Ellis v. Patonai, 2006 Ohio 5054 (Ohio App. 9/29/2006)
| Decision Date | 29 September 2006 |
| Docket Number | C. A. No. 06CA0012. |
| Citation | 2006 Ohio 5054 |
| Parties | William M. Ellis, et al., Appellees, v. Deborah S. Patonai aka Deborah S. Phillips, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Judgment Entered in the Court of Common Pleas County of Wayne, Ohio, Case No. 05 CV 0049.
Timothy B. Pettorini and Elizabeth Krieder Wright, Attorneys at Law, 225 N. Market Street, P.O. Box 599, Wooster, Ohio 44691, for Appellant.
Robert J. Reynolds, Attorney at Law, 441 West Liberty Street, P.O. Box 958, Wooster, Ohio 44691, for Appellees.
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following disposition is made:
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Deborah Patonai has appealed from the judgment of the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
{¶2} Appellant owns two lots in the Happy Trails Allotment in Wayne County. At the time Appellant purchased the lots with her now ex-husband, her deed noted that it was subject to restrictions of record. Appellant did not investigate what these restrictions were, despite the fact that they were properly filed with the plat of the development. Appellant has a home on one of the lots and operates an alpaca farm on the other. Appellant and her now ex-husband started the farm with the purchase of three alpacas in 1996. Since that time, Appellant's farm has grown through natural birth cycles, and Appellant now owns more than twenty alpacas and boards several others. Since the inception of the farm, Appellant has expended more than $200,000 to operate the farm.
{¶3} In October of 2004, Appellant received a letter, dated October 15, 2004, informing her that she was in violation of several of the allotment's restrictive covenants. The letter indicated that Appellant was running a business on her lot and harboring more than two animals on the lot, both violations of the restrictive covenants. The letter was signed by "The Happy Trails Homeowner's Action Committee." Appellant did not stop operating her farm and suit was filed against her on January 26, 2005. Appellees, seventeen residents of the allotment, sought an injunction which would prohibit Appellant from continuing to operate her farm.
{¶4} Following discovery, the matter proceeded to a bench trial. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found for Appellees. In so doing, the trial court permanently restrained Appellant from owning more than four alpacas, ordered that she reduce her herd to four within ninety days, and ordered that she maintain her property free from underbrush and unsightly growth.1 Appellant has timely appealed the trial court's judgment, raising three assignments of error for review.
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED [APPELLANT'S] MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND DETERMINED THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS WERE VALID, DESPITE THE AMBIGUITY OF THE TERM `ANIMALS.'"
{¶5} In her first assignment of error, Appellant has asserted that the trial court erred in enforcing the restrictive covenants. Specifically, Appellant has argued that the term "animals" is ambiguous and prevents enforcement of the covenant. We disagree.
{¶6} The construction of written instruments, including deeds is a matter of law. Karam v. High Hampton Development, Inc., 9th Dist. Nos. 21265 & 21269, 2003-Ohio-3310, at ¶20, citing Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co. (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 241, paragraph one of the syllabus. Questions of law are determined de novo. Graham v. Drydock Coal Co. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 311, 313, quoting Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Guman Bros. Farm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 107, 108.
{¶7} The rules of construction applicable to restrictive covenants are well established. Generally, restrictions on the free use of land are disfavored. Driscoll v. Austintown Assoc. (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 263, 276-77; Benner v. Hammond (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 822, 827. If the covenant's language is indefinite, doubtful, and capable of contradictory interpretations, the court must construe the covenant in favor of the free use of land. Houk v. Ross (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 77, paragraph two of the syllabus. Where the language in a restriction is clear, a court must enforce the restriction. Dean v. Nugent Canal Yacht Club, Inc. (1990), 66 Ohio App.3d 471, 475. Accordingly, when interpreting a restrictive covenant, common, undefined words appearing in the written instrument "will be given their ordinary meaning unless manifest absurdity results, or some other meaning is clearly evidenced from the face or overall contents of the instrument." Alexander, 53 Ohio St.2d at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶8} Furthermore, the goal of interpreting the language of a restrictive covenant is to determine the intent of the parties as reflected by the language used in the restriction. Hitz v. Flower (1922), 104 Ohio St. 47, 57. Courts must give words used in a restrictive covenant their common and ordinary meaning. Arnoff v. Chase (1920), 101 Ohio St. 331, 334; Devendorf v. Akbar Petroleum Corp. (1989), 62 Ohio App.3d 842, 845. In addition, courts must read the restrictive covenants as a whole. LuMac Dev. Corp. v. Buck Point Ltd. Partnership (1988), 61 Ohio App.3d 558, 563.
{¶9} Appellant has alleged that the following covenant is ambiguous:
Specifically, Appellant has asserted that the word "animals" is ambiguous. In support of her argument, Appellant relies upon the definition of animal contained in the Federal Animal Welfare Act. We find that Appellant's argument lacks merit.
{¶10} Initially, we note that the Animal Welfare Act has no relevance to the instant action and its definition has no bearing on the matters herein. The mere fact that the term "animals" is capable of being defined in more than one fashion depending upon its context does not permit this Court to abandon our well-established rules of construction. "Animal" is defined as follows:
"[A]ny of a kingdom (Animalia) of living beings typically differing from plants in capacity for spontaneous movement and rapid motor response to stimulation *** one of the lower animals as distinguished from man[.]" Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1980) 45.
Applying this ordinary meaning does not result in manifest absurdity. Accordingly, "animals" must be given its ordinary meeting. Alexander, 53 Ohio St.2d at paragraph two of the syllabus. We, therefore, find no error in the trial court's determination that the above covenant was unambiguous. Appellant's first assignment of error lacks merit.
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ENFORCED THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AND REFUSED TO APPLY THE DOCTRINES OF LACHES, WAIVER AND ABANDONMENT."
{¶11} In her second assignment of error, Appellant has argued that the trial court erred in awarding Appellees injunctive relief. Specifically, Appellant has asserted that Appellees' relief is foreclosed by the doctrine of laches. This Court disagrees.
{¶12} "Laches is an omission to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party." Baughman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 160 Ohio App.3d 642, 2005-Ohio-1948, at ¶10. To succeed utilizing the doctrine of laches, one must establish: "(1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right; (2) absence of an excuse for such delay; (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party." Connolly Constr. Co. v. Yoder, 3d Dist. No. 12-04-39, 2005-Ohio-4624, at ¶23, citing State ex rel. Cater v. N. Olmsted (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 315, 325. Accordingly, "[d]elay in asserting a right does not of itself constitute laches." State ex rel. Scioto Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Gardner (1996), 113 Ohio App.3d 46, 57, quoting Smith v. Smith (1959), 168 Ohio St. 447, at paragraph three of the syllabus. Instead, the proponent must demonstrate that he or she has been materially prejudiced by the unreasonable and unexplained delay of the person asserting the claim. Connin v. Bailey (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 34, 35-36.
{¶13} Generally, the delay is measured from the point in time at which the complaining party, having actual or constructive knowledge of the violation of the restrictive covenant, reasonably could have instituted suit. Cox v. Garrett (Aug. 23, 1982), 2d Dist. No. 81-CA-69, at *2.
"In actions to enforce restrictive building covenants reasonably prompt action may be essential to the avoidance of good faith expenditures by an individual seeking to add improvements to his property.
"Prejudice, generally the critical element in the doctrine of laches, may involve, inter alia, a good faith change of position in reliance upon a complainant's inaction, the acquisition of rights by innocent third parties, the loss of essential evidence or testimony, or the expenditure of money or incurring of obligations upon belief of possession of a clear or unencumbered right." (Internal citations omitted; emphasis added.) Id.
We note that the improvements to Appellant's property, such as her expenditures in building the barn, are not at issue herein. Appellees have not asserted that Appellant's improvements to the land are in violation of any of the restrictions and the trial court's order does not require Appellant to remove any of the physical improvements made to her property. Furthermore, as Appellant has alternatives available to her to maintain her investment, such as boarding her animals or selling them outright, this Court finds that the "prompt action" standard discussed in Cox is inapplicable. Additionally, once the proponent of laches has demonstrated an unreasonable delay, the burden then shifts to the complaining party to provide...
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