Ellis v. State, 02S00-9609-CR-625

• Citation: 707 N.E.2d 797
• Decision Date: 16 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. 02S00-9609-CR-625,02S00-9609-CR-625
• Parties: William ELLIS, Sr., Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 797

707 N.E.2d 797

William ELLIS, Sr., Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 02S00-9609-CR-625.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 16, 1999.

Timothy E. Stucky, Wyss, McNellis, Riebenback & Myers, Fort Wayne, Attorneys for Appellant.

Jeffery A, Modisett, Attorney General, Preston W. Black, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Attorneys for Appellee.

ON DIRECT APPEAL

SULLIVAN, Justice.

Defendant William Ellis, Sr., was convicted of murder for shooting another man to death. Finding no trial court error, we reject Defendant's multiple challenges to his conviction, including claims that there was insufficient evidence of his guilt and that his confession was improperly admitted into evidence. We also affirm the trial court with respect to Defendant's sentencing claims except for one matter which requires remand.

We have jurisdiction over this direct appeal because the longest single sentence exceeds fifty years. Ind. Const. art. VII, § 4; Ind. Appellate Rule 4(A)(7).

Background

On March 31, 1995, Defendant, John Runner and James Jones went to the home of Defendant's sister, Stacey Ellis, in Fort Wayne. Soon afterwards, they were joined by the victim, Rickey Burris.

Burris, accompanied by Defendant, Runner, Jones and Stacey Ellis, went for a drive in Burris's car. Returning to Stacey Ellis' home, Burris and Stacey Ellis began arguing. During the argument, Runner pulled Burris out of the car and struck him. Entering Stacey's home, Runner and Jones began to beat Burris. Defendant and Jones then placed Burris in the trunk of Burris's car.

Defendant and Runner, driving Burris's car, picked up Defendant's brother, Christopher Ellis, and the three drove to an abandoned building on Pontiac Street. Upon arrival, Christopher handed Defendant a gun and the two took Burris out of the trunk. Defendant and Christopher Ellis then took Burris to the basement of the building, where Defendant placed Burris on a chair and shot him repeatedly.

On May 3, 1995, Fort Wayne police received a tip regarding Burris's death. Later that day, police found Burris's body in the basement of the Pontiac Street building. An autopsy revealed that Burris had been shot three times in the back of the head as well as in his left arm and upper torso. The cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds to the head.

On the morning of May 9, 1995, Defendant, and his brother and sister, Christopher Ellis and Stacey Ellis, were picked up by members of the Fort Wayne Police Department and taken in for questioning concerning the death of Ricky Burris. The three were separated and questioned by officers Frederick Rogers and Don Flueckiger. The officers first questioned Stacey Ellis, who implicated Defendant and herself in Burris's beating and death.

Officers next spoke with Defendant. Defendant was advised of, and waived, his Miranda rights prior to speaking with police. In his initial statement, Defendant denied any involvement in Burris's death. However, upon viewing a videotaped statement given by Stacey Ellis implicating him, Defendant gave a second statement admitting that he was present at the Pontiac Street building but contending that James Jones was responsible for Burris's death.

Officer Flueckiger then examined Defendant's shoes and noted to Defendant that his shoes were approximately the same size as shoe prints found near Burris's body. Upon hearing this, Defendant admitted that he entered the basement, set up a chair and placed Burris on the chair. He insisted, however, that Jones shot Burris. Officer Rogers then interviewed Christopher Ellis, who implicated Defendant and himself in Burris's death, stating that he and Defendant had entered the basement of the Pontiac Street building.

Officer Rogers then interviewed Defendant again. At approximately 5:06 p.m., Defendant stated that he understood his Miranda rights and wished to waive them. Officer Rogers then played some of Christopher Ellis's videotaped statement. After viewing the statement, Defendant gave a third statement. In this statement, which police videotaped, Defendant admitted that he and Christopher Ellis had entered the basement on Pontiac Street, that Jones was not present, and that he himself had shot Burris.

Discussion

Defendant presents six issues for this Court's consideration: (1) whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant's conviction for murder; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress his confession; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting the fact that Defendant's brother was dead without also permitting evidence as to the date and cause of his death; (4) whether the trial court erred in refusing the Defendant's tendered jury instruction concerning the burden of proof; (5) whether the trial court erred at sentencing by failing to consider mitigating circumstances and enhancing the sentence; and (6) whether the trial court utilized the proper sentencing statute.

I

Defendant contends that because the State presented no physical evidence tending to incriminate him, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for murder. We disagree.

Our standard of review for sufficiency of evidence claims is well established. This Court neither reweighs evidence nor resolves questions of credibility; rather, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Blanche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind.1998); Jones v. State, 689 N.E.2d 722, 724 (Ind.1997). We will affirm a conviction if, considering that evidence and those inferences, we find substantial evidence of probative value to support the judgment. Blanche 690 N.E.2d at 712; Minter v. State, 653 N.E.2d 1382, 1383 (Ind.1995).

Although the police never recovered the murder weapon in this case, Defendant gave a videotaped statement admitting that he shot the victim. In his account, Defendant said that the victim was beaten at Stacey Ellis's home and placed in the trunk of the victim's car. Defendant also stated that he drove the victim's car to pick up Christopher Ellis and that he and Christopher took the victim to the basement of the building on Pontiac Street. And Defendant admitted that once in the basement, he repeatedly shot the victim.

Defendant's challenge to the admissibility of this statement aside, ¹ additional evidence corroborates his account. First, physical evidence collected at Stacey's home containing blood and proteins of human origin corroborated Defendant's account of the fight. Also, James Jones and John Runner gave accounts of the fighting at Stacey's home similar to that offered by Defendant. Runner testified that after Jones and Defendant beat the victim and placed him in the trunk of the victim's car, he, Defendant, and Christopher Ellis drove to the building on Pontiac Street. Runner further testified that Christopher Ellis gave Defendant a gun, after which Christopher Ellis and the Defendant entered the building with the victim, shots were fired, and the two men returned without the victim. Finally, Defendant's statement proved consistent with the murder scene, where the police found the victim near a chair in the basement of the Pontiac Street building and subsequent tests revealed that the victim had been shot repeatedly with the same gun.

Defendant questions the credibility of John Runner's and James Jones's testimony, characterizing it as "self-serving, contradictory and conflicting." (Appellant's Amended Appeal Br. at 11). However, judging the credibility of witnesses lies squarely within the province of the jury and we will not reassess its credibility determinations. Gee v. State, 526 N.E.2d 1152, 1153 (Ind.1988). We find that there existed substantial evidence of probative value from which the trier of fact could find Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

II

Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting into evidence his videotaped statement. In arguing that he gave the incriminating statement involuntarily, Defendant claims that (1) the police used deceit with respect to footprints found at the scene of the crime; (2) the police used improper threats of prosecution of Defendant's brother and sister; and (3) at the time of his interrogation Defendant was suffering from a lack of sleep and was impaired by alcohol and drugs.

The decision whether to admit a defendant's custodial statement is within the discretion of the trial court. Horan v. State, 682 N.E.2d 502, 509 (Ind.1997); Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 56 (Ind.1995). In making a determination as to the voluntariness of a statement, the trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances. Fields v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1315, 1320 (Ind.1997). The court attempts to insure that a confession was not obtained "through inducement, violence, threats or other improper influences so as to overcome the free will of the accused." Id. (quoting Collins v. State, 509 N.E.2d 827, 830 (Ind.1987)).

When reviewing a challenge to the trial court's decision, we do not reweigh the evidence but instead examine the record for substantial, probative evidence of voluntariness. Jones, 655 N.E.2d at 56. The record shows that once in custody, the police advised Defendant of his Miranda rights, he signed a waiver form, and stated that he understood his rights and wished to give a statement. The police questioned Defendant for just over four hours with interruptions. The police later testified that this time was typical in murder investigations. Before giving his final statement, police advised Defendant of his Miranda rights a second time. Defendant again signed a waiver form and indicated that he wished to give a statement. From this evidence, we find that the trial court could have properly concluded that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.

As for Defendant's assertions that the police...