Elliott v. City of Waterbury, 15699

• Decision Date: 14 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. 15699,15699
• Citation: 245 Conn. 385,715 A.2d 27
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Jean V. ELLIOTT, Administratrix (Estate of Kevin Elliott) v. CITY OF WATERBURY et al.

Page 27

715 A.2d 27

245 Conn. 385

Jean V. ELLIOTT, Administratrix (Estate of Kevin Elliott) v. CITY OF WATERBURY et al.

No. 15699.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 11, 1997.

Decided July 14, 1998.

Michael F. O'Connor, North Haven, for appellant (plaintiff).

Linda L. Morkan, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was John H. Gorman, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for appellees (named defendant et al.).

Philip T. Newbury, Jr., with whom was Thomas R. Gerarde, Hartford, for appellees (defendant Town of Morris et al.).

William F. Gallagher, Cynthia C. Bott and Kurt D. Koehler, New Haven, filed a brief for the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Mary-Michelle U. Hirschoff, Bethany, filed a brief for the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities et al. as amici curiae.

Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

BORDEN, Associate Justice.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether General Statutes § 52-557n (b)(6) ¹ establishes a sole proximate causation standard, or some other heightened causation standard, in order to establish the tort liability of a municipality or its employees, officers or agents. The plaintiff, Jean V. Elliott, the administratrix of the estate of Kevin Elliott (decedent), appeals from the trial court's summary judgment ² in favor of the named defendant, the city of Waterbury, and the defendant employees and officers of that city (Waterbury defendants), and the defendant town of Morris, and the defendant employees and officers of that town (Morris defendants), on all counts of her complaint against them. ³ The action arises out of the alleged unintentional shooting of the decedent by Robert W. Cook, who was hunting on watershed land owned by the city of Waterbury and located in the town of Morris. ⁴ The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that, given the intervening role of Cook in causing the death of the decedent, § 52-557n (b)(6) shields the municipal defendants from liability for nuisance and negligence. The Waterbury defendants and the Morris defendants argue that the trial court's grant of summary judgment in their favor on the nuisance and negligence claims was proper because § 52-557n (b)(6) establishes either a sole proximate causation or a "direct" causation standard that bars liability for the alleged nuisance and negligence in this case. We conclude that § 52-557n (b)(6) does not establish either such standard. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court as to the nuisance claim against the Waterbury defendants. As to the other counts, however, we affirm the judgment of the trial court on other grounds.

The trial court summarized certain material, undisputed facts as follows. On November 11, 1992, "[the decedent] was jogging on Pitch Road, an unpaved road in Morris when he was unintentionally shot and killed by ... a person who was hunting in the watershed area adjacent to the road and owned by Waterbury. Pitch Road was a Morris town road, unpaved with a gravel surface, used as [a means of] access to the Waterbury reservoir from [Route] 109. The road was plowed by Morris during large storms to the dam area so that Waterbury workers could daily read instruments at the reservoir.... Pitch Road was also used by walkers and joggers, [and] hunters used it as well to gain access to the watershed area north of Route 109. Waterbury allowed hunting on its watershed property and Robert Cook was hunting on the day this incident occurred." In addition to these facts, the following undisputed facts are also relevant to our analysis: the watershed property consisted of 1800 acres; and, with regard to that property, Waterbury paid Morris an unspecified amount in lieu of taxes.

The relevant procedural history is not in dispute. The plaintiff initially filed this wrongful death action against the Waterbury defendants and the Morris defendants, and subsequently amended her complaint to add claims against Cook. See footnote 4. Counts one through four and count eight of the amended complaint are against the Waterbury defendants. The first count alleges that the city and its employees were negligent for allowing hunting on the watershed property and failing to take steps to make the activity safe. The second count is a claim for indemnification of the individual Waterbury defendants by the city of Waterbury with respect to the negligence count pursuant to General Statutes § 7-465. ⁵ The third count alleges that the Waterbury defendants created a public nuisance by allowing hunting on the watershed land. The fourth count alleges that the Waterbury defendants were wanton and reckless in failing to take appropriate steps to alleviate the danger posed to pedestrians on Pitch Road by the hunting on the watershed property, despite actual knowledge of that danger. The eighth count alleges that the Waterbury defendants engaged in wilful and malicious misconduct by failing to guard or warn against the dangers posed by the hunting on the watershed property.

Counts five, six and seven of the amended complaint are against the Morris defendants. The fifth count alleges that the Morris defendants were negligent by failing to post signs on Pitch Road warning of the hunting, failing to close the road to the public and failing to prohibit hunting on the land adjacent to Pitch Road. The sixth count alleges that the Morris defendants were wanton and reckless in failing to take those steps to alleviate the danger, despite actual knowledge of that danger. Finally, the seventh count alleges that the Morris defendants created a public nuisance by "maintain[ing] Pitch Road as a public roadway open to members of the general public, despite dangerous conditions created by the hunting on adjacent property...."

The Waterbury defendants and the Morris defendants moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted their motions as to all counts against them. This appeal followed, which challenges the judgment of the trial court as to all claims against the Waterbury defendants--counts one through four and count eight of the complaint--and the negligence and nuisance counts against the Morris defendants--counts five and seven of the complaint. ⁶

Before turning to the specific issues, we note that "[t]he standard of review of a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is well established. Practice Book § 384 [now Practice Book (1998 Rev.) § 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barrett v. Danbury Hospital, 232 Conn. 242, 250, 654 A.2d 748 (1995).

I

We first address the principal issue raised by this appeal: whether § 52-557n (b)(6) establishes a sole proximate causation standard, or some other heightened causation standard, regarding the liability of a municipality and its employees, officers or agents. Section 52-557n (b) provides in relevant part that "a political subdivision of the state or any employee, officer or agent acting within the scope of his employment or official duties shall not be liable for damages to person or property resulting from ... (6) the act or omission of someone other than an employee, officer or agent of the political subdivision...." The trial court concluded that § 52-557n (b)(6) establishes either "a rule that [in order for a municipality or its agents, officers or employees to be held liable] a person must be injured solely and proximately from the acts or omissions of the municipality ... [or] a rule that the municipality's negligence be the direct cause of the injury and not that of a third party." Given the role of Cook in causing the death of the decedent, the court concluded that § 52-557n (b)(6) provides immunity for the Waterbury defendants from liability on the negligence and nuisance claims under counts one through three of the complaint, regardless of which of these two rules the subsection is thought to embody. ⁷

The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly interpreted § 52-557n (b)(6). Essentially, she argues that the provision is a codification of the basic common-law notion that municipal defendants, like any defendants, are not liable for the acts of others who are not employees or agents of the municipality. She claims that the provision should not be interpreted as incorporating a sole proximate cause standard or a "direct cause" standard because either rule would represent a dramatic shift away from the common-law standards concerning causality in tort actions against municipalities or their employees, without a clear indication of such a legislative intention in the text of the statute or its legislative history.

The Waterbury defendants assert that the trial court's conclusion that § 52-557n (b)(6) establishes either a sole proximate causation standard or a "direct causation" standard was correct. The core of their argument is the "basic tenet of statutory construction that the legislature did not intend to enact meaningless provisions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Castagno v. Wholean, 239 Conn. 336, 346, 684 A.2d 1181 (1996). "[O]nly by the adoption of one of these two standards," they argue, "is it possible for this Court to give any true meaning to § 52-557n (b)(6)." The Morris defendants agree with the Waterbury defendants' interpretation of § 52-557n (b)(6). They maintain that the provision constitutes an alternative ground for affirmance of the trial court's judgment on the negligence and nuisance counts against them. We agree with the plaintiff that § 52-557n (b)(6) does not embody either a sole proximate cause standard or a "direct cause" ...