Ellis v. Beemiller, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 November 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 09–1414.
• Parties: Regis ELLIS and Bonnie Ellis, his wife, Plaintiffs, v. BEEMILLER, INC. and MKS Supply, Inc., t/d/b/a Hi–Point Firearms, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

910 F.Supp.2d 768

Regis ELLIS and Bonnie Ellis, his wife, Plaintiffs,

v.BEEMILLER, INC. and MKS Supply, Inc., t/d/b/a Hi–Point Firearms, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 09–1414.

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

Nov. 19, 2012.

Jason M. Schiffman, Schiffman & Wojdowski, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Stephen J. Dalesio, Gregory C. Scheuring, Davies, McFarland & Carroll, Pittsburgh, PA, Christopher Renzulli, John A. Tartaglia, Renzulli Law Firm, LLP, White Plains, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BLOCH, District Judge.

Presently before the Court is Defendant Beemiller, Inc.'s and Defendant MKS Supply, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 52). For the reasons set forth below, the Defendants' motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

This is a strict products liability case over which this Court has jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

As set forth in the complaint, Plaintiffs Regis and Bonnie Ellis, who are husband and wife, allege that Plaintiff–Husband's left hand was seriously injured after a Hi–Point model C9, 9mm pistol, which was manufactured and sold by Defendant Beemiller, Inc., and sold and distributed by Defendant MKS Supply, Inc., exploded in his hand even though Plaintiff–Husband never pulled the trigger.

Plaintiff–Husband (“Plaintiff”) allegedly suffered serious injuries, including a comminuted fracture of the mid-portion of the left thumb metacarpal. As a result, Plaintiff has allegedly (i) suffered great pain, suffering, mental anguish and embarrassment, (ii) undergone hospitalization and surgeries, (iii) incurred medical bills for treatment, (iv) been disfigured, (v) been unable to enjoy the ordinary pleasures of life, (vi) been unable to perform his normal daily activities including employment, and (vii) had his general health, strength, and vitality impaired. Plaintiff–Wife alleges that she suffered damages due to a loss of consortium.

Based upon the above, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are strictly liable to Plaintiffs for their injuries sustained by the handgun (Counts I and IV), that Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for breach of implied warranties (Counts III and VI) and that Defendants are liable for Plaintiff–Wife's loss of consortium (Counts X and XI).¹ On January 13, 2010, the Court approved Plaintiffs' notice dismissing withoutprejudice Federal Cartridge Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of ATK Corporation. See (Doc. No. 19).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The record as read in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs establishes the following background. On or about April 13, 2007, Plaintiff and his friend David Williams (“Williams”) were at a campsite located at Raystown Lake, Pennsylvania, with several other individuals. The two men decided to look for an alternative fishing spot since their normal location had been designated for special needs fisherman and children. At some point, it was decided that the pair would find an area to fire the Hi–Point Model C9 9mm Luger handgun that Williams owned and brought to the campsite. Williams had purchased the gun new with 50 rounds of ammunition in approximately 2005 or 2006; he testified that he fired about 2 to 4 rounds of the ammunition in his backyard when he first purchased the gun and then cleaned it and placed it into a locked drawer in his home afterwards. Williams testified that the gun had not been touched until the date of the incident.

The two men traveled to a location behind a cabin where a tree stump was located by a creek. Williams was the first to fire the gun and he shot one clip of eight rounds at a target which had been attached to a four-by-four stand near the water. After Williams emptied out his clip, he inserted a loaded clip into the gun and handed it to Plaintiff with the safety on. Plaintiff testified that after he was handed the gun, he took the safety off, held it with his right hand, and wrapped his left hand around his right hand and gun. He then fired seven rounds at the target without any incident.

Prior to shooting his eighth and final round of ammunition, Plaintiff testified that he noticed that the slide of the gun did not fully go forward and was approximately 0.5 to 0.75 inches open. At that point, he stated that he lowered the gun, took his finger off the trigger, and commented to Williams that he thought the gun was jammed. Plaintiff took his left hand off the gun and was reaching towards the slide to try to clear the “jam” when all of a sudden the gun exploded in his hand. Plaintiff testified that the gun exploded without him ever pulling or touching the trigger and that the bullet came out of the trigger housing/left side of the gun and not the muzzle. He testified that when the gun “exploded,” his left hand was parallel to the trigger housing and that the tip of his finger would have been taken off if it had been on the trigger when the explosion happened. Plaintiff suffered a bullet injury to his left thumb as a result of the incident.²

III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis in original). The summary judgment standard requires the issue to be genuine, that is, one where a reasonable jury, based on the evidence presented, could return a verdict for the non-moving party with regard to that issue. See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In addition, the disputed fact must be material, meaning it might affect the outcome under the substantive law. See Boyle v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir.1998).

When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party without weighing the evidence or questioning the witnesses' credibility. See id. The movant has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, while the non-movant must establish the existence of each element for which it bears the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the movant has pointed to sufficient evidence of record to demonstrate that no genuine issues of fact remain, the burden is on the non-movant to search the record and detail the material controverting the movant's position. See Schulz v. Celotex Corp., 942 F.2d 204, 210 (3d Cir.1991). Rule 56 requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and show, through the evidence of record, that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Furthermore, “[a]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not ... to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). However, a court need not “turn a blind eye to the weight of the evidence.” Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir.1992) (emphasis added). In order for a dispute to be “genuine,” the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” but must instead “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (quotation marks omitted).

Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiffs have failed to present sufficient evidence that the gun was defective. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot proceed to trial without the use of an expert to explain how this incident could have occurred in the manner attested to by Plaintiff.³ They assert that even if expert testimony is not required, the record is devoid of any evidence which would lead a rational fact-finder to conclude that the gun exploded without Plaintiff pulling the trigger and that the explosion caused the bullet to exit out of the left side of the gun, Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot rely on the product malfunction theory to advance their claims because (1) the actual product is available and has been subject to examination and testing and (2) Plaintiffs have identified a specific defect—an out of battery discharge (“OOBD”)—which they claim caused the injuries in this case. Defendants state that even if the malfunction theory applied, Plaintiffs have failed to negate a reasonable secondary cause of the accident which Defendants have identified—that an outside force caused the damage to the gun.

Plaintiffs contend they have set forth evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case under the product malfunction theory and state that they have provided “competent” and “unrefuted” evidence that the gun malfunctioned in the manner described by Plaintiff and caused his injuries. They argue that expert testimony is not required to prove that the product was defective because lay testimony and observation of the gun suffice to establish that a malfunction occurred. Plaintiffs further assert that Defendants have failed to prove their theory that a reasonable secondary cause for the...