Elmhurst Fire Co. v. City of New York

• Citation: 106 N.E. 920,213 N.Y. 87
• Parties: ELMHURST FIRE CO. v. CITY OF NEW YORK.
• Decision Date: 10 November 1914
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

213 N.Y. 87

106 N.E. 920

ELMHURST FIRE CO.

v.CITY OF NEW YORK.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 10, 1914.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Suit by the Elmhurst Fire Company against the City of New York . From a judgment of the Appellate Division (157 App. Div. 891,141 N. Y. Supp. 1118), modifying a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.Frank L. Polk, Corp. Counsel, of New York City (Curtis A. Peters, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Joseph J. Tuohy, of Long Island City, for respondent.

COLLIN, J.

The plaintiff, an incorporated association of present volunteer firemen, seeks a judgment annulling and canceling of record the taxes against its real estate in the city of New York for the years 1902 to 1909, inclusive, upon the ground that the property was exempt from taxation. The statute provided:

‘The following property shall be exempt from taxation: * * * 8. Real property of an incorporated association of present or former volunteer firemen actually and exclusively used and occupied by such corporation and not exceedings in value fifteen thousand dollars.’ Laws 1896, c. 908, § 4; Laws 1909, c. 62, § 4; Consol. Laws, c. 60, § 4.

Allegations of the complaint, admitted by the demurrer, are that the property of the plaintiff was through the years named actually and exclusively used by it, did not exceed in value the sum of $15,000, and was assessed at the sum of $4,200. The judgment of the Special Term annulling the taxes was modified (and correctly as the respondent concedes) by the Appellate Division, by striking therefrom the cancellation of the tax for 1902, and, as thus modified affirmed.

The defendant asserts: (a) The statute enacted that, if the value of the property was $15,000 or less, it was exempt; if the value exceeded $15,000, it was exempt to the extent of $15,000, and the balance of the value was taxable; (b) therefore the assessors, being obligated to determine the value of the property, had jurisdiction over it and the owner, which they presumptively exercised by judicially determining that the value was $19,200, and allowing the partial exemption of $15,000; and (c) having jurisdiction, their determination can be reviewed only by the statutory writ of certiorari (Tax Law, § 290, formerly § 250), not by a court of equity in a collateral action . The plaintiff asserts: (a) The statute enacted that, if the actual value of the property was $15,000 or less, it was exempt; if the value exceeded $15,000, there was no exemption, and the plaintiff was taxable upon the full value; and (b) as the value did not exceed $15,000, the assessors were without jurisdiction to assess, the taxes were invalid, and constitute a cloud upon the title which a court of equity will cancel. The assertions of the plaintiff are true.

[1][2] The power of taxation is vested in the absolute legitimate discretion of the Legislature. It alone can declare the property which shall be subject to or exempt from taxation. In the present case the primary inquiry is: Did the Legislature intend by the statute as quoted to create a partial or a conditional exemption? The language of the statute and the context convinces us that it intended the latter. The language is direct and not seriously ambiguous. It states, in effect, that the real property of the corporation, which is used as designated and is worth no more than $15,000, is exempt from taxation. Its meaning is not that the exemption shall not exceed the value of $15,000, and is that the property, to be exempt at all, shall not exceed in value that sum. The logical and natural decision is that its property which is not so used, or being so used, is worth more than $15,000, is not exempt. The context supports such decision. Thus the language of the subdivision next following that under discussion is:

‘All dwelling houses and lots of religious corporations while actually used by the officiating clergyman thereof (shall be exempt from taxation), but the total amount of such exemption to any one religious corporation shall not exceed two thousand dollars.’

Subdivision 11, after creating an exemption, states:

‘But the total amount of such exemption on account of both real and personal property shall not exceed fifteen hundred dollars.’

Other subdivisions (5, 7) create exemptions ‘to the extent of’ an ascertainable sum or value, while other subdivisions (18, 19) create exemptions, ‘provided that such exemption of property for any society in the...