Ellis v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.
| Decision Date | 04 November 1944 |
| Docket Number | 36228. |
| Citation | 152 P.2d 860,159 Kan. 213 |
| Parties | ELLIS v. KROGER GROCERY & BAKING CO. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Dec. 15, 1944.
Syllabus by the Court.
Ordinarily statutes are designed to operate prospectively rather than retrospectively and they will not be given the latter effect unless it clearly appears that they were intended to so operate.
Where a retrospective construction of a statute will disturb vested rights, the statute will not be given a retrospective construction unless the wording of the statute makes such construction imperative.
The 1943 amendment authorizing recovery of a lump-sum judgment on compensation award upon default in payment of any installment thereof covers installment payments which were to become due and payable in the future irrespective of whether the judgment was rendered before or after the passage of the amendment. Laws 1943, c. 189.
Where parties are within the Workmen's Compensation Act the substantive rights of the parties are determined by the law in effect on the date of the workman's injury.
The 1943 amendment authorizing recovery of a lump-sum judgment on compensation award upon default in payment of any installment is supplemental and remedial in character and does not impair vested rights of the employer. Laws 1943, c. 189.
A statute which merely changes a remedy is not unconstitutional, although it is applied retroactively.
The 1943 amendment authorizing recovery of a lump-sum judgment on compensation award upon default in payment of any installment thereof, including those due and payable in the future, is not invalid for uncertainty. Laws 1943, c. 189.
The 1943 amendment authorizing recovery of a lump-sum judgment on compensation award upon default in payment of any installment is only supplemental to existing remedies and is not unconstitutional on ground that it amends certain provisions of the compensation law without containing the sections so amended. Laws 1943, c. 189; Const. art. 2, § 16.
Statutes which effect the amendment of existing laws by implication are not within purview of constitutional provision that no law shall be amended unless the new act contain the entire act or section amended. Const. art. 2, § 16.
A letter clearly indicating that employee wanted the employer to pay past-due compensation installments, although more of a request than a demand, was a sufficient compliance with statute providing for recovery of a lump-sum judgment upon employer's failure to pay past-due installments upon written "demand". Laws 1943, c. 189.
A demand for payment of past-due compensation installments by registered mail addressed to counsel for employer in the compensation proceeding, to whose office payments had been made, and addressed to employer's local store was sufficient compliance with statute requiring demand for payment to be made on the person, firm or corporation liable to pay the same before action could be brought for lump-sum judgment. Laws 1943, c. 189.
The Workmen's Compensation Act must be liberally construed in favor of the workman.
In action for lump-sum judgment for entire compensation award under statute permitting such recovery upon failure to pay past-due installments, excluding employer's proffered evidence that the award was for an unscheduled injury, that application for review had been made and that employer had requested employee to submit to physical examination, was not error where application and request were made after the employer had failed to comply with demand for payment under the amended law and after district court had acquired jurisdiction of action for lump-sum judgment. Laws 1943, c 189.
1. Ordinarily statutes are designed to operate prospectively rather than retrospectively and they will not be given the latter effect unless it clearly appears they were intended to so operate.
2. When a retrospective construction of a statute will disturb vested rights, the statute will not be given a retrospective construction unless the wording of the statute makes such a construction imperative.
3. A statute which merely changes a remedy is not invalid. There are no vested rights to any particular remedy.
4. The provisions of G.S.1943 Supp. 44-512a authorizing, under conditions therein stated, the rendition of a lump-sum judgment covering all installments of compensation including those due and payable in the future, examined and held: (a) The statute is supplemental and remedial in character; (b) it does not impair vested rights of the employer; and (c) it does not contravene provisions of article 2, section 16 of our state constitution.
5. Complaints relating to the exclusion of evidence examined and not sustained.
Appeal from District Court, Crawford County; L. M. Resler, Judge.
Action by Wesley John Ellis, employee, against Kroger Grocery & Baking Company, employer, to obtain a lump-sum judgment covering all past and future weekly installment payments provided for in a workmen's compensation award. Judgment for plaintiff, and the employer appeals.
See also, 152 P.2d 869.
Lawrence M. Walker, of Pittsburg, and A. Harry Crane, of Topeka (F. H. Richart, of Joplin, Mo., on the brief), for appellant.
Sylvan Bruner and Pete Farabi, both of Pittsburg, for appellee.
This action was brought in the district court to obtain a lump-sum judgment covering all past and future weekly installment payments provided for in a judgment previously rendered in a workmen's compensation case. Plaintiff, the workman, prevailed and defendant, the employer, appeals.
The instant action was brought pursuant to a 1943 law which became effective after the judgment of the district court in the compensation case had been rendered. Appellant contends the legislature did not intend the law should operate retroactively but prospectively and challenges its validity if it be held to apply retroactively. Appellant also contends that if the 1943 law authorizing an action for a lump-sum judgment be held valid as to a judgment for compensation previously rendered, then the judgment rendered in the instant case cannot stand by reason of certain trial errors.
The workman was injured May 7, 1942. Both parties appealed from the award of the commissioner. On March 23, 1943, the district court rendered its judgment, the pertinent portion of which reads:
The entire statute upon which the instant action is based, Chapter 189, Laws of 1943 (G.S.1943 Supp. 44-512a) including its title reads:
competent jurisdiction for the collection thereof in like manner as for the collection of a debt. The remedies of execution, attachment, garnishment or any other remedy or procedure for the collection of a debt now provided by the laws of this state shall apply to such action and also to all judgments entered under the provisions of section 44-529 of the General Statutes of 1935: Provided, No exemption granted by any law shall apply except the homestead exemption granted and guaranteed by the constitution of this state.
The statute became effective March 24, 1943, one day after rendition of judgment in the compensation case. The last weekly compensation payment under the judgment was made November 2, 1943, to and including November 9th.
On November 29, 1943, the attorney for appellee sent a letter by registered mail to the attorney for appellant which was as follows:
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...Hardwood Floors, Inc., 190 Kan. 809, 378 P.2d 80; Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 Kan. 295, 303 P.2d 197; Ellis v. Kroger Grocery Co., 159 Kan. 213, 152 P.2d 860, 155 A.L.R. 546.)" 220 Kan. at In Hendrix v. City of Topeka, 231 Kan. 113, 643 P.2d 129 (1982), this court, in refusing to apply ......
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