Elm Street/Mccracken Pike Preservation Alliance, Inc. v. Barrows, 2002-CA-001927-MR.
| Decision Date | 17 October 2003 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2002-CA-001927-MR.,2002-CA-001927-MR. |
| Parties | ELM STREET/MCCRACKEN PIKE PRESERVATION ALLIANCE, INC. APPELLANT, v. JOSEPHINE BARROWS; BLUEGRASS TRADITION, LLC; CITY OF VERSAILLES APPELLEES. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
T. Bruce Simpson, Jr., Lexington, Kentucky, BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT.
Robert L. Roark, WALTHER, ROARK, GAY & TODD, PLC Lexington, Kentucky, BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES.
BEFORE: EMBERTON, Chief Judge; McANULTY, Judge; HUDDLESTON, Senior Judge.1
VACATING AND REMANDING
The Elm Street/McCracken Pike Preservation Alliance2 appeals from a summary judgment in favor of Josephine Barrows and Bluegrass Tradition.3 The Developers appealed to Woodford Circuit Court from the denial of their application for a zoning change involving approximately 47 acres owned by Barrows.4 Because the findings of the Versailles-Midway-Woodford County Planning and Zoning Commission were supported by substantial evidence, the circuit court ordered the "Versailles City Council to adopt the proposal of the [planning commission] amending the zoning map to show that the [Barrows property] shall be zoned R-1B/PUD with a planned unit development overlay."
Since 1977, the Barrows property has been designated for future residential land use in the comprehensive plan, and that designation remained intact as of the most recent plan update in 1997. In 1999, the City of Versailles annexed the property into the city limits with the consent of Barrows based on its finding that the property was "suitable for residential subdivision or urban purposes without unreasonable delay." Currently, 41.197 acres of the Barrows property are being utilized for agricultural purposes although there is one single family residence on the portion of the farm currently zoned R1-A.
On May 8, 2000, the Developers filed an application for a zoning map amendment requesting that the zoning classification of the subject property be changed to R-4. The Developers subsequently decided to reconfigure their development plan in order to incorporate principles of new urbanism as defined by a task force appointed to study future development in Woodford County, and they amended their application to request that the property be classified as R-1C with a Planned Unit Development (PUD) overlay. After conducting a public hearing on both the zoning map amendment and conceptual development plan/preliminary plat, but prior to any motion, the chairman of the planning commission clarified that only the issues of the amendment and the PUD would be considered. No vote was taken on the preliminary plat.
On March 8, 2001, the planning commission held a public hearing on the zone change application at which the staff presented its report and introduced numerous exhibits. The Developers and the Alliance offered documentary and testimonial evidence in support of their respective positions. At a meeting held on May 10, 2001, the planning commission voted six to three in favor of recommending that the zoning classification of the Barrows property be changed to R-1B/PUD "based upon the Summary of Evidence and Findings and Conclusions presented on behalf of [the Developers], and the minutes of the public hearing held on March 8, 2001 . . . ." In so doing, the planning commission concluded that the zone map amendment, and the evidence offered in support thereof, "fits precisely within the land use and development standards of the 1997 Comprehensive Plan and further is in conformity with the princip[le]s of the Master Plan as recently approved" by the planning commission.
On July 17, 2001, the Versailles City Council convened to consider the recommendation of the planning commission. By a unanimous vote, the city council declined to conduct a public hearing or hear presentations from the parties. "After reviewing the entire record of the Planning Commission and listening to the summary statements from opposing counsel," the city attorney submitted a motion to disapprove the requested zoning change and "findings of fact" in support thereof on behalf of a council member which the city council unanimously approved.
On the same day, the Developers filed a complaint against the City of Versailles alleging that the city had acted arbitrarily and in excess of its authority in denying the recommendation of the planning commission thereby denying them due process of law. On August 24, 2001, before the Alliance had filed a responsive pleading, the Developers filed an amended complaint, again naming the City of Versailles as the defendant. The City of Versailles filed its answer on August 30, 2001 and, one week later, the Alliance filed a motion to intervene. Although the Alliance argued its motion on September 12, 2001, the circuit court did not grant the motion until November 13, 2001. While the motion was pending, Barrows deposed the members of the city council and those depositions were of record below.
The Developers then filed a motion for summary judgment to which both the City of Versailles and the Alliance responded. On April 26, 2002, the court held oral arguments on the matter. Because all parties agreed that there were no factual issues to be resolved, the sole issue as framed by the court was "whether the record supports the decision of the city council."
Drawing a parallel with Bryan v. Salmon Corp.,5 the circuit court determined that the decision of the city council was arbitrary "since there was not significant evidence to support any of its findings, some of its findings were beyond its authority, and some were irrelevant." Having read the depositions of the council members, the court concluded that the city council had improperly relied upon extraneous evidence not considered by the planning commission in reaching its decision. As the action taken by the planning commission was "supported by the record," the court concluded that it "had no choice but to order the City of Versailles to amend its zoning map to reflect the decision of the [planning commission] in this case."
Relevant for present purposes, the court resolved the threshold issue of whether the proper parties had been named as follows:
The first issue which must be resolved is [the Alliance's] argument that the complaint must be dismissed because it has named the improper party by naming the of instead Versailles of City the Versailles City Council. As grounds for that, [the Alliance] submits a charter of a municipal improvements corporation granted on December 8, 1965, and claims that that municipal improvements corporation is the party actually sued and not the Versailles City Council. As [the Developers] very correctly point out, the charter cited by [the Alliance] is for a municipal improvement corporation and is not the City of Versailles. [the Alliance's] argument is absurd. One need not look any further than the caption of one of the most significant planning and zoning cases in Kentucky, City of Louisville v. McDonald,[6] to see that the proper way to institute this action was to name the City of Versailles. It is this Court's decision that the City of Versailles is the proper party and the complaint will not be dismissed for that reason.
In denying the Alliance's subsequent motion to alter, amend or vacate the summary judgment, the court engaged in the following analysis of this issue:
Obviously, that argument was absurd and the Court pointed out that the City of Versailles was not a corporation, but a municipality and a local unit of government pursuant to Section 156 of the Constitution of Kentucky and KRS Chapter 81, et seq. However, [the Alliance] is quite correct that . . . City of Louisville v. McDonald, [] is not controlling on this issue since that case was decided prior to the amendment of KRS 100.347, which specifically requires that "[t]he legislative body shall be a party in any such appeal filed in the Circuit Court."
[The Alliance] now states that the case should be dismissed since: the Versailles City Council has never been named in this case; and more than 30 days have elapsed since the final decision in this matter. It is interesting to the Court that the City of Versailles and the members of the Versailles City Council which have participated in this litigation and are represented by the City Attorney have never raised this objection and, in fact, in their answer admitted that they were before the Court as the legislative body through the naming of the City of Versailles,[]. Although it is not dispositive of the issue in this case, the Court does question the ability of [the Alliance], who did not file to intervene until after the answer of the City of Versailles was filed and the 30 days had run, to raise an issue concerning jurisdiction over the original Defendant.
However, there is another reason this matter should not be dismissed. * * * All parties in their memorandums discussed items produced during the discovery which indicate that this was more than an appeal of an administrative body. [In] Greater Cincinnati Marine Service, Inc. v. City of Ludlow,[7] the [C]ourt held: "It is clear that the complaint judged by its content, is far more than an appeal under the aegis of KRS 100.347(2) []." Since this matter is clearly more than just an appeal, the requirements under Board of Adjustments v. City of Richmond v. Flood[8] of KRS 100.347(2) are not dispositive of this matter. Therefore, the complaint should not be dismissed.
On appeal, the Alliance argues that the failure to name the legislative body, i.e., the Versailles City Council, "is a clear jurisdictional defect and requires dismissal as a matter of law." In its view, City of...
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