trial judge must weigh the evidence and determine (1) whether the verdict is against his or her view of the clear weight of the evidence; and (2) whether a new trial would produce a different result." Hoffer v. Shappard , 160 Idaho 868, 877, 380 P.3d 681, 690 (2016) (quoting Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co. , 152 Idaho 741, 749, 274 P.3d 1256, 1264 (2012) ); accord, e.g. , Blizzard , 156 Idaho at 207–08, 322 P.3d at 289–90. The trial court is given broad discretion in determining whether to grant a motion for a new trial, and the "trial judge may set aside the verdict even though there is substantial evidence to support it." Sheridan , 135 Idaho at 779–80, 25 P.3d at 92–93.

Here, the district court, after noting that the grant of a new trial was within its discretion, determined that the jury's verdict of "no injury" was against the clear weight of the evidence. In doing so, the district court specifically looked to the fact that Nelson, Dr. Nona, Dr. Greenwald, Dr. Beglinger, and Dr. Beaver all concluded that Ellefson sustained a concussion in the accident. The district court also noted "even Dr. Calhoun conceded that Ellefson's referral to the brain injury program was appropriate, given Ellefson's symptoms." Finally, the court noted that there was "no indication that any medical provider has any issue of malingering." Based on these facts, the district court concluded that "the verdict that Ellefson was not injured in the collision is against the clear weight of the evidence" and that "it is more probable than not that a different jury, at a new trial, would answer the same question differently." In doing so, the district court relied on facts in the record and, after weighing that evidence, determined whether, in its view, the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence and whether a new trial would produce a different result.

Palmer argues that the district court abused its discretion in granting a new trial because the court, in denying Ellefson's motion for j.n.o.v., had previously concluded that there was "substantial evidence" to support the jury's verdict. Specifically, Palmer states:

Appellant's struggle to understand how the district court could recognize that it was not free to substitute it's [sic] own judgment for that of the jury, finding substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict in regard [to] the request for JNOV, and then concluded that the jury's decision that Ellefson was not injured was against the clear weight of the evidence, ordering a new trial or additur. Palmer argues that the court abused its discretion in determining that Ellefson was entitled to a new trial or additur.

(citations omitted). However, the standards that are applied when evaluating a motion for j.n.o.v. and a motion for a new trial are expressly different.

Under a motion for j.n.o.v., the trial court is forbidden to "weigh the evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses and make his own separate findings of fact and compare them to the jury's findings as he would in deciding a motion for a new trial." Quick v. Crane , 111 Idaho 759, 763, 727 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1986). Rather, the only issue to be determined under a motion for j.n.o.v. is whether "there is substantial and competent evidence to support the jury's verdict." O'Shea v. High Mark Dev., LLC , 153 Idaho 119, 129, 280 P.3d 146, 156 (2012). The trial court "must simply determine whether reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion as the jury when the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Mosell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., Inc. ...