Ellison v. Berryhill, Civil Action No. 16–602
| Decision Date | 23 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 16–602 |
| Citation | 263 F.Supp.3d 135 |
| Parties | Steven ELLISON, Plaintiff, v. Nancy A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Stephen F. Shea, Elkind & Shea, Silver Spring, MD, for Plaintiff
Lauren Donner Chait, Social Security Administration Office of the General Counsel, Region III, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant
Plaintiff Steven Ellison ("Plaintiff") commenced this action against the Acting Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant"), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking reversal of an Administrative Law Judge's decision denying Plaintiff's claim for Supplemental Social Income Benefits. See Complaint (ECF No. 1) at 1. Pending for determination by the court are Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment of Reversal ("Plaintiff's Motion") (ECF No. 10) and Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Affirmance ("Defendant's Motion") (ECF No. 11).2 Upon consideration of the motions, the memoranda in support thereof and opposition thereto, the administrative record, and the entire record herein, the court will grant, in part, Plaintiff's Motion and deny Defendant's Motion.
On September 13, 2012, Plaintiff applied for Supplemental Security Income Benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, alleging December 5, 2005 as the onset date of his disability. Plaintiff's Memorandum (ECF No. 10–1) at 1. Plaintiff cited gout, arthritis
, swollen joint and hypertension as the bases for his claim of disability. Id. The Social Security Administration ("SSA") denied Plaintiff's disability claims initially and upon reconsideration. Id.
Following the denial, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Said hearing took place on June 24, 2014. Id. at 2. On November 5, 2014, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Id. at 2. In the decision, the ALJ utilized the five-step process outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 to determine whether Plaintiff was disabled. Administrative Record ("AR") (ECF No. 7–3) at 5.
At Step One, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the application date. Id . at 7. At Step Two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: "gouty arthritis
and osteoarthritis and allied disorder." Id. At Step Three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's impairment did not meet or medically equal the severity of any listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, specifically considering Listing 1.02. Id . at 8.3 At Step Four, the ALJ conducted a residual functional capacity assessment of the Plaintiff and found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform less than full range of medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c), but could frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, climb ramps and stairs, and occasionally climb ropes, ladder and scaffolds. Id. Additionally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. Id. at 12. At Step Five, after considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity ("RFC"), the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was able to perform other work and thus, was not disabled, as defined by the Social Security Act. Id. at 17–18.
Thereafter, Plaintiff sought review of the decision by the Appeals Council. Plaintiff's Memorandum (ECF No. 10–1) at 2. The Appeals Council rejected Plaintiff's request, concluding that there was no basis for granting review of the ALJ's denial. Id.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's decision must be reversed because his assessment of Plaintiff's RFC was not supported by substantial evidence. Primarily, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiff's "periodic flare-ups of gouty arthritis
[,]" Plaintiff's "primary impairment[,]" when determining Plaintiff's RFC. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 5. More specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ's failure to consider the "frequency and duration" of Plaintiff's flares resulted in an inaccurate analysis of and determination with respect to Plaintiff's RFC. Plaintiff's Reply (ECF No. 16) at 4. Plaintiff asserts that during his episodes of flares, he has difficulty performing basic tasks, and the ALJ should have assessed Plaintiff's ability to sustain gainful employment during a flare-up period to accurately discern Plaintiff's RFC. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 5 (). According to Plaintiff's testimony, the flares induced by his condition occur "between one time per week and one time per month" and "the length of the gout flare[ ] was reported to be anywhere from a few days to two weeks." Id. at 6.
Given the significant limitation of motor movements caused by his reoccurring flares, Plaintiff argues that the vocational expert could not have considered these impairments and still found Plaintiff capable of performing gainful employment activity, particularly after stating during the administrative hearing that "if an individual was absent from work as little as two days per month, the individual would not be employable." Plaintiff's Reply at 4 (citing AR at 78). Plaintiff concludes that as a result of the ALJ's failure to consider the effect of Plaintiff's gout flares on his ability to sustain substantial gainful employment, the RFC finding that Plaintiff could perform "medium exertional" work is unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. See id. at 23.
In response, Defendant asserts that the ALJ's RFC determination, in which the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform a limited range of medium work including standing, sitting or walking for six hours in an eight-hour day, was supported by substantial evidence in the record. As argued by Defendant, substantial evidence existed in the record to support the ALJ's determination, including the medical opinion of Dr. Randi Abramson (excluding her April 2012 letter), Dr. Fizzeh Nelson–Desiderio, a disability determination services physician, and Plaintiff's own testimony concerning his ability to perform daily activities. Defendant's Memorandum at 11–12.
In reply, Plaintiff reasserts the aforementioned arguments and challenges Defendant's attempt to apply a post-hoc rationalization to the ALJ's decision to deny Plaintiff's claim for benefits. In response, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's claims lack merit and the ALJ properly considered the evidence in the record and determined, based on substantial evidence, that Plaintiff was not disabled under the statutory definition outlined by the SSA.
The Social Security Act of 1935 ("the Act") established a framework to provide "disability insurance benefits" to eligible individuals and "supplemental security income" to individuals who have attained the age of 65, are blind, or disabled." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423, 1381, 1381a. The Act defines "disability" for non-blind individuals as "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) ; 20 C.F.R. § 416.905. A "disabled" individual is eligible for supplemental security income if he or she meets additional statutory requirements concerning income and resources. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a). The SSA has promulgated regulations, pursuant to the Act, outlining a five-step process for determining disability of adults. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
First, the agency evaluates whether the claimant is "doing substantial gainful activity." If so, the agency concludes that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b) ; 416.920(a)(4)(i), (b).
Second, if the claimant is not engaging in substantial gainful activity, the agency determines whether the claimant has a "severe medically determinable physical or medical impairment that meets the duration requirement ... or a combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration requirement ...." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).
Third, if deemed severe, the next question becomes whether the impairment "meets or equals one of the listings " in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a) (emphasis added). The "listings" refer to a "listing of impairments" which "describes for each of the major body systems impairments that [the agency] considers to be severe enough to prevent an individual from doing any gainful activity, regardless of his or her age, education, or work experience." Id.
Fourth, if the claimant's impairment does not satisfy one of the listings, the agency assesses the claimant's "residual functional capacity" to see whether the claimant is still capable of performing "past relevant work." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id. Residual functional capacity is "the most [an individual] can still do despite [his or her] limitations." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545.
Fifth, and finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his or her "past relevant work," the agency evaluates the claimant's "residual functional capacity and ... age, education, and work experience to see if [he or she] can make adjustment to other work." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g) ; 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g). If the claimant cannot make such an adjustment, the agency finds that the individual is "disabled." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1).
A claimant may seek judicial review in a district court of "any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party ...." 42 U.S.C. § 405...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Arora v. Buckhead Family Dentistry, Inc.
-
Nicholas L. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
...and the public with intense anxiety and avoidance—would preclude work. (See AR 86-90.) 5. Of note, in Ellison v. Berryhill, 263 F. Supp. 3d 135, 143-44 (D.D.C. 2017), another case involving a plaintiff who experienced episodic gout flares similar to Plaintiff's in this case, the court recen......