Elliott v. Benedict
| Decision Date | 08 December 1881 |
| Citation | 13 R.I. 463 |
| Parties | JOHN ELLIOTT v. STEPHEN G. BENEDICT, Deputy Sheriff. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
In Rhode Island, subject to the limitations of Pub. Laws R.I cap. 723, of June 20, 1878, a debtor may lawfully apply all his attachable property to paying any one of his creditors exclusive of the others.
The transfer of all a debtor's estate to a creditor made in good faith, and for a fair consideration, is, subject to the above limitations, valid, although the debtor's other creditors remain unpaid.
A bill of exceptions to the Court of Common Pleas and a petition for a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered evidence, or because a verdict is against evidence, cannot be combined in the same proceeding.
If a litigant desires relief from error of law on the part of the court, and of fact on the part of the jury, and wishes to combine the two grounds of relief in one proceeding, he should proceed by a petition for a new trial.
EXCEPTIONS to the Court of Common Pleas.
Thomas P. Barnefield, for plaintiff.
Hugh J. Carroll, for defendant.
This case comes up on exceptions from the Court of Common Pleas. It is replevin for a stock of groceries which was attached by the defendant, a deputy sheriff, as the property of John Smith. The defence is, property in Smith. On trial in the court below, the plaintiff testified that the groceries were transferred to him by John Smith, between two and three months before the attachment, in payment of a debt of $340.71, which Smith owed him for money lent at divers times that the transfer was by bill of sale and delivery; that he took possession immediately, and put his sister, who was the wife of Smith, in charge of the groceries and the shop wherein they were, and that she had carried on the shop ever since for him as his hired agent or servant. His testimony was confirmed by that of Smith and his wife, who also testified that the groceries were not worth $340.71, and that they were transferred to the plaintiff because the plaintiff demanded payment and threatened to attach them. Smith admitted that he had no other property except a small stock of liquors; that he owed several hundred dollars, and that several bills were coming against him which he could not pay when he made the transfer. The defendant submitted evidence of circumstances to discredit the plaintiff's claim, but none which directly contradicted him. After the evidence was in, the defendant made several requests for instructions, some of which were not granted or not granted without modification. The verdict was for the plaintiff.
The errors alleged are three, to wit: First, The defendant asked the court to charge the jury that if the transfer embraced the whole of Smith's property, leaving nothing to satisfy an execution, the jury must presume that it was fraudulent as to other creditors; and that if it was voluntary, it made no difference whether the transferee knew whether there were other creditors or not. The court, instead of so charging, charged that the transfer would not necessarily be fraudulent if it covered the whole property but if it did cover the whole, that would be a circumstance for the jury to consider in determining whether it was fraudulent; and also, that if the transfer was bonâ fide and for a valid consideration, though voluntarily made, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to inquire concerning other creditors.
Second, The defendant asked the court to charge that if Smith sold the property to the plaintiff because he was indebted to several other creditors, and wished to satisfy the plaintiff against the interests of the other creditors, then the transfer was fraudulent and void. The court, instead of so charging, charged that if the transfer was a contrivance between Smith and the plaintiff to cheat the other creditors, and was not made in good faith and for a valid consideration, then it was void.
Third, The defendant asked the court to charge that one who takes an absolute and voluntary conveyance of property, knowing that the grantor is largely in debt and unable to pay his debts, is guilty of fraud in law against the creditors, and the conveyance is void as to them. The court, instead of so charging, repeated the charge first above stated, and added that it must be left with the jury to determine, on the testimony and under all the circumstances, whether the conveyance was...
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Gaspee Cab, Inc. v. McGovern
...to see that the purchase price was applied to the payment of the vendor's creditors. 2 Moore, Fraudulent Conveyances, p. 611; Elliott v. Benedict, 13 R. I. 463; Perkins v. Hutchinson, 17 R. I. 450, 22 A. 1111; Colt v. Sears Commercial Co., 20 R. I. 323, 38 A. 1056; Taylor v. Cooper (R. I.) ......
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Garner v. Second Nat Bank of Providence
...of the sale of her property, although they had been applied to defray family expenses, with her consent and approval. In Elliott v. Benedict, 13 R. I. 463, 465, it was held that, subject to the limitations prescribed by the insolvent laws of Rhode Island,—which limitations do not affect the......
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Faiella v. Tortolani, 1947
...that statute even though it may in fact result in nonpayment of other debts. See Coates & Co. v. Wilson, 20 R.I. 106, 37 A. 537; Elliott v. Benedict, 13 R.I. 463, and cases therein They further argue that the theory of a preference implicitly rests solely upon payment and satisfaction of th......
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Coates v. Wilson
...taken to avoid the security. Except for such proceedings, a transfer of property which operates as a preference is good. Elliott v. Benedict, 13 R. I. 463; Austin v. Manufacturing Co., 14 R. I. 464; Perkins v. Hutchinson, 17 R. I. 450, 22 Atl. 1111. The mortgage in the present instance havi......