Elliott v. Hinds
Decision Date | 24 October 1983 |
Docket Number | No. L 83-38.,L 83-38. |
Citation | 573 F. Supp. 571 |
Parties | Charles R. ELLIOTT, Plaintiff, v. Robert A. HINDS, individually and as Superintendent and Appointing Authority of the Indiana State Veterans' Home; William D. Murchie, individually and as Director of the Indiana State Board of Health Management and Services; Dr. David J. Edwards, individually and as Associate State Health Commissioner of the Indiana State Board of Health; Dr. B.E. Fitzgerald, individually and as Medical Director of Indiana State Veterans Home; and Betty Moore, individually and as Chief Pharmacist of the Indiana State Veterans Home, and Indiana State Veterans Home, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Richard O. Bovey, Lafayette, Ind., for plaintiff.
Louis Pearlman, Lafayette, Ind., Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of Ind., Indianapolis, Ind., for defendants.
This action was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a former employee of the Indiana State Veterans Home in Lafayette, Indiana, against said Home and various state officials connected therewith. Jurisdiction of this court over the claims presented is predicated on a federal question, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343. In addition to his complaint for damages, plaintiff also seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 et seq. This matter is presently before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss. Both sides having carefully briefed their respective positions, this motion is now ripe for ruling.
The underlying facts in this case, as set forth in plaintiff's complaint, are as follows. The plaintiff was appointed to the position of Registered Professional Pharmacist at the Lafayette, Indiana State Veterans Home on August 27, 1979. During the course of the plaintiff's employment at the Home, he observed pharmacy practices which, in his opinion were violative not only of proper medical procedures but of the law as well. After plaintiff's repeated complaints of such conduct (as well as the complaints of others at the Home) resulted in an investigation which allegedly confirmed plaintiff's charges, plaintiff was discharged from his position on July 9, 1982. In essence, then, plaintiff's complaint is grounded on a state tort law theory of unlawful retaliatory discharge, a claim which has managed to wend its way into federal court because the defendants putatively acted "under color of state law."
In their motion to dismiss, the defendants advance the argument that the portion of plaintiff's complaint seeking "damages and other relief payable from public funds in the state treasury" is barred by the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. The defendants contend that the real defending party in interest is the State of Indiana, and that the monetary relief sought is retroactive in nature.
There are three issues presented by this motion to dismiss:
(1) Whether the Eleventh Amendment acts as a bar to that portion of plaintiff's action seeking damages and injunctive relief of a monetary nature (e.g., reinstatement with back pay, etc.).
(2) Assuming the answer to the above to be in the affirmative, whether the defendants waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity.
(3) Whether the defendant Indiana State Veterans Home is an "arm or agency" of the State of Indiana for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Each issue will be addressed in its turn.
The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, ratified on February 7, 1795, in response to the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793), states as follows:
Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 350, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945).
415 U.S. at 677, 94 S.Ct. at 1362.
415 U.S. at 668, 94 S.Ct. at 1358.
In determining whether relief sought will be prospective or retroactive, it is instructive to consider the recent Seventh Circuit case, Buckhanon v. Percy, 708 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir.1983).
The Court took guidance from Edelman, supra, and from subsequent Supreme Court interpretations of it. The Seventh Circuit noted that in Edelman, the Court spoke of "a time when petitioner was under no court-imposed obligation to conform to a different standard," 415 U.S. at 668, 94 S.Ct. at 1358. The Seventh Circuit also cited Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 451, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2669, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976), for the proposition that the date for determining whether a monetary award is retroactive or prospective is that upon which the district court determined that the state's conduct was wrongful. Finally, the Seventh Circuit considered one of its own cases, Vargas v. Trainor, 508 F.2d 485 (7th Cir.1974), which found that "the entry of a court order or judgment requiring that payments be made divides the past from the prospective for Eleventh Amendment purposes." 508 F.2d at 491.
It is true, as plaintiff correctly points out, that the line of decisions from Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) onward has shown a consistent willingness to uphold as an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity prospective applications of injunctive relief against state officials. However, it is equally clear from the foregoing that should a judgment be entered against the defendants in this case, any monetary award with respect to their actions committed prior to the date of the judgment's entry would be retroactive and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, as the Supreme Court noted in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1143, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979), "the distinction between that relief permissible under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young and that found barred in Edelman was the difference between prospective relief on one hand and retrospective relief on the other." See also Florida Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 101 S.Ct. 1032, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981); Wright, Law of Federal Courts 291 (4th ed. 1983).
It is axiomatic that any individual or entity enjoying immunity from suit may freely waive such immunity. In order to determine whether such a waiver has in fact taken place, this court is guided by the standard enunciated in Edelman v. Jordan, supra:
In deciding whether a State has waived its constitutional protection under the Eleventh Amendment, we will find waiver only where stated "by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction." Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171, 29 S.Ct. 458, 464, 53 L.Ed. 742 (1909).
415 U.S. at 673, 94 S.Ct. at 1360.
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. at 345, 99 S.Ct. at 1147.
Although Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) held that Congress overrode the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in enacting the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees...
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