Elliott v. Perez
| Decision Date | 07 February 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-3243,83-3243 |
| Citation | 751 F.2d 1472 |
| Parties | James ELLIOTT and Joseph Defley, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Leander H. PEREZ, Jr., etc., Defendant, Eugene E. Leon, Jr., etc., and Frank Klein, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Camille F. Gravel, Jr., Anna E. Dow, Baton Rouge, La., for James elliott.
Michael S. Fawer, New Orleans, La., for Joseph Defley.
Peter J. Butler, New Orleans, La., for Eugene Leon.
Gerald J. Gallinghouse, Margaret Anne Bretz, New Orleans, La., for Frank Klein.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
Before CLARK, Chief Judge, and BROWN and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
This case concerns the doctrines of judicial and prosecutorial immunity. The District Court, 561 F.Supp. 1325 (E.D.La.1983), dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against a state judge and an assistant district attorney for damages resulting from their acts. We find that the absolute constitutional tort immunity accorded to some government officials requires the trial judge to demand heightened standards of pleading by plaintiffs in cases in which that doctrine is going to come into play. In cases against governmental officials involving the likely defense of immunity we require of trial judges that they demand that the plaintiff's complaint state with factual detail and particularity the basis for the claim which necessarily includes why the defendant-official cannot successfully maintain the defense of immunity. We therefore vacate the judgment (as to Klein and Judge Leon) and remand to the district court.
This appeal results from a series of events over several days in early 1981 centering on the activities of a special grand jury sitting in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. 1 The grand jury had been impaneled in August 1979 to investigate assertedly illegal dealings of certain public officials in the Parish. Five individuals, who are the parties to this suit, were closely connected to the grand jury: defendant Leander H. Perez, Jr., was the Plaquemines Parish district attorney who originally convened the grand jury; defendant Frank Klein was first assistant district attorney to Perez; defendant Eugene E. Leon, Jr., was then the judge of the 25th Judicial District Court in which the grand jury was impaneled; plaintiff James Elliott was the foreman of the grand jury; and plaintiff Joseph E. Defley, Jr., was a witness before the grand jury on two occasions. For eighteen months, the grand jury performed its investigation into public corruption.
On the evening of February 15, 1981--four days before the term of the grand jury was to expire--Elliott, the grand jury foreman, received an envelope at his home containing a letter and several copies from Defley, the witness. In the letter Defley expressed the view that district attorney Perez' deceased father had illegally "bilked" the Parish out of a substantial number of valuable mineral leases beginning in the 1930s by diverting them to his company, Delta Development Company, Inc. He suggested that Perez and his brother and sisters, who were then the major shareholders of Delta Development, were as culpable as their deceased father, and that the grand jury should indict them for various crimes. Perez, the letter stated, might also be indicted for refusing to investigate and prosecute the theft of public funds. Defley urged Elliott to share the "ideas" in the letter with the other members of the grand jury and, in closing, asked that the letter be kept out of "general circulation." 2
Elliott distributed copies of the letter to the members of the grand jury the next morning. Perez, assistant district attorney Klein, and then district judge Leon apparently did not know about the letter at this point. On February 17, two days before its term was to lapse, the grand jury indicted Perez for the theft of $43 million in Parish funds and his company, Delta Development, for the theft of $72 million in Parish funds.
Elliott sought out a member of the district attorney's office to sign the indictment, as he and the other members of the grand jury thought that some sort of official authorization was necessary to validate the instrument. The ad hoc district attorney 3 refused to sign because Judge Leon had told him his authority extended only to matters concerning Perez' brother Chalin, and Perez was the legal advisor to the grand jury for other matters. Klein similarly refused to sign the indictment. He said that as a member of Perez' staff he could not participate in the indictment of the district attorney, nor of the corporation of which Perez was a major owner.
Elliott then contacted Judge Leon for his advice. He asked Judge Leon, the judicial officer responsible for the special grand jury, to direct an officer of the court to sign the indictment. Judge Leon assured Elliott that he would arrange a conference with the State Attorney General on the matter the next day. He told Elliott that the grand jury should adjourn for the day.
Still on February 17, Klein informed Perez of the pending indictments against him and Delta Development. At noon that day Perez, Klein, and Judge Leon met at a restaurant outside the Parish to discuss the situation. Perez asked Klein to prepare a motion for the district attorney to recuse himself from involvement with the indictments. Klein telephoned Elliott from the restaurant, and told him of Perez' decision to recuse himself and his staff from the matter. 4
Perez and Klein met again later that day. Perez at some point learned of Defley's letter and that it had been distributed to the grand jury members. He sought the advice of the Jefferson Parish district attorney and of a private lawyer. Both told him to move to discharge the grand jury since it had been tainted by outside influence. 5
On the morning of February 18, one day before the official end of the term of the special grand jury, Perez presented to Judge Leon a motion to discharge the grand jury, along with Defley's letter. The motion stated that the grand jury had "completed the function for which it was impaneled and had completed its report on all offenses presented to it by the District Attorney." Judge Leon by formal decree ordered that the grand jury be discharged as of that morning. He then telephoned Elliott and told him and the other grand jury members to report to his courtroom. When they arrived, Judge Leon advised them that the grand jury had been discharged. He did not inquire of them whether they had any further matters on which to report. Judge Leon also told Elliott that Perez had filed bills of information charging Elliott and Defley with conspiring to extort Perez, as evidenced by Defley's letter to Elliott.
Later that day, Perez filed the bills. Defley and Elliott were charged, arrested, confined, and forced to post bond for their release. 6
At Judge Leon's urging Klein filed another bill of information against Defley one week later (February 25), charging him with jury tampering, again relating to his February 15 letter to Elliott. 7
On February 27, the State Attorney General moved to supersede Perez' office in any criminal matters arising out of the activities of the special grand jury. The motion was granted almost a year later on February 24, 1982, pursuant to a writ issued by the Louisiana Supreme Court on May 18, 1981. All charges against Elliott and Defley were thereafter dropped.
Elliott and Defley brought separate suits seeking compensatory and punitive damages stemming from the asserted deprivation of their civil rights by the defendants. 8 Their complaints were substantially identical and were ultimately consolidated.
The most critical thing--which put the trial judge in the middle of a constitutional guessing game--was the loose charge that Perez, Klein, and Judge Leon conspired through the criminal prosecution and discharge of the grand jury to injure the plaintiff because the grand jury had indicted Perez.
This claim--on which every serious constitutional question turns--was pleaded in the following blunderbuss fashion in each of the complaints:
Complainant further shows that the actions of defendants LEANDER H. PEREZ, JR., FRANK KLEIN and EUGENE E. LEON, JR., the defendants PEREZ, KLEIN and LEON conspired to deter by force, intimidation or threat through the criminal prosecution of complainant and improper discharge of the special grand jury to influence the verdict, presentment and indictment of the special grand jury and specifically [plaintiff Elliott] as foreman of the special grand jury and to injure complainant in his person and property on account of the action taken by the special grand jury in voting the indictment of defendant LEANDER H. PEREZ, JR., and Delta Development Company, Inc., which indictments had been lawfully assented to and which indictments ought to have been signed by a person in authority and returned prior to the official discharge date of the special grand jury.
(Emphasis added).
Prior to any discovery or responsive pleadings, Perez and Klein moved to dismiss the claims against them based on their absolute immunity as prosecutors to suits for money damages. Judge Leon filed a similar motion based on his absolute immunity as a judge. The District Court denied Perez' motion but granted Klein's motion, treating both as motions for summary judgment. The Court also granted Judge Leon's motion to dismiss. It entered final judgments as to Klein and Judge Leon under F.R.Civ.P. 54(b), to which the plaintiffs timely noticed their appeal. 9
The blunderbuss phrasing of the arguable claims in the plaintiffs' complaints, (just quoted) presents this Court initially with an issue which goes to the heart of the "immunity" from damage suits long accorded certain government officials....
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