Ellis v. Checotah Muscogee Creek Indian Community, (2011)
| Decision Date | 20 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | SC-10-01 |
| Parties | A.D. ELLIS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS, PRINCIPAL CHIEF OF THE MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. CHECOTAH MUSCOGEE CREEK INDIAN COMMUNITY, DUCK CREEK INDIAN COMMUNITY, EUFAULA INDIAN COMMUNITY, HOLDENVILLE CREEK INDIAN COMMUNITY, AND OKEMAH INDIAN COMMUNITY, CHARTER COMMUNITIES, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. |
| Court | Suppreme Court of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation |
NOW as of the 20th day of July, 2011, the above cited case comes before this Court for appellate review. At issue is whether the lower courts order of permanent injunctive relief should be upheld.
Since we have no precedent in the Muscogee (Creek) Nation for the standard of review of trial court awards of equitable relief we find the rule applied by the United States Supreme Court in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S.388 (2006) persuasive. We believe this rule articulates the traditional principles in Muscogee tribal law. In eBay, the Court held "[t]he decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by the district court, reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion." Id.
"Abuse of discretion" is one of the most rigorous standards of judicial review in Muscogee law. Under that standard, lower court action may be reversed if the lower court's decision is unreasonable in light of the facts of the case or is an unreasonable deviation from precedent. This court finds no unsound, unreasonable or illegal abuse of discretion. The Appellants have not made a showing that the lower court decision should be reversed.
Nor have the Appellants shown the trial court unreasonably deviated from Muscogee precedent.
We held in Reynolds v. Skaggs that "a per-capita payment ipso facto is ...wrong." 4 Mvs. L. Rep 116, 120 (2006). In that matter, Justice Harjo-Ware, in her then capacity as Attorney General, argued no per capita payments should be made in any circumstances. Id. at 120. It was left up to the trial court to determine if payments made were legal or illegal. Id. at 121.
The lower court ruling in the instant case is consistent with our previous opinion in Reynolds and will not be disturbed, and a system that permits a community to receive a share of gaming revenues for disbursement as they see fit was properly permanently enjoined by the lower court.
In conclusion, this Court finds no fundamental or reversible error in the lower court's legal rulings in this case. No abuse of discretion has been demonstrated. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court decision issued March 19, 2010 in the District Court, Patrick E. Moore presiding.
We now separately address certain issues raised by Justices Supernaw and Harjo-Ware in their respective discussions. These issues involve: 1.) the appropriate standard of review; 2.) the relationship between Muscogee law and federal law; and 3.) certain considerations regarding the gaming authority of the Communities and 4.) Balancing of Equities.
The Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review set forth in the main opinion is perfectly consistent with our precedent. Under our case law, when exercising appellate jurisdiction, this Court will review issues of law de novo and issues of fact for clear error. This general and well-established rule is identical to the standards applied by numerous tribal, federal, and state appellate courts. That said, appellate courts often have to refine this general approach in a variety of specific circumstances. For instance, appellate courts differ as to how they will review mixed questions of law and fact. Similarly, the de novo/clear error distinction is not entirely helpful when reviewing lower court permanent injunction orders. As stated in the main Opinion, the commonly-applied standard of review for such matters in other jurisdictions is that of a review for an abuse of discretion. That this Court adopts such a universally-applied standard to such matters into Muscogee case law is decidedly unremarkable.
Furthermore, Justice Harjo-Ware's position that all lower court decisions should be reviewed de novo is neither tenable nor consistent with this Court's case law. As stated above, when exercising appellate jurisdiction, we do not look at findings of fact de novo, as we have a well-established and logical rule that such findings be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. This rule, as we and a multitude of tribal, federal, and state courts have noted, recognizes the fact that trial courts are in a much better position than appellate courts to receive evidence and evaluate witness credibility. The dissent appears to suggest that we should always review facts de novo, an approach that is only appropriate when we exercise original jurisdiction. We do not believe Justice Harjo-Ware adequately takes into account the distinction between original and appellate jurisdiction.
Justice Supernaw's dissent provides a lengthy discussion of the 1994 Reynolds v. Skaggs case. She concludes that she would "overrule" an essential part of this MCN Supreme Court precedent.[1] She further suggests that all FUAs should be reviewed in light of federal regulations to determine whether they qualify as management contracts under federal law.
This issue, however, of whether Facility Use Agreements are management contracts was not central to the District Court's ruling. Indeed, the District Court's only reference to the Reynolds case — a brief nod to the precedent that disbursements that are patently illegal are void and properly enjoined under MCN Supreme Court case law — makes no mention whatsoever to management contracts. Instead, the District Court ruled that the FUA schemes are invalid because of more fundamental considerations. The District Court stated:
Muscogee (Creek) Nation law cannot now or in the future, permit a "50-50 Split" of gaming revenue because such a participation in net gaming revenue is not permitted under the Federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act since it dilutes and splits "sole proprietary interest" in net gaming revenues the Muscogee (Creek) Nation must statutorily and legally own.
District Court Final Judgment and Order, p. 18. Thus, analysis of the specific language of any of the FUAs is unnecessary. The District Court's Order holds that the 50-50 split schemes they institute are illegal on their face without some legal authorization (such as a properly approved RAP) to the contrary. Therefore, a microanalysis of the specific FUAs in this case is beside the point.
Thus, Justice Supernaw's discussion of the definition of a management contract is of little relevance to the District Court's ultimate holding and does not factor into whether the District Court's ruling constituted reversible error. Furthermore, notwithstanding the District Court's scant discussion of Reynolds, the case is part of our case law and is binding precedent. Justice Supernaw's interest in "overruling" part of its holding does not change, without a majority vote of the Justices issuing a given opinion, its precedential value.
The District Court performed a valuable public service in thoroughly receiving evidence, reviewing the record, and applying relevant law in issuing its Order. Although the District Court presented a complete analysis of federal law, its ruling was ultimately grounded in Muscogee law. We believe it was correct in doing so, and we disagree with Justice Supernaw's position that the FUAs should each be reviewed to determine whether they comport with federal regulations. Instead, if 50-50 splits are improper without a RAP under Mvskoke law as the District Court held, such a federal analysis is unnecessary.
Acknowledgment and adherence to federal law is an attribute of a prudent approach to the creation of tribal common law. Although acknowledgment of federal law is necessary — especially in areas of significant federal regulation such as gaming — decisions of the Muscogee Courts must always be grounded in Muscogee law.
Our analysis of federal law should be done with an eye toward recognizing the impact of federal law on internal tribal operations and using that knowledge to tailor our decisions to produce an MCN common law (MCN case law) that is fully protective of the best interests of the Nation.
The District Court properly acknowledged federal considerations in issuing its holding based on MCN law. As such, Justice Supemaw's dissent's suggestion that the FUAs should be reviewed based on a new federal checklist is erroneous. Instead, we do find that the DC properly weighed federal repercussions and properly assessed Appellee's concerns about federal sanctions in making a ruling based on MCN law. Justice Supernaw's statement that there is no Mvskoke precedent in this matter is also inaccurate. As stated above, Justice Supernaw states that she would overrule the portion of our Reynolds precedent with which she disagrees. Her disagreement, however, does not change its existence.
The interpretation of MCN law in light of federal considerations is entirely within the domain of MCN courts. This type of analysis — one that the District Court undertook — should not be...
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