Elmore v. Overton

• Decision Date: 07 January 1886
• Docket Number: 11,715
• Citation: 4 N.E. 197,104 Ind. 548
• Parties: Elmore v. Overton
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

4 N.E. 197

104 Ind. 548

Elmore v. Overton

No. 11,715

Supreme Court of Indiana

January 7, 1886

From the Montgomery Circuit Court.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

E. C Snyder and W. W. Thornton, for appellant.

T. E Ballard, M. E. Clodfelter, M. D. White and W. S. Moffett, for appellee.

OPINION

Niblack, C. J.

Action by James Elmore, a person occasionally engaged, and desirous of continuing, in the business of a common school teacher against John G. Overton, formerly the superintendent of the common schools of Montgomery county, for damages for refusing, while such superintendent, to issue to him a license, as such teacher, after he had, by law, become entitled to receive such a license.

The complaint was in four paragraphs; but a demurrer was sustained to the second paragraph, and, in consequence, it is not in the record.

The first paragraph charged that, notwithstanding the plaintiff had furnished satisfactory evidence of his good moral character, and had passed an examination which entitled him to a license as a teacher in the common schools for the period of twelve months, the defendant unlawfully and maliciously refused to grant and to issue to him a license as a teacher in such schools.

The third paragraph charged that, upon the plaintiff having furnished satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and having passed a successful examination, as alleged in the first paragraph, the defendant granted to him a license to teach in the common schools of Montgomery county, but that the defendant had thereafter, wickedly and corruptly, failed and refused to issue to him, the plaintiff a certificate of the fact that a license, as such teacher, had been so granted to him.

The fourth paragraph was substantially the same as the third, with the additional averment that the defendant had given out and pretended, as a reason for not issuing a certificate of the fact that the plaintiff had been granted a license to teach in the common schools of the county, that he, the plaintiff, was not a man of good moral character, by means of which the plaintiff became greatly scandalized and injured in his business as a teacher in the common schools.

Issue, trial, verdict and judgment for the defendant.

Error is assigned upon the overruling of the plaintiff's motion for a new trial, and by the assignment of cross errors questions are made upon the sufficiency of the first, third and fourth paragraphs of the complaint.

It is well settled, and hence conceded, that a judicial officer is not civilly liable for an erroneous decision, however gross the error may have been, or however bad the motive was which inspired it. Such a liability would be inconsistent with the proper exercise of judicial functions. Besides, other appropriate means are provided for relief against a false or erroneous judgment. Larr v. State, ex rel., 45 Ind. 364; Kress v. State, ex rel., 65 Ind. 106; State, ex rel., v. Jackson, 68 Ind. 58; Halloran v. McCullough, 68 Ind. 179; Cooley Torts, pp. 379, 403; Stewart v. Cooley, 23 Am. R. 690; Busteed v. Parsons, 25 Am. R. 688; Rains v. Simpson, 32 Am. R. 609; Jones v. Brown, 37 Am. R. 185; 2 Wait Actions and Defenses, 117.

It is claimed that a county superintendent of common schools, in passing upon the evidence offered in support of the moral character of an applicant for a license as a teacher, as well as in judging of his qualifications and fitness to become a teacher, acts either judicially, or to such an extent quasi judicially as to entitle him to the same immunity against a civil action for an erroneous or false judgment as that enjoyed by a judicial officer.

Section 4424, R. S. 1881, provides for the election of a county superintendent of common schools in each county. Section 4425 prescribes that "Said county superintendent shall examine all applicants for license as teachers of the common schools of the State, by a series of written or printed questions, requiring answers in writing, if he wishes so to do; and, in addition to the said questions and answers in writing, questions may be asked and answered orally; and if, from the ratio of correct answers and other evidences disclosed by the examination, the applicant is found to possess a knowledge which is sufficient in the estimation of the superintendent to enable said applicant to successfully teach, in the common schools of the State, orthography, reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, English grammar, physiology, and the history of the United States, and to govern such schools, said superintendent shall license said applicant for the term of six months, twelve months, eighteen months, or two years, according to the ratio of correct answers and other evidences of qualification given upon said examination, the standard of which shall be fixed by the superintendent. Applicants, before being licensed, shall produce to the superintendent the proper trustee's certificate, or other satisfactory evidence of good moral character: Provided, That after an applicant has received two licenses in succession, for two years, in the same county, the superintendent thereof, after the expiration of the last license issued, may renew the same without a reexamination, at his discretion."

As we construe this section of the statute, it does not confer on the county superintendent either judicial or quasi judicial power in the matter of licensing persons to teach in the common schools; nor is such superintendent invested with any such power by any other provision of the statute having relation to the duties of his office. The office in question belongs to the executive department of the State, and the duties attached to it are, strictly speaking, of a merely administrative character, that is, are in aid of the execution of, and assist in giving force and effect to, other provisions of our common school system. Any attempt, therefore, to confer on such an officer any power essentially judicial would be in derogation of article 3 of the Constitution of our State, which prohibits an officer in the executive department from discharging any duty pertaining to either the legislative or judicial departments of the State government. But we regard the discretion conferred upon the county superintendent on the subject of licensing teachers as being so far analogous to a judicial discretion that he is protected from any claim for damages on account of any mere mistake in his decision, or error in judgment, whether in granting or withholding a license to a person desirous of becoming a qualified teacher in the common schools. In that respect, we think, a county superintendent of schools occupies a similar, and generally analogous, position to that of an inspector of an election, who can not be made responsible for a mere error of judgment in rejecting a ballot offered by a qualified voter, but who may be required to answer in damages for maliciously rejecting such a ballot. Gates v. Neal, 23 Pick. 308; Jenkins v. Waldron, 11 Johns. 114; Goetcheus v. Matthewson, 61 N.Y. 420; Weckerly v. Geyer, 11 S. & R. 35; Rail v. Potts, 8 Humph. 225; State v. M'Donald, 4 Del. 555, 4 Harr. 555.

After discussing and approving the doctrine that a judicial officer can not be held pecuniarily responsible for an...