Elmer Buchta Trucking, Inc. v. Stanley
| Decision Date | 16 July 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 14A01-9805-CV-164.,14A01-9805-CV-164. |
| Citation | 713 N.E.2d 925 |
| Parties | ELMER BUCHTA TRUCKING, INC., Appellant-Defendant, v. Christina STANLEY and Larry Stanley as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Michael G. Stanley, Deceased, Appellees-Plaintiffs. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Robert F. Wagner, Dina M. Cox, Lewis & Wagner, Indianapolis; D. Timothy Born, Shawn M. Sullivan, Terrell, Baugh, Salmon & Born, Evansville, for appellant.
John B. Drummy, Eric D. Johnson, Kightlinger & Gray, Indianapolis, amicus curiae.
James D. Johnson, Rudolph, Fine, Porter & Johnson, LLP, Evansville, amicus curiae for Defense Trial Counsel of Indiana.
F. Wesley Bowers, Bowers, Harrison, Kent & Miller, Evansville, amicus curiae.
James R. Fisher, Debra H. Miller, Ice Miller Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, for appellees.
William F. Conour, Conour Doehrman, Indianapolis, amicus curiae for Indiana Trial Lawyers Association.
Elmer Buchta Trucking, Inc. ("Buchta") appeals a judgment in favor of Christina Stanley and Larry Stanley as co-personal representatives of the Estate of Michael G. Stanley, deceased. Buchta raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as:
I. Whether the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the portion of Michael's lost earnings that he would have consumed for his personal maintenance.
II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing two of Buchta's tendered jury instructions.
We affirm.1
Michael died as a result of injuries he sustained during a collision between his vehicle and a truck driven by an agent of Buchta. The co-representatives of Michael's estate brought a wrongful death action against Buchta. Buchta admitted liability, and the case proceeded to trial on the issue of damages. The jury returned a verdict of $6,243,189.00, upon which the trial court entered judgment against Buchta. This appeal ensued.
Buchta contends that the trial court erred by excluding evidence regarding the portion of Michael's lost earnings that Michael would have consumed for his personal maintenance. Buchta sought to introduce this "personal maintenance" evidence in order to reduce the damage award by proving that a portion of Michael's lost earnings would have been unavailable to his family even if he had lived to his expected age. The trial court granted the Stanleys' motion in limine to exclude such evidence. Buchta preserved the issue for appeal by making an offer to prove at trial in which an expert testified that Michael would have consumed approximately twenty-four percent of his lifetime earnings for his personal maintenance.2
Initially, we note our standard of review. We will reverse a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence only for an abuse of discretion. Paullus v. Yarnelle, 633 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind.Ct.App.1994),reh. denied, trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the court has misinterpreted the law. McCullough v. Archbold Ladder Co., 605 N.E.2d 175, 180 (Ind.1993).
Buchta contends that the trial court abused its discretion by misinterpreting Indiana's Wrongful Death Act ("the Act"). Buchta argues that the Act requires that damages based upon a decedent's lost earnings be reduced by personal maintenance expenses. Buchta concludes that the trial court must admit personal maintenance evidence, and that failure to do so is an abuse of discretion. On the other hand, the Stanleys contend that the Act requires the full amount of a decedent's lost earnings be included in a damage award. Thus, the Stanleys argue that personal maintenance evidence is never admissible in a wrongful death action, and the trial court lacks discretion to admit such evidence.
Wrongful death actions in Indiana are based entirely upon statute. Ed Wiersma Trucking Co. v. Pfaff, 643 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), adopted on transfer, 678 N.E.2d 110 (Ind.1997); see IND.CODE § 34-1-1-2 (1993)3; IND.CODE § 34-1-1-8 (1993)4 (). Legislative authorization is necessary because at common law there was no liability in tort for killing another. Ed Wiersma, 643 N.E.2d at 911. Because actions for wrongful death are in derogation of the common law, they are strictly construed. Southlake Limousine and Coach, Inc. v. Brock, 578 N.E.2d 677, 679 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), trans. denied. Moreover, only those damages prescribed by the wrongful death statute may be recovered. Ed Wiersma, 643 N.E.2d at 911; Southlake Limousine, 578 N.E.2d at 679.
Since 1965, the damage provision of the wrongful death act has provided, in relevant part, as follows:
When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, ... the damages shall be in such an amount as may be determined by the court or jury, including, but not limited to, reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expenses, and lost earnings of such deceased person resulting from said wrongful act or omission.
IC 34-1-1-2; see 1965 Ind. Acts 305, ch. 174, § 1. Prior to 1965, the Act made no mention of lost earnings. See 1957 Ind. Acts 43-44, ch. 25, § 1. Nevertheless, the Indiana Supreme Court had long interpreted the damage provision of the Act to permit recovery for a decedent's lost earnings. Pittsburg, C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Burton, 139 Ind. 357, 37 N.E. 150, 156 (1894), reh. denied, 139 Ind. 357, 38 N.E. 594 (1894). However, the supreme court had also required that those damages be reduced by the decedent's personal maintenance expenses. Burton, 37 N.E. at 156. Since the 1965 amendment adding the language regarding lost earnings, Indiana's appellate courts have not addressed whether trial courts are required to admit or exclude evidence of personal maintenance expenses pursuant to this provision.5 Buchta contends that the General Assembly's inclusion of the lost earnings language did not affect the pre-1965 interpretations of the Act. In support of its argument, Buchta refers to the Act's underlying policy and purpose and to various rules of statutory construction. Before looking to these matters, however, we must first examine the plain language of the Act.
Our primary goal in construing a statute is to determine and effectuate the General Assembly's intent. Sullivan v. Day, 681 N.E.2d 713, 717 (Ind.1997); Smith v. State, 675 N.E.2d 693, 696 (Ind.1996). However, "[j]udicial construction of a statute is inappropriate where a statute is clear and unambiguous." Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912, 915 (Ind.1993). Therefore, we need only look to other rules of statutory construction where the Act's plain language is ambiguous. A statute is ambiguous where it is susceptible to more than one interpretation. Id.
Buchta contends that the damage provision of the Act as it relates to lost earnings is ambiguous. The Stanleys contend that the damage provision is unambiguous and that the plain language of the act mandates that a wrongful death plaintiff recover the entire amount of a decedent's lost earnings without an offset for personal maintenance. We agree with the Stanleys.
The Act provides in relevant part: "... the damages shall be in such an amount as may be determined by the court or jury, including, but not limited to, ... lost earnings of such deceased person...." IC 34-1-1-2. As Buchta observes, this statute vests the fact-finder with the discretion to determine the amount of the wrongful death damages. However, contrary to Buchta's contention, the statute also specifies, in part, the manner by which these damages are to be determined. The phrase "including, but not limited to, ... lost earnings of such deceased person" refers to and describes the subject of the sentence—"damages." Thus, the statute specifies that wrongful death damages include the decedent's lost earnings. There is nothing ambiguous about this requirement. Although the fact-finder retains the discretion to weigh the evidence and determine the amount of lost earnings, the fact-finder lacks discretion to omit any of the decedent's lost earnings from the damage award.
Furthermore, the meaning of "lost earnings of such deceased person" is not ambiguous. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1970) defines "lost" as "not made use of: WASTED" or "not claimed: FORFEITED." Id. at 1338. A decedent's "lost" earnings are those earnings a decedent has been denied as a result of his or her untimely death.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed.1990) defines "earnings" as:
Income. That which is earned; i.e., money earned from performance of labor, services, sale of goods, etc. Revenue earned by an individual or business. Earnings generally include but are not limited to: salaries and wages, interest and dividends, and income from self-employment. Term is broader in meaning than "wages."
Id. at 509. WEBSTER'S defines "earnings" as:
"a: something (as wages or dividends) earned as compensation for labor or the use of capital ... b: the balance of revenue for a specific period that remains after deducting related costs and expenses incurred...." Id. at 714. To the extent that these definitions contemplate expenses, it is business expenses, and not personal expenses, that are relevant. BLACK'S uses the term "income" to define "earnings." In turn, "income" is defined as: "The return in money from one's business, labor or capital invested; gains, profits, salary, wages, etc...." BLACK'S at 763. Personal expenses are not pertinent in determining the return in money from a person's business ventures. The WEBSTER'S definition refers to the costs and expenses that are incurred in the production of revenue. Again, personal expenses are not incurred in connection with producing revenue. Personal expenses are not pertinent to the calculation of a decedent's lost earnings.
Because the plain language of the Act requires a court or jury to include a decedent's lost earnings in the wrongful death...
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