Ellis v. City of Pratt City

• Decision Date: 25 June 1896
• Citation: 111 Ala. 629,20 So. 649
• Parties: ELLIS v. PRATT CITY.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

20 So. 649

111 Ala. 629

ELLIS v. PRATT CITY.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 25, 1896

Appeal from city court of Birmingham; W. W. Wilkerson, Judge.

Action by Susan Ellis against Pratt City, in which the Southern Insurance Company was summoned as garnishee. From a judgment discharging the garnishee, on the ground that the fund was exempt, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

On the 17th day of May, 1894, Susan Ellis recovered of defendant Pratt City, a judgment for $1,000 damages and $94.60 costs in an action of tort in the city court of Birmingham. On the 21st day of May, 1895, a garnishment on said judgment was duly sued out, and on the 22d day of May, 1895, said garnishment was served on the Southern Insurance Company, one of the garnishees. On the 20th day of June, 1895, said garnishee filed its written answer, and, being required to answer orally, did answer orally, admitting an indebtedness to defendant, Pratt City, in the sum of $1,000, due and payable 60 days after the 18th day of June, 1895. The answer of the garnishee set forth that the indebtedness was under a policy of insurance on the public hall and market house; that defendant claims that said money is exempt from garnishment under the law, because it is insurance money on public buildings, and the said answer asked the court to direct the payment of said money. Defendant filed in court its claim of exemptions. The plaintiff contested this claim of exemptions and upon the contest it was shown by the undisputed evidence that the buildings which had been burned were used for municipal purposes. The other facts of the case are sufficiently stated in the opinion. The court overruled the motion of the plaintiff for a judgment against the garnishee and rendered judgment discharging the garnishee. From this judgment the plaintiff appeals, and assigns the same as error.

Bowman & Harsh, for appellant.

J. J Aird and Houghton & Collier, for appellee.

HARALSON J.

1. Section 2514 of the Code provides, that "all property, real or personal, belonging to the several counties or municipal corporations of this state, and used for county or municipal purposes, shall be exempt from levy and sale under any process, judgment or decree whatsoever." In Mayor, etc., v. Rumsey, 63 Ala. 352, touching the power of municipal corporations to purchase and hold property for municipal purposes, this court said: "We do not hesitate to declare, that city property owned or used by the corporation for public purposes, such as public buildings, public markets, hospitals, cemeteries, engine houses, fire engines and their apparatus, and other property, real or personal, of kindred utility, cannot be taken in execution for debts of the city. But if the city owns private property, not useful or used for corporate purposes, such property may be seized and sold under final process, precisely as similar property of ; individuals is seized and sold. 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 446." And in a still more recent case,-Murphree v. City of Mobile, 104 Ala. 532, 16 So. 544,-it was held, "that where land owned by a city has been used for municipal purposes for a great number of years, the fact that for a short time during such continuous use the city did not have occasion to use all of said property, or that there was a temporary use of it for private purposes at a small rental, does not change the character of the use to which the property was applied, and the land does not thereby lose its exemption from levy and sale under execution as provided by section 2514 of the Code." Klein v. New Orleans, 99 U.S. 149.

It cannot be doubted, under our holdings, that the city hall in Pratt City, under the facts disclosed, was municipal property, held and used by the city for municipal purposes, exempt from levy and sale under any judicial process, judgment or decree.

2. It is well settled by the current of authority, that where a debtor's property, being his family homestead, burns down, being insured against loss by fire, the insurance money takes the place in the exemption statute of the property destroyed, and, like it, is also exempt, and not liable to garnishment. Thomp. Homest. & Ex. § 750. The reason of the rule is found in the fact, that the property has been exempted by law for the use of the exemptor and his family and he may insure it to protect himself and them from loss. It is intended by the insurance, to secure the means, in case of loss, for the restoration of the property after its destruction by fire. Not to allow the insurance money after loss, to take the place of the property destroyed, and be exempt from liability to the debts of the exemptor, would, by a mere technical evasion, pervert the object and spirit of the statutes of exemptions, always to be liberally construed in favor of the exemptor. The same rule applies to exempted personal property. Houghton v. Lee, 50 Cal. 101; Hall...