Elton v. Davis

Decision Date14 October 2003
Docket NumberNo. WD 61987.,WD 61987.
Citation123 S.W.3d 205
PartiesJoann ELTON, Respondent, v. Marcellus D. DAVIS, II and Rhonda K. Davis, Appellants.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Alan L. Markowitz, Kansas City, MO, for Appellants.

Keith W. Hicklin, Platte City, MO, for Respondent.

Before JAMES M. SMART, JR., P.J., ROBERT G. ULRICH and LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JJ.

ROBERT G. ULRICH, J.

Marcellus and Rhonda Davis appeal the judgment of the trial court in favor of Joann Elton on her claims for ejectment and reformation of deed and their counterclaim for adverse possession. The Davises raise five points on appeal. They contend that Mrs. Elton's claims were barred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches. They also argue that the judgment was not supported by substantial evidence and was against the weight of the evidence. Finally, the Davises contend that the trial court erred in adjudging moot their counterclaim for adverse possession. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

In 1978, Joann Elton and her late husband, Ronald Elton, acquired by deed certain real property located south and west of Platte City in Platte County. That property was legally described as:

All of Lots 5 and 6, of Fractional Section 3, Township 52, Range 35, Platte City, Missouri.

In 1987, the Eltons sold approximately two acres of this land to Marcellus and Rhonda Davis. Mr. Elton measured off the two-acre lot with his tractor computer starting on the east side of the lot where the Davises had started their construction and had placed their septic tank. A road bordered the south side of the lot. Mr. Elton placed a steel fence post on the west side of the lot to mark the western boundary. The Eltons executed a warranty deed to the Davises on November 6, 1987, conveying the property, which was legally described as:

Commencing at the Southeast corner of a tract of land described as all of Lots 5 and 6 of Fractional Section 3, Township 52, Range 35, Platte County, Missouri, thence West 370 feet to the point of beginning; thence North 348.5 feet; thence West 250 feet; thence South 348.5 feet; thence East 250 feet to the point of beginning.

After conveyance of the property, the Davises constructed buildings including a house and a driveway on the lot. The driveway was constructed on the east side of the steel post. The Davises also planted trees on the north side of the lot. They used the east side of the two-acre lot as a lawn and installed a swimming pool and a satellite dish on it.

Mr. Elton farmed the land surrounding the Davises' property as measured by Mr. Elton from the time the Davises purchased the property in 1987 until his death in 1995. After Mr. Elton's death, Mrs. Elton hired Hal Swaney to continue to farm the land until the time of trial in 2002. Specifically, the soybean crop line bordered the steel post and the Davises' driveway on the west side of their lot, the trees planted by the Davises on the north side of their lot, and a vent pipe on the east side of their lot.

After Mr. Elton's death in 1995, Mrs. Elton began to notice that the Davises periodically parked vehicles and trailers in the soybean field to the west of the steel post. As a result, Mrs. Elton had a survey done of the Davises' two-acre lot in July 2001. The survey showed a discrepancy between the legal description of the Davises' property in the deed and boundary lines established by Mr. Elton. The legal description in the deed showed that the Davises' property was situated fifty-three feet west of the boundary lines established by Mr. Elton and maintained by the Davises. Specifically, the legal description included land to the west of the steel post, driveway, and crop line and did not include the eastern part of the Davises' lawn and swimming pool, or the septic tank and satellite dish.

As a result of the survey, Mrs. Elton filed a petition in ejectment in April 2002. She later amended her petition to add a count for reformation of deed. The Davises answered raising the affirmative defenses of statute of limitations and laches and counterclaimed for adverse possession of the land consisting of the eastern portion of their lawn and a narrow pie-shape strip of land on the northern border of the property maintained by the Davises.

Following a bench trial, the trial court entered its judgment on September 17, 2002, ordering reformation of the legal description in the deed to read as follows:

Commencing at the Southeast corner of a tract of land described as all of Lots 5 and 6 of Fractional Section 3, Township 52, Range 35, Platte County, Missouri, thence 317 feet to the point of beginning; thence North 348.5 feet; thence West 250 feet; thence South 348,5 feet; thence East 250 feet to the point of beginning.

In essence, the corrected description shifted the Davises two-acre lot fifty-three feet east of the land described in the original deed to the location measured by Mr. Elton initially. The court also ordered the Davises ejected from all property not contained within the boundaries of the reformed legal description and entered judgment against the Davises on their affirmative defenses of statute of limitations and laches. Finally, the trial court found that the Davises' counterclaim for adverse possession was moot in light of the reformed legal description. This appeal by the Davises followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On review of a court-tried case, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed unless substantial evidence does not support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976); Mullenix-St. Charles Properties, L.P. v. City of St. Charles, 983 S.W.2d 550, 554-55 (Mo.App. E.D.1998). The evidence and inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and all contrary evidence is disregarded. Mullenix, 983 S.W.2d at 555. The appellate court defers to the factual findings of the trial court, which is in a superior position to assess credibility, but evaluates independently the trial court's conclusions of law. Id. Finally, the appellate court should exercise the power to set aside a judgment on the ground that it is against the weight of the evidence with caution and with a firm belief that the judgment is wrong. Id.

I. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND LACHES

In their first two points on appeal,1 the Davises claim that trial court erred in entering judgment against them on their affirmative defenses of statute of limitations and laches. First, they argue that the trial court erroneously declared and applied the law in applying section 516.1002 to determine when the cause of action accrued for statute of limitations purposes. Specifically, the trial court found that the ten-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until the damage from the mistake in the legal description was sustained and ascertained in 2001 when Mrs. Elton ordered a survey and, thus, the statute of limitations did not bar Mrs. Elton's claims for ejectment and reformation of deed. The Davises argue that the statute of limitations began to run when the alleged mistake was made, which was on or about November 6, 1987, when the deed was delivered. Secondly, the Davises contend that Mrs. Elton's claims of ejectment and reformation of deed were barred by the doctrine of laches because delay in bringing this suit was unreasonable and inexcusable and the delay materially prejudiced them.

The ten-year statute of limitations governs the causes of action in this case.3 § 516.110.3; A.P. Green Refractories Co. v. Duncan, 659 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Mo.App. E.D.1983). The commencement of that period is governed by section 516.100, which provides in pertinent part:

the cause of action shall not be deemed to accrue when the wrong is done or the technical breach of contract or duty occurs, but when the damage resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment....

Generally, the statute of limitations for reformation of deed will not run against a party in possession, at least until her right to possession has been challenged. Bramhall v. Bramhall, 216 S.W. 766, 769-70 (Mo.1919); Stark v. Zehnder, 204 Mo. 442 102 S.W. 992, 995 (1907); Epperson v. Epperson, 161 Mo. 577, 61 S.W. 853, 854 (1901); Duncan, 659 S.W.2d at 21.

The evidence in this case showed that Mrs. Elton has been in continuous, peaceable, and uninterrupted possession of the western fifty-three feet of the deeded property since before 1987 when the deed was delivered. Mrs. Elton testified that she believed she and her husband owned the fifty-three foot section of land. After delivery of the deed, Mr. Elton continued to farm the land until his death in 1995. Thereafter, Mr. Swaney continued to farm the land for Mrs. Elton up to time of trial. Although evidence was offered that, after Mr. Elton's death, Mr. Davis parked vehicles in the field occasionally during the wintertime, this intermittent encroachment did not constitute a challenge to Mrs. Elton's right of possession. Not until Mrs. Elton commissioned a survey in 2001 did she learn that the legal description in the original deed included the fifty-three foot section of property. The damage resulting from the mistake in the legal description was not, therefore, sustained and ascertainable until 2001 when the survey results were made known to Mrs. Elton. Thus, Mrs. Elton's causes of action did not accrue, and the ten-year statute of limitations did not begin to run, until July 2001. The statute of limitations, therefore, did not bar Mrs. Elton's cause of actions.

Neither were Mrs. Elton's causes of actions barred by laches. "`Laches' is the neglect for an unreasonable and...

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