Elliotte v. Com., 1338-86-2
Decision Date | 04 October 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 1338-86-2,1338-86-2 |
Citation | 7 Va.App. 234,372 S.E.2d 416 |
Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Parties | Michael Lee ELLIOTTE v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. Record |
Andrea C. Long (Boone, Beale, Cosby & Hyder, Richmond, on brief), for appellant.
Birdie H. Jamison, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Mary Sue Terry, Atty. Gen., W. Mark Dunn, Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellee.
Present KOONTZ, C.J., and BENTON and COLE, JJ.
Upon his conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248, Michael Lee Elliotte was sentenced to fourteen years in the penitentiary with six years suspended and fined $1,000. Elliotte contends that (1) the evidence was obtained in violation of his fourth amendment rights during a warrantless entry into his residence; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine. We hold that because there was no valid consent to the entry, no warrant, and no recognized exception to justify a warrantless search, all evidence obtained during the search should have been suppressed. We, therefore, reverse the conviction.
At the suppression hearing, Detective Dickerson testified that another police officer had received "a complaint of loud music and parties going on all night" at Elliotte's house. The police officer informed Dickerson that the house apparently was operated as a club and "that his information was that anybody could gain entry into it." Suspecting that an illegal public night club was being operated, Detectives Dickerson and Coleman went to Elliotte's home for the purpose of purchasing alcoholic beverages. Dickerson testified that his plan was to gain access by knocking on the door and then to buy a drink once inside. Dickerson further testified that if he were stopped at the door, he was prepared to identify himself, to explain that there were complaints about an illegal club, and to request to see the owner of the house.
At approximately 1:15 a.m., Dickerson and Coleman approached the house at the same time as four other men. One of the four men opened the screen door and knocked on the inside door. A man, later identified as Marvin Sampson, opened the inside door, said, and stepped back to allow the men to enter. Sampson shook hands with each of the first four men as they entered. Dickerson next moved forward with his badge in hand, but not displayed. When Dickerson had one foot in the house and the other on the threshold, Sampson "looked, and he said 'police.' " Sampson then turned away and continued to say "police, police" as he walked quickly toward the kitchen through a group of people.
Dickerson "was right behind him" and followed Sampson into the kitchen. When Dickerson entered the kitchen, he saw Elliotte seated at a table, another man standing beside the table, and two plastic bags of cocaine on the table. Dickerson moved toward Elliotte, who was reaching toward the table, and grabbed him from behind. Dickerson testified that at that time Elliotte said: Dickerson reached into Elliotte's pocket and pulled out a large plastic bag with thirty-two smaller bags of cocaine within it.
Elliotte filed a motion to suppress the cocaine on the ground that Sampson neither consented to the entry of the officers nor had the authority to admit the officers. The circuit judge found "that the close was broken; that the officer was admitted into the dwelling by one who had, or appeared to have authority to do so, for the officer was lawfully upon the premises; [and that] the officer was never ordered out of the dwelling by anyone." Based upon those findings the circuit judge denied the motion.
In Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984), the Supreme Court stated:
It is axiomatic that the "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." And a principal protection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on agents of the government who seek to enter the home for purposes of search or arrest. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Court has recognized, as "a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment Law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable."
Id. at 748-49, 104 S.Ct. at 2097. (citations omitted). Thus, it is well established that "the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1382, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980).
The Commonwealth argues that the entry in this case was not violative of the fourth amendment because Elliotte had relinquished his expectation of privacy in his home by using it as a public place and because the police were invited to enter. In support of this proposition, the Commonwealth cites Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211, 87 S.Ct. 424, 427, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966) ( ), Commonwealth v. D'Onofrio, 396 Mass. 711, 715-18, 488 N.E.2d 410, 413-14 (1986) ( ), and State v. Carey, 417 A.2d 979, 981-82 (Me.1980) ( ). The findings in Lewis, D'Onofrio, and Carey that there were no reasonable expectations of privacy, however, were all premised on a finding that the police gained entry onto the premises by invitation as either a member of the general public or as an individual specifically invited to conduct illegal business within the home. Thus, although invitation or "consent" could form the basis of a finding that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists, that a person is engaged in criminal conduct within his home does not, standing alone, destroy a homeowner's expectation of privacy. United States v. Whaley, 779 F.2d 585, 590 n. 8 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1055, 107 S.Ct. 931, 93 L.Ed.2d 982 (1987).
When there has been a warrantless entry in a home by police authority, "[i]t is well settled that the burden is on the Commonwealth to establish an exception to the warrant requirement." Walls v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 639, 645, 347 S.E.2d 175, 178 (1986); see also United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51, 72 S.Ct. 93, 95, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951); Verez v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 405, 410-11, 337 S.E.2d 749, 753 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 813, 107 S.Ct. 63, 93 L.Ed.2d 21 (1986). One established exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the fourth amendment is conduct pursuant to consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). In order to justify a warrantless search on the basis of consent, the Commonwealth must demonstrate from the...
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