Elsemore v. Longfellow

• Decision Date: 05 May 1884
• Citation: 76 Me. 128
• Parties: ANNIE D. ELSEMORE v. ISAAC P. LONGFELLOW.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

76 Me. 128

ANNIE D. ELSEMORE v. ISAAC P. LONGFELLOW.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

May 5, 1884

ON REPORT.

An action against a deputy sheriff for false arrest and imprisonment. The writ was dated September 7, 1881. The plea was the general issue, and brief statement wherein the defendant claimed justification under the following complaint and warrant which was placed in his hands for service:

" State of Maine.

Washington, ss. To Mason H. Wilder, a trial justice in and for the county of Washington: Cyrus C. Rollins, one of the overseers of the poor of the town of Wesley in the county aforesaid, on the twentieth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-one, in behalf of the State of Maine, on oath complains: That Anna D. Elsemore a person who has her settlement in Wesley aforesaid, but is now and has been for several years supported by the town of Wesley in the town of East Machias in said county; that the overseers of the poor in said Wesley, desiring the removal of said Anna D. Elsemore from said East Machias to said Wesley, went in person to said East Machias to the house of the mother of said Anna D. Elsemore who refused to deliver up to said Anna D. Elsemore or to inform said overseers where she was, by which said overseers were prevented from obtaining possession of her the said Anna D. Elsemore. And the said Anna D Elsemore utterly refuses to return to the place of her settlement, to wit, Wesley aforesaid; against the peace of the state," & c. (common form signed and sworn to, and a warrant in common form was issued thereon.)

Other material facts stated in the opinion. By the terms of the report, " If the warrant and return and other facts stated were a justification to the officer, and he had a right to lodge her in a jail to prevent her running away, the officer performing his duties in a prudent and reasonable manner, then the plaintiff to be nonsuit," otherwise the case to stand for trial.

John C. Talbot, for the plaintiff, cited: Guptill v. Richardson, 62 Me. 264; 18 Me. 23; 24 Me. 180; 39 Me. 465; Spaulding v. Record, 65 Me. 220; R. S., c. 24 § § 22, 23; Stat. 1879, c. 162, c. 157; Gurney v. Tufts, 37 Me. 130; Thurston v. Adams, 41 Me. 419; Vinton v. Weaver, 41 Me. 430; Nowell v. Tripp, 61 Me. 426; Constitution of Maine, Art. 1, § 6; Constitution of U. S. 14th amendment; Portland v. Bangor, 65 Me. 120; Dunn v. Burleigh, 62 Me. 24; Gross v. Rice, 71 Me. 241;

Charles Sargent, for the defendant, cited: Whipple v. Kent, 2 Gray 410; Savacool v. Boughton, 5 Wend. 170; Coon v. Congden, 12 Wend. 496; Parker v. Walrod, 16 Wend. 514; Nowhall v. Tripp, 61 Me. 426; Dominick v. Eacker, 3 Barb. 17; and contended that as trial justices have jurisdiction of the subject matter by express provision of the statute, it could not be required of the defendant, as deputy sheriff, to determine questions of law or of fact and ascertain whether or not the complaint and warrant contained more or less than was legally required. He only knew, and was required to know, that the magistrate had jurisdiction of the subject matter.

Counsel further cited: Beach v. Furman, 9 Johns. 229; Warner v. Shed, 10 Johns. 138; Donahoe v. Shed, 8 Met. 326; 5 Selden 208; 3 Green. 40; Hart v. Dubois, 20 Wend. 236; Suydam v. Keys, 13 Johns. 444; Thurston v. Adams, 41 Me. 419; Chase v. Fish, 16 Me. 132; 13 Me. 36; Wilmarth v. Burt, 7 Met. 257; Henderson v. Brown, 1 Caines 92; Dwinnels v. Boynton, 3 Allen 312; Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray 45; Stevenson v. McLean, 5 Humph. 332; Barner v. Barbour, 1 Gilman 401; Parker v. Smith, 1 Gilman 411; 9 Conn. 140.

PETERS J.

This is an action against an officer for false arrest and imprisonment, the question involving the sufficiency and validity of the papers under which the officer acted. The theory of the law is, to protect an officer in his acts of official duty so far as it reasonably can without injustice to others. The rule should be liberally interpreted in the officer's behalf.

The proceedings in this case were instituted for the removal of a pauper from one town to another, by force of the statutory provisions contained in § 27, ch. 24, R. S., of 1871, and ch. 157, laws of 1879. The subject matter was within the jurisdiction of the magistrate who issued the process to the officer. The important question is, whether a proper process was issued or not; whether the process disclosed a jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff; in other words, whether the process under which the defendant acted was valid or void.

The officer is protected unless the process is void, and unless he can see from the face of the process itself that it is void. If the process shows its want of validity, the officer is not justified in acting under it. Irregularities, merely, that are amendable do not vitiate it. An officer has a right to suppose that what may be amended will be amended. Amendable defects do not even justify an officer in refusing to serve the process. Although the cause of action may be ever so informally and imperfectly expressed, still, if a proper cause is indicated, the process may be legal on its face. The officer stands upon defensible ground unless the process be absolutely void. McGlinchy v. Barrows, 41 Me. 74; Thurston v. Adams, Id. 419; Gurney v. Tufts, 37 Me. 130; Nowell v. Tripp, 61 Me. 426, and cases; Big. Cas. Torts, 277; Bou. Law Dic. " Arrest."

Under those rules, and upon...