Elliott v. University of Tennessee

Decision Date09 July 1985
Docket NumberNo. 84-5692,84-5692
Citation766 F.2d 982
Parties38 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 522, 37 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,419, 54 USLW 2063, 26 Ed. Law Rep. 139 Robert B. ELLIOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Avon N. Williams, Jr. (Lead), Williams & Dinkins, Russell T. Perkins, Judith Reed (argued), Nashville, Tenn., for plaintiff-appellant.

Alan Parker (Lead) (argued), Associate Gen. Counsel, Beauchamp E. Brogan, Knoxville, Tenn., G. Ray Bratton, Richard Glassman, Glassman, Jeter & Embry, P.C., Memphis, Tenn., George R. Fusner, Jr., White & Reasor, Nashville, Tenn., for defendants-appellees.

Before KEITH and MARTIN, Circuit Judges, and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr., Circuit Judge.

Robert B. Elliott appeals from an order of the district court granting summary judgment to the defendants on his claim that the defendants violated his civil rights.

Elliott is a minority employee of the University of Tennessee Agricultural Extension Service. He has been employed by the Service since 1966. On December 18, 1981, the Dean of the Service advised Elliott that he was to be terminated from his job due to inadequate work performance, inadequate job behavior, and incidents of gross misconduct. On December 22, 1981, Elliott filed an administrative appeal from the Notice of Pending Termination under the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. On January 5, 1982, Elliott filed his federal complaint that forms the basis of the present appeal.

Elliott's federal complaint alleges that in the past he made complaints to University of Tennessee officials regarding racial discrimination in the treatment of black leaders, students, and staff personnel in connection with 4-H club events and a series of racially derogatory acts on the part of University officials. One of Elliott's major complaints was a racial slur made by defendant Coley, a Service livestock judge, at an official Service event.

The federal complaint alleges that following Elliott's complaint regarding the Coley incident, defendants Downen, Luck, and Shearon (University officials) conspired with defendants Murray Truck Lines and Korwin to have Elliott terminated from his job. Elliott recently had complained to Korwin, shop manager at Murray Truck Lines, regarding eight racially insulting signs in windows at Murray Truck Lines' place of business. The complaint alleges that the University officials conspired with Korwin to secure a letter from Korwin accusing Elliott of referring to Mr. Murray as a "white racist" and threatening him. Based on the Korwin letter, Downen placed a letter of reprimand in Elliott's job file.

The complaint also alleges that, because of Elliott's complaint regarding Coley, the University officials conspired with defendants Donnell, Johnson, Smith, Hopper, and Cathey, all of whom were members of the Agricultural Extension Service Committee in the county in which Elliott was employed, to have the Committee recommend to Downen that Elliott be terminated from his job. Two black members of the Committee refused to vote for Elliott's removal. All five white members, two of whom are related to Coley by marriage, voted for Elliott's removal.

The complaint next alleges that Elliott's immediate Supervisor, Shearon, and other University officials began a harassment campaign by requiring Elliott to produce mileage books when white employees were not subject to the same requirement; unjustifiably finding fault with his work; subjecting him to discriminatory job assignments; attempting to place pretextual supervisory complaints in his personnel file; and falsely accusing him of failure to carry out a specific job assignment.

The complaint alleges that at least one of the individual defendants was aware that Elliott was active in a federal lawsuit seeking to secure the right of blacks to gain membership in exclusively white country clubs in Gibson and Madison County, Tennessee, and that the present defendants' actions were designed in part to punish him for his efforts in that case.

Finally, the complaint alleges that the Service continues to discriminate against black citizens by refusing to implement an effective affirmative action plan; failing to integrate its homemaker demonstration clubs and other educational activities; refusing to integrate its 4-H clubs; refusing to address low minority participation in agricultural programs and community resource development programs; refusing to eliminate discrimination in promotion, training, and continuing education; refusing to eliminate discrimination in the establishment and operation of agricultural extension committees; and permitting discrimination by local white officials against black participants in educational programs.

The complaint seeks certification of a class of "persons in Tennessee who are similarly situated [as Elliott] and/or affected by the policies ... complained of herein which violate not only the rights of [Service employees] ... but also the rights of black infant and adult citizens who are intended beneficiaries of [the Service]...." The relief requested includes an injunction restraining the University of Tennessee, the Service, the University officials, and the Committee from continuing the discriminatory practices outlined above. Also requested is a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring defendants to cease attempting to discharge, cause the discharge of, or otherwise penalize Elliott on the basis of false allegations and other harassing actions. Finally, the complaint seeks attorneys' fees and one million dollars in damages. The complaint invokes jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1331 and 1341. Claims are asserted under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, 2000d and e and under the first, thirteenth, and fourteenth amendments.

On January 19, 1982, the court entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting the defendants from taking any personnel action against Elliott. On February 23, 1982, the court withdrew the restraining order to permit the parties to proceed through the state administrative appeals process. The court emphasized that the withdrawal of the restraining order did not "in any fashion adjudicat[e] the merits of this controversy."

After dissolution of the restraining order, the parties proceeded through the Tennessee administrative review process. The contested case provisions of the Tennessee Code provide for determination of the issues by an administrative judge who must be an employee of the affected agency or of the office of the secretary of state. Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 4-5-102(1) & (4). A party may move to disqualify an administrative judge for "bias, prejudice, or interest," Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 4-5-302(a), the administrative judge may not be a person who has been involved in the investigation or prosecution of the case, Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 4-5-303(a), and the administrative judge may not receive ex parte communications, Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 4-5-304(a). The parties have the right to be represented by counsel, Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 4-5-305(b), to receive notice of the hearing, Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 4-5-307(a), to file pleadings, motions, briefs, and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 4-5-308(a) & (b), to request the administrative judge to issue subpoenas, Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 4-5-311(a), and to examine and cross-examine witnesses, Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 4-5-312(b). The administrative judge is bound by the civil rules of evidence except that evidence otherwise not admissible may be relied upon if it is "of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent [people] in the conduct of their affairs." Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 4-5-313(1). An order issued by an administrative judge must include conclusions of law and findings of fact. Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 4-5-314(c). An initial appeal from an adverse decision by the administrative judge is to the agency itself or to a person designated by the agency. Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 4-5-315(a). Judicial review of the final agency decision may be had by filing a petition for review in the state chancery court within sixty days of entry of the agency's order. Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 4-5-322(b). The chancery court sits without a jury and is limited to a review of the administrative record to determine whether the agency decision is in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions or is arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence. Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 4-5-322(g) & (h). Review of the decision of the chancery court may be had in the Court of Appeals of Tennessee. Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 4-5-323.

The administrative judge conducted a lengthy hearing in which Elliott's counsel examined nearly one hundred witnesses. The University alleged eight separate instances of poor job performance and sought approval of its decision to dismiss Elliott. Elliott defended against the charges by asserting, inter alia, that the accusations against him were racially motivated. The administrative judge issued an order upholding four of the eight charges but denying approval of the dismissal. Instead, the order directed that Elliott retain his position but be transferred to a different county. The decision of the administrative judge concluded that he had no jurisdiction to hear Elliott's claims of civil rights violations. Nevertheless, the claims of racial discrimination were considered "affirmative defenses" to the University's charges, and the administrative judge made the following finding:

An overall and thorough review of the entire evidence of record leads me to believe that employer's action in bringing charges against employee ... [was] based on what it, through its administrative officers and supervisors perceived as improper and/or inadequate behavior and inadequate job performance rather than racial discrimination. I therefore conclude...

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