Eltalawy ex rel. A.M. v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 08 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-10832,19-10832 |
| Parties | OMAYMA ELTALAWY, Individually and next friend of A.M. and N.M., Plaintiff - Appellant v. LUBBOCK INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; NANCY PARKER, In her Individual Capacity and her Official Capacity as Principal of Ramirez Elementary School, Defendants - Appellees |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
Before DENNIS, GRAVES, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.
*
Appellant Omayma Eltalawy, individually and as next friend to A.M. and N.M., appeals the district court's order granting Appellees Lubbock Independent School District ("LISD") and Nancy Parker, in her official capacityas the principal of Ramirez Elementary School1 ("School"), summary judgment. We AFFIRM.
The following facts are undisputed. A.M. and N.M. are Egyptian nationals who immigrated to the United States with Appellant—their mother—in February 2017. On February 9, 2017, A.M. and N.M. began attending the third grade at the School, which is part of LISD. On February 27, 2017, A.M. and N.M. were removed from the third grade and placed in the second grade. Appellant was not given prior notice of the decision to remove A.M. and N.M. from the third grade.
The parties dispute the circumstances around the removal. Parker states that—once A.M. and N.M. started the third grade—A.M. and N.M. underwent assessments of their academic abilities to determine whether they were appropriately placed in the third grade. Yu Kim-Johnson and Esther Caballero, A.M. and N.M.'s third grade teachers at the time of removal, respectively state that the assessments and their observations of A.M. and N.M. showed that A.M. and N.M. were not academically suited for the third grade. Specifically, Parker states that the assessments showed that A.M. and N.M. "had difficulty with third-grade level reading comprehension" and that their comprehension was "very limited." Kim-Johnson and Caballero state that, after the assessments, they met with Appellant to discuss the children's difficulties with the third-grade curriculum. Both teachers state, "As a resultof the meeting, it was decided that it would be best for both NM and AM to be placed in the second grade to finish the 2016-2017 school year."
Appellant, for her part, states that—prior to enrolling her children at the School—she was told that A.M. and N.M. would be placed in the third grade and that that decision was final. Appellant states that she never met with A.M. and N.M.'s teachers prior to the children's removal and that A.M. and N.M. "were doing fine in their subjects" at the time of removal. Appellant instead states that she met with Parker several days before A.M. and N.M. were removed and that, at this meeting, Parker stated that she was concerned that A.M. and N.M. would fail an upcoming third-grade State of Texas Assessments of Academic Readiness ("STAAR") test. Appellant states that Parker (1) informed her that A.M. and N.M. would need to repeat the third grade if they failed the STAAR test and (2) suggested removing them to the second grade. Appellant states that it was only later that she learned that failing the third-grade STAAR test would not preclude A.M. and N.M. from progressing to the fourth grade. Parker does not directly refute Appellant's statements regarding Parker's comments about the STAAR test; however, Parker states that if A.M. and N.M. took the third-grade STAAR test and failed, it would have "gone on their record" but otherwise not affected "the accountability ratings of Ramirez Elementary or LISD."
In any case, Appellant did not formally file a complaint with LISD about the removal. Instead, on May 21, 2018, Appellant sent a letter about A.M. and N.M.'s removal to LISD's Board of Trustees.2 On June 7, 2018, Appellant met with Parker, Kim-Johnson, LISD interim associate superintendent Sam Ayres, and LISD associate superintendent Doyle Vogler. At the meeting, Appellantstated that she did not want her children—who were set to start the fourth grade—accelerated to the fifth grade.3 Instead, she stated that she wanted an investigation opened into A.M. and N.M.'s removal from the third grade. In response, Vogler stated that he and Ayres had already investigated the removal and determined that the removal was appropriate.
Subsequently, Appellant filed this suit, which alleged that Appellees violated Appellant's rights when A.M. and N.M. were removed from the third grade. Specifically, Appellant brought three actions under, respectively, (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983—through which she alleged that Appellees violated Appellant's Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection under the law; (2) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VI"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.; and (3) the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 ("EEOA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.
Two summary judgment motions were filed. First, Parker—who was sued in her individual and official capacities—moved for summary judgment on Appellant's individual-capacity claims. The district court granted this motion and entered partial final judgment on the individual-capacity claims.4 Second, LISD and Parker—now in her official capacity only—moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims. The district court also grantedthis motion and entered partial final judgment on the remaining claims. Appellant timely appealed from the second partial final judgment.5
"We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court." Haverda v. Hays County, 723 F.3d 586, 591 (5th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the moving party shows "that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case," then the non-moving party must produce evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); see also State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990).
Appellant has not shown a genuine dispute of material fact regarding her § 1983, Title VI, or EEOA claims.6 We address the claims in turn.
First, Appellant used § 1983 as a vehicle to bring two claims: that Appellees violated A.M. and N.M.'s Fourteenth Amendment rights to (1) due process and (2) equal protection under the law. We consider the claims against LISD and Parker in turn.
Section 1983 "makes liable '[e]very person' who, under color of state law, violates federal constitutional rights." Littell v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 622 (5th Cir. 2018). Municipal entities—such as LISD—qualify as persons under § 1983. Id. For liability to attach to a municipal entity, a litigant must prove the existence of three elements: "a policymaker; an official policy [or custom]; and a violation of constitutional rights whose 'moving force' is the policy or custom." Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 865 (5th Cir. 2012); see also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) ().
Regarding official policies, when "the decision to adopt [a] particular course of action is properly made by that government's authorized decisionmakers, it . . . represents an act of official government 'policy' as that term is commonly understood." Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986) (footnote omitted). The court must "identify those officials or governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue." Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). "[W]hether a particular official has 'final policymaking authority' is a question of state law." Id. (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483) (emphasis in original).
Appellant argues that Parker had final policymaking authority for LISD and that A.M. and N.M.'s removal from the third grade was an exercise of that authority. But under Texas law, LISD's board of trustees possesses final policymaking authority over policies applicable to the School. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.151(b); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 1241, 1245 (5th Cir. 1993). Thus, Parker could not create policies for LISD. And LISD is not liable for Parker's independent actions. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (); cf. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (). Nor does Appellant identify any LISD policy or custom in association with her § 1983 claims let alone argue that an LISD policy orcustom was the "moving force" behind the alleged constitutional violations. For these reasons, Appellant's § 1983 claims against LISD are unavailing.
Appellant's official-capacity claims against Parker are unavailing for the same reasons her claims against LISD are unavailing. "Official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "Because the real party in interest in an official-capacity suit is the governmental entity and not the named official, the entity's policy or custom must have played a part...
To continue reading
Request your trial