Ellingson v. Knudson, 920275
Decision Date | 27 April 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 920275,920275 |
Citation | 498 N.W.2d 814 |
Parties | Mark S. ELLINGSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jeffrey O'Neil KNUDSON and United Parcel Service, a corporation, Defendants and Appellees. Civ. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
John E. Widdel, Jr., Grand Forks, for plaintiff and appellant; argued by Damon E. Anderson on behalf of counsel of record.
Scott David Jensen of McElroy, Camrud, Maddock & Olson, Grand Forks, for defendants and appellees.
Mark S. Ellingson appeals from a summary judgment dismissing his personal injury action against Jeffrey O'Neil Knudson and United Parcel Service and from the district court's order denying his motions for post-summary-judgment relief. We affirm.
On December 28, 1987, in Grand Forks, Ellingson's pickup truck was struck from behind by a United Parcel Service (UPS) delivery truck driven by Knudson. Ellingson was examined at United Hospital and released the same day. Ellingson returned to his home in Mason City, Iowa and resumed his job as a police officer. Ellingson did not miss any work due to the accident.
During the spring of 1988, Ellingson saw a Mason City doctor several times for shoulder and neck pain. Ellingson moved to Grand Forks in April 1988, where he saw Dr. Eugene Byron several times for headaches and neck pain. In May 1989, Ellingson received medical treatment after a motorcycle accident. In October 1989, Dr. Douglas Lester, a Bismarck chiropractor, evaluated Ellingson as having a 15 percent permanent partial disability. Dr. Lester attributed 75 percent of the disability to the 1987 auto accident and 25 percent to a 1989 motorcycle accident. 1
In 1990, Ellingson sued Knudson and UPS, alleging that the 1987 auto accident caused permanent and disabling injuries to his spine. Ellingson sought $1,321.94 for medical expenses since the accident, 2 and "general damages" for pain, suffering, and permanent disability in an amount in excess of $50,000.
Knudson and UPS moved for summary judgment because Ellingson had failed to meet the no-fault thresholds of the North Dakota Auto Accident Reparations Act, N.D.C.C., Chapter 26.1-41. Under section 26.1 -41-08, 3 a "securedperson" 4 is exempt from liability for noneconomic loss, unless there is a "serious injury." A serious injury is "an accidental bodily injury which results in death, dismemberment, serious and permanent disfigurement or disability beyond sixty days, or medical expenses in excess of two thousand five hundred dollars...." N.D.C.C. Sec. 26.1-41-01(21).
To oppose the motion, Ellingson submitted Dr. Lester's diagnosis. Ellingson also submitted an affidavit from family practitioner Dr. Eugene Byron, which says, in part:
At a summary judgment hearing on January 13, 1992, Ellingson urged the district court to consider the medical expenses likely to accrue during his lifetime:
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, ruling that, (1) as a matter of law, a lifetime was too long a period within which a plaintiff can accumulate medical expenses towards the $2,500 no-fault threshold; and, (2) there was no evidence that Ellingson was disabled. Judgment was entered on March 16, 1992.
Ellingson moved for a new trial under Rule 59(b)(4) N.D.R.Civ.P., claiming he had incurred additional medical expenses since the summary judgment hearing. He also asked the district court to amend its findings under Rule 52(b), N.D.R.Civ.P. In addition, Ellingson moved to alter or amend the summary judgment under Rule 59(j) N.D.R.Civ.P., to reflect that: (1) $1,462.39 in total medical expenses had been incurred; (2) the disability issue had been raised; (3) Dr. Byron's affidavit did not refer to a lifetime standard; and, (4) the action should be dismissed without prejudice.
At the rehearing on June 23, 1992, Ellingson argued the district court had misconstrued Dr. Byron's affidavit. According to Ellingson, Dr. Byron's affidavit states that medical expenses will continue to accrue periodically in proportion to the expenses already incurred. Since medical expenses of approximately $1,400 were incurred within a four-year period following the accident, a similar amount is expected to be incurred during the next four years. The district court treated Ellingson's motions as a motion to reconsider, 5 and amended the findings to reflect $1,462.39 in total medical expenses. The district court held that the additional medical expenses did not affect its summary judgment order. Ellingson's other requests were denied.
Ellingson appeals, arguing that genuine issues of material fact exist which preclude summary judgment. He contends: (1) he has satisfied the medical expense threshold; and, (2) the issue of disability must go to a jury.
In Matter of Estate of Stanton, 472 N.W.2d 741 (N.D.1991), this Court summarized the standards governing summary judgment. Under Rule 56, N.D.R.Civ.P., a summary judgment should be granted only if it appears that there are no issues of material fact or any conflicting inferences which may be drawn from those facts. See Production Credit Ass'n of Minot v. Klein, 385 N.W.2d 485 (N.D.1986). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden to clearly demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Binstock v. Tschider, 374 N.W.2d 81, 83 (N.D.1985). In considering a motion for a summary judgment, the court may examine the pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits, interrogatories, and inferences to be drawn from the evidence to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Everett Drill. Vent. v. Knutson Flying Serv., 338 N.W.2d 662, 664 (N.D.1983). The court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and that party will be given the benefit of all favorable inferences which can reasonably be drawn from the evidence. See Stokka v. Cass Cty. Elec. Co-op., Inc., 373 N.W.2d 911 (N.D.1985). Courts must also consider the substantive standard of proof at trial when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); State Bank of Kenmare v. Lindberg, 471 N.W.2d 470, 474 (N.D.1991).
Ellingson contends the district court "has misinterpreted the affidavit of Dr. Byron and misapplied the holding in Calavera."
In Calavera v. Vix, supra, Calavera filed a personal injury suit within the six-year statute of limitations, but the medical expense threshold was not crossed until sometime after that six-year period. The district court granted summary judgment to Vix on the ground that Calavera had failed to cross the medical expense threshold within the six-year statute of limitations period. We reversed, holding that a tort action filed within the limitations period is not barred by the medical expense threshold, if the plaintiff can, in good faith, establish that the threshold will be crossed, with reasonable medical certainty, in the future. Mere speculation regarding the medical services required in the future is insufficient. Id. at 902. Justice Gierke, concurring, urged the legislature to examine the "open ended nature of Chapter 26-41, N.D.C.C., and consider placing a limit on the time within which the medical expenses must result or occur in order for an injury to be considered 'a serious injury' within the meaning of Sec. 26-41-03(18), N.D.C.C." Id. The legislature has not addressed this issue and legislative history provides little guidance. 6
Rule 56(e), N.D.R.Civ.P., requires that affidavits offered to oppose a summary judgment motion must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. This standard, combined with our holding in Calavera, requires a party opposing summary judgment to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the monetary threshold will be crossed in the future with reasonable medical certainty. Mere speculation will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. The essence of Dr. Byron's affidavit is that (1) he has treated Ellingson for injuries sustained in the 1987 accident, (2) he has...
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