Elliot v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc.
| Decision Date | 15 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:19-CV-1934,3:19-CV-1934 |
| Parties | James R. ELLIOT, Plaintiff, v. PENNSYLVANIA INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, INC., ("PIAA"), et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
James Elliott, Scranton, PA, for Plaintiff.
Alan R. Boynton, Jr., Carol Steinour Young, Dana W. Chilson, McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendants.
On May 6, 2020, Plaintiff, James R. Elliot ("Elliot") filed a three-count amended complaint against Defendants the PIAA, Frank Majikes ("Majikes") and William Schoen ("Schoen"), in their individual and official capacities, and Luke Modrovsky ("Modrovsky"). On May 20, 2020, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The Court grants in part and denies in part the Defendants’ motion.
For the claims that shall be dismissed, Plaintiff will be provided leave to further amend his complaint.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court dismisses a complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff has failed to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A motion to dismiss "tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading"1 and "streamlines litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding."2 " Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law."3 This is true of any claim, "without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one."4
Following the Roberts Court's "civil procedure revival,"5 the landmark decisions of Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly6 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal7 tightened the standard that district courts must apply to 12(b)(6) motions. These cases "retired" the lenient "no-set-of-facts test" set forth in Conley v. Gibson and replaced it with a more exacting "plausibility" standard.8
Accordingly, after Twombly and Iqbal , "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ "9 "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."10 "Although the plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."11 Moreover, "[a]sking for plausible grounds ... calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [wrongdoing]."12
The plausibility determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."13 No matter the context, however, "[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ "14
When disposing of a motion to dismiss, the Court "accept[s] as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw[s] all inferences from the facts alleged in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff]."15 However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions."16 "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."17
As a matter of procedure, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed that:
Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal , a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps. First, it must tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, it should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.18
"Generally, consideration of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is limited to consideration of the complaint itself."19 Typically, to consider materials outside the complaint, a motion to dismiss must be converted to a motion for summary judgment.20 However, "[c]onsideration of materials outside the complaint is not entirely foreclosed on a 12(b)(6) motion."21 It is permissible to consider full text of documents partially quoted in complaint.22 It is also permissible to consider documents relied upon by plaintiff in drafting the complaint and integral to the complaint. 23
"However, before materials outside the record may become the basis for a dismissal, several conditions must be met."24 "For example, even if a document is ‘integral’ to the complaint, it must be clear on the record that no dispute exists regarding the authenticity or accuracy of the document."25 It must also be clear that there exist no material disputed issues of fact regarding the relevance of the document.26 In this matter, I find that these conditions have been met as to the Defendant's attachments (PIAA's bylaws, policies and procedures, and official's manual).27 I will consequently consider these attachments.
The facts alleged in the first amended complaint, which I must accept as true for the purposes of this motion, are as follows.
Plaintiff Elliot is an adult individual living in Scranton, Pennsylvania, and a registered sports official with the PIAA.28 The PIAA is an organization that was established by a group of high school principals in order to "eliminate abuses, establish uniform rules, and place interscholastic athletics in the context of secondary education."29 Otherwise stated, "[t]he purpose and function of [the] PIAA is to develop and enforce rules, which are authorized or adopted by the member schools, regulating interscholastic athletic competition."30 As part of this mission, the PIAA hires sports officials from a pool of qualified officials to officiate games among members schools.31
The PIAA is divided into 12 geographic Districts in the state, with each District having both a District Committee elected by the member schools and a District Chairman, also elected, who represents that District on the PIAA Board of Directors.32 Further, officials of the PIAA must join Chapters within a District which correspond to a specific sport and area in the District where they will officiate games.33 For the purposes of this action, it is further important to note that each District has an Officials’ Representative, who, after being elected to the position, serves as a member of the District Committee, assigns officials to regular season games, and recommends officials for inter and intra District playoff games.34 District 2, which is the District in which Elliot officiates, also has a District (Basketball) Interpreter who aids in the interpretation of relevant officiating rules in the District and who is selected, in part, through a recommendation by the Officials’ Representative.35
Elliot has been a registered official with the PIAA since 1998.36 Elliot is a member of the Scranton Basketball Chapter, the Lackawanna County Baseball Chapter, and the Wyoming Valley Football Chapter.37 Elliot has also served as the rules interpreter for the Scranton Basketball Chapter since 2013.38 Elliot has further served as an official for district and state playoff games and tournaments in each sport he officiates.39 He has thus been acknowledged by the PIAA to be a "very good official."40
In December 2016, Dave Elliot, Plaintiff's brother, ran against William Schoen for the position of the PIAA District 2 Officials’ Representative.41 In January 2017, Schoen was declared the winner of the election.42 Soon thereafter, due to alleged animosity towards the Elliot family for supporting Dave Elliot's campaign against Schoen, Schoen began retaliating against Elliot and his family.43
Schoen first, in February and March 2017, no longer used Mr. Elliot's sister as the "ticket-taker" for PIAA playoff games despite past years of being hired.44 Schoen then, in September 2017, forced Elliot's brother to transfer from the Lackawanna League Football Chapter to the Wyoming Valley Football Chapter.45 Schoen then recommended, in December 2017, Bruce Weinstock to be the new District 2 (Basketball) Interpreter over Elliot, despite Elliot's qualifications for the position and despite assurances to the contrary.46 District Chairman Frank Majikes, as a supporter of Schoen, also participated in this recommendation.47 Further, in 2017 and 2018, following Schoen's election, despite being regularly assigned to officiate such games, Schoen did not assign Elliot to a state playoff game.48 In response to Schoen's actions, Elliot then felt forced to transfer from the Lackawanna County Football Chapter to the Wyoming Valley Football Chapter.49
Out of fear of further retaliation, Elliot decided to run against Schoen in the 2018 Officials’ Representative election.50 As a local chapter nomination is required to run for the position, Schoen attempted to dissuade the Wyoming Valley Football Chapter from nominating Elliot.51 Elliot was thus instead nominated to the position by the Scranton Basketball Chapter.52 During the election, Luke Modrovsky, departmental intern and sports official for the PIAA, provided "up-to-date election tabulation" to certain officials, including Schoen and Majikes, in order to support Schoen's re-election.53 Finally, in 2019, despite being previously assigned to such games, Elliot was not assigned to any District 2 basketball playoff games by Majikes, who had been delegated the responsibility, in conjunction with third party Joe Ross,...
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