Elterich v. Leicht Real Estate Co. Inc
Decision Date | 16 June 1921 |
Citation | 107 S.E. 735 |
Parties | ELTERICH et al. v. LEICHT REAL ESTATE CO., Inc. |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Norfolk County.
Suit by the Leicht Real Estate Company, Incorporated, against Kathryn E. Elterich and another. Decree for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.
This suit was instituted by the appellee against the appellants (who will be hereinafter designated plaintiff and defendants, respectively, in accordance with their positions in the court below), having for its object the obtaining of a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from proceeding with the erection of a certain building, alleged to be in violation of certain restrictions or conditions contained in the deed from plaintiff to one of the defendants, which conveyed to the latter the lot on which the building was being erected.
A preliminary injunction was granted on the filing of the bill; subsequently depositions were taken and filed in behalf both of plaintiff and defendants, and upon consideration of the cause on the merits the court below entered the decree under review, which granted the permanent injunction sought by the bill.
The material facts, the issues, and conflicts in the evidence are as follows:
The plaintiff is engaged in the business of developing a residential section known as Winona, located in Norfolk county, constituting one of the suburbs of Norfolk city. The plaintiff was chartered in 1909, acquired the ownership of the real estate in that section, subdivided it into lots, with streets and avenues, and undertook to build sidewalks, macadamize the streets and avenues, lay gas and water mains, provide a drainage and sewerage system, etc.,.and sold the lots to purchasers with certain restrictions and conditions contained in all of the deeds to purchasers. The purchasers united in the deeds. These restrictions and conditions were the same as those contained in the deed to the defendant Mrs. Kathryn E. Elterich, presently to be more specifically mentioned, except that about 5 years before this suit the words "apartment house" were added to the restrictions as contained in the sixth clause of the last-named deed.
By deed dated February 5, 1919, in which the defendant Mrs. Elterich united as the party of the second part, the plaintiff conveyed to such defendant, the lot above mentioned, subject to certain conditions and restrictions set forth in the deed, a portion of which are as follows:
The bill quotes the sixth and seventh clauses of the restrictions or conditions in the deed, and alleges that the defendants had commenced the erection on said lot of a dwelling house according to certain plans, of which copies were filed with the bill, and that the erection of such home on such lot would be in violation of the sixth clause of said restrictions or conditions, in that such house would be a double house or an apartment house.
The testimony both for plaintiff and defendants concurs in showing that the house which the defendants were proceeding to erect, and which they claim by answer filed in the case and by their proof that they have the right under their deed to erect, was a two-story dwelling house, in addition to the basement, with but one outside front door and one outside back door, but both of such doors opened into front and rear vestibules, respectively, from which vestibules therewere separate front and separate rear entrances into two separate apartments; one apartment, on the first floor above the basement, consisting of a kitchen, dining room, living room, bathroom, water-closet and three bedrooms, together with a hall, pantry, and certain closets; and the other apartment, on the second floor, being the exact duplicate of the first floor with respect to the same number and size of rooms, including a bath room, water-closet, hall, pantry and closets; so as to be suitable for the separate occupancy of the building by two families, for living, cooking and eating therein; the front and rear entrances to the first-named apartment being on the said first floor, and such entrances to the second-named apartment being up front and rear stairways extending from the front and rear vestibules aforesaid to the said second story of the house.
The primary question in issue between the parties plaintiff and defendant is whether such a house is an apartment house within the meaning of the sixth covenant aforesaid in the deed; it not being contended for the plaintiff that the proof shows that such a house is a double house.
At the time the deed was executed, the plaintiff had sold a considerable portion of the lots in Winona, on quite a number of which dwelling houses had been erected and were occupied. During the World War and up to the time of such deed some 50 per cent, of such houses were occupied by more than one family, although with a single exception presently to be mentioned, they were not constructed so that the respective families could occupy separate apartments; but this was considered an exceptional condition, due to the scarcity of houses to accommodate the congested population in that section during that period. Even the president of the plaintiff company at that time rented to another family a portion of the residence in Winona in which he with his family lived during such period, and such renting was going on when defendants purchased said lot and the deed thereto was made. When such purchase and deed were made there was one, and but one dwelling house in Winona which was constructed for separate occupancy by two families. That was what is designated in the record as the "Neff" residence, which was a two-story house constructed into two separate apartments, one on the first and the other on the second floor. All the other dwelling houses in Winona, including that of the president of the plaintiff company, were constructed for the separate occupation of only one family. Many of them, however, were large enough for the joint occupancy of more than one family.
It does not appear from the evidence at what time the deed...
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