Elson v. State

Citation337 So.2d 959
Decision Date23 September 1976
Docket NumberNo. 47342,47342
PartiesRichard James ELSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida

David J Busch and Ron K. Zimmet, Asst. Public Defenders, and Jerold Arthur Caughey, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, Tacoma, Wash., for petitioner.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

ADKINS, Justice.

By petition for certiorari, we have for review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District (Elson v. State, 310 So.2d 450), which allegedly conflicts with prior decisions of this Court (State v. Leveson, Fla., 151 So.2d 283, and Church v. State, 151 Fla. 24, 9 So.2d 164) on the same point of law. Fla.Const. art. V, § 3(b)(3), F.S.A.

Petitioner Elson, hereinafter referred to as defendant, and co-defendant Chesher borrowed a U-Haul van from co-defendant Conn, the lessee of the van. Late at night the truck became stuck in a ditch and a deputy sheriff, responding to a report of a stranded truck, arrived at the scene. Upon learning the names of defendant and Chesher, the officer ordered a check of records which revealed that Chesher had been arrested for possession of dangerous drugs and concealed weapons.

According to the officer, the back of the truck was open and the dome light was on. He could see in plain view the interior of the truck and a plastic bottle of different colored pills. Also, several watches were lying on the floor of the truck. The officer entered the truck, picked up the pills, and arrested defendant and Chesher for possession of dangerous drugs.

When defendant and Chesher were taken to jail, a motel room key was produced. It was ascertained that defendant and another man had rented the motel room. The sheriff and a highway patrolman proceeded to the motel, and were accompanied by the manager to the room which was registered in the name of co-defendant Chesher. The sheriff knocked on the door and Gary Conn, who was occupying the room, opened the door. The sheriff entered. He testified that he was making an inventory search so as to protect any property defendant and Chesher might have had at the motel and obtain any money which might be available for bond purposes.

After entering the motel room the sheriff seized a bank bag, as well as a number of watches, and some silver coins which were on a table. The sheriff was not searching for any particular property, claiming he was making an 'inventory' of the property of the two men who were in jail.

In considering an appeal from an order denying the motion to suppress, the District Court of Appeal held that defendant did not have standing to question the search as '(h)e was not registered in the motel, and therefore he did not have any constitutional inhibition against a search of the motel room.'

In State v. Leveson, 151 So.2d 283 (Fla.1963), a lottery conviction, the trial court denied motions to suppress evidence on the ground that Leveson had no standing to attack the search warrants. The facts were discussed as follows:

'It appears that Leveson had arranged for the occupancy of the apartment by his 'girl friend.' Although the lease was technically taken in the name of the 'girl friend' it is perfectly obvious that the arrangement was made for the convenience and accommodation of Leveson, as well as the technical lessee. Leveson had fulltime possession of a key to the apartment and occupied the same at will. He kept articles of clothing there and frequently spent the night. On occasions he had occupied the apartment for as many as five nights consecutively. He paid the rent for the first and last months, as well as for intervening periods. The execution of the lease in the name of the 'girl friend' was merely to accommodate his meretricious arrangement to the fact that he had a wife and a home at another location.' 151 So.2d at 284.

On appeal two District Court judges concluded that the search warrant was fatally defective. For different reasons they concluded that Leveson had standing to question the search. One judge felt that Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 78 A.L.R.2d 233 (1960), was not applicable in Florida. The consequence was that two judges held the search invalid and two held that Jones v. United States, supra, was not applicable in Florida. In holding that Leveson had standing to attack the search and seizure, this Court said:

'Our examination of the record leads us to conclude that, under the long-established Florida rule existing prior to Jones v. United States, supra, Leveson had a sufficient interest in the property searched to enable him to attack the validity of the search. We, therefore, do not reach the question of the applicability of the rule of Jones v. United States, supra. By that decision the Supreme Court of the United States apparently has eliminated the former technical requirements of ownership or right of occupancy. The federal rule now appears to be that anyone legally on the premises which are subjected to the search can attack the validity of the search if the proceeds of the search are offered in evidence against him. This rule, however, is still in its formative stages and remains subject to numerous potential ramifications.'

'In reaching our conclusion we lay aside any concern regarding technical distinctions relating to rights of occupancy and possession, as defined by the great body of private property law. Our consideration of the instant problem is limited entirely to the question of standing to assert the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.' 151 So.2d at 285.

In the instant case defendant possessed the motel room key. Although the room was registered in the name of Chesher, it contained defendant's property. There is conflict and we have jurisdiction.

The search of the motel room was not incident to an arrest nor was it conducted on premises within defend...

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10 cases
  • Morales v. State, s. 80-248
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 15 December 1981
    ...Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); Norman v. State, 379 So.2d 643 (Fla.1980); Elson v. State, 337 So.2d 959, 963 (Fla.1976); State v. Oliver, 368 So.2d 1331, 1335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. dismissed, 383 So.2d 1200 (Fla.1980). Second, the search and se......
  • Rolling v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 20 March 1997
    ...six days later, we find that it was a valid inventory search. An inventory search is a Fourth Amendment search and seizure, Elson v. State, 337 So.2d 959 (Fla.1976), but is unique in that its purposes are for the protection of property and persons rather than to investigate criminal activit......
  • State v. Oliver
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 13 March 1979
    ...security by agents of the public. If there is an intrusion upon personal security by an officer, there is a search." Elson v. State, 337 So.2d 959, 963 (Fla.1976). Essentially, then, a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment covers any official invasion of a person's reasonable expect......
  • Twilegar v. State, No. SC07-1622 (Fla. 1/7/2010)
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 7 January 2010
    ...governing inventory searches by police provides as follows: An inventory search is a Fourth Amendment search and seizure, Elson v. State, 337 So.2d 959 (Fla.1976), but is unique in that its purposes are for the protection of property and persons rather than to investigate criminal activity.......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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