Elmore v. Drainage Comm'rs

• Decision Date: 01 November 1890
• Citation: 135 Ill. 269,25 N.E. 1010
• Parties: ELMORE v. DRAINAGE COMMISSIONERS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

135 Ill. 269

25 N.E. 1010

ELMORE

v.DRAINAGE COMMISSIONERS.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 1, 1890.

Appeal from appellate court, third district.

Beach & Hodnett, for appellant.

T. N. Mehan, for appellees.

BAKER, J.

The defendant corporation was organized in the town of Mason City, Mason county, Ill., under the statute in force July 1, 1879, providing for the organization of drainage districts, and for the construction, maintenance, and repair of drains and ditches by special assessments on the property benefited thereby, the commissioners of highways being the drainage commissioners of said district. Appellant, who was plaintiff in the circuit court, is the owner of lands included in said district, and was assessed $800 for draining said lands; and, after the payment by him of such assessment, the defendant without his knowledge or consent enlarged the boundaries of said district by taking in a large area of territory including the greater part of Mason City, which territory had a natural drainage for the water falling thereon in a direction opposite to the lands of appellant; and defendant, by a system of drainage, collected the water falling on said area, and discharged all said water into the ditches on the lands of appellant, which were too small to carry off the additional water without enlarging the same, and also performed the work so carelessly and negligently as to overflow and submerge appellant's land with water from the territory so added to the district, and precipitated upon his lands. He thereby lost the crops planted thereon, and the use of the lands; and, having called the attention of the commissioners to the condition of his lands without avail, he brought this action in case against the corporation. The declaration contained three counts charging, substantially, the above facts and negligence on the part of the defendant in the construction of the drains, and in connecting the drains and ditches of the added territory with the drains running through appellant's lands, and negligence in failing to enlarge and give sufficient fall to the drains on appellant's lands, so as to carry off without damage the increased volume of water so discharged thereon. A general demurrer was interposed to the declaration, and sustained; and, appellant abiding by his declaration, a final judgment was rendered against him for costs. The judgment was affirmed in the appellate court, on the ground that the corporation is not liable in an action for the damages claimed in the declaration. The record has been brought here by appeal; and the assignments of error question the propriety of the judgment of affirmance entered in the appellate court.

That a private corporation, formed by voluntary agreement for private purposes, is held to respond in a civil action for its negligence or tort, goes without saying; and yet, in deciding the mooted question at issue in this case, it seems convenient to restate that proposition. So, also, it is admitted law that municipal corporations proper, such as villages, towns, and cities, which are incorporated by special charters, or voluntarily organized under general laws, are liable to individuals injured by their negligent or tortious conduct, or that of their agents or servants, in respect to corporate duties. In regard to public involuntary quasi corporations, the rule is otherwise, and there is no such implied liability imposed upon them. These latter, such as counties, townships, school-districts, road-districts, and other similar quasi corporations, exist under general laws of the state which apportion its territory into local subdivisions for the purposes of civil and governmental administration, and impose upon the people residing in said several subdivisions precise and limited public duties, and clothe them with restricted corporate functions, co-extensive with the duties devolved upon them. In such organizations, the duties and their correlative powers, are assumed in invitum, and there is no responsibility to respond in damages in a civil action for neglect in the performance of duties, unless such action is given by statute. 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. §§ 761, 762; Cooley, Const. Lim. 240, 247; Hedges v. County of Madison, 1 Gilman, 567;Town of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 346. The grounds upon which the liability of a municipal corporation proper is usually placed are that the duty is voluntarily assumed, and is clear, specific, and complete, and that the powers and means furnished for its proper performance are ample and adequate. Browning v. City of Springfield, 17 Ill. 143. In such case there is a perfect obligation, and a consequent civil liability, for neglect in all cases of special private damage. The non-liability of the public quasi corporation, unless liability is expressly declared, is usually placed upon these grounds: That the corporations are made such nolens volens; that their powers are limited and specific; and that no corporate funds are provided which can, without express provision of law, be appropriated to private indemnification. Consequently, in such case, the liability is one of imperfect obligation, and no civil action lies at the suit of an individual for non-performance of the duty imposed.

Does the declaration in this cause show a cause of action against the appellee corporation? The solution of this question depends upon the answer to be given to the inquiry, in what class of corporations does appellee fall? The reclamation of large bodies of swamp and overflowed lands, and their consequent improvement, is justly to be regarded as a matter of public concern. In fact, it was, in 1878, deemed by the people of the state to be of such public importance as to justify an amendment to the constitution of the state, wherein it was provided (by the amendment then made to section 31 of article 4 of...