Elustra v. Mineo

• Decision Date: 09 February 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-2183.,09-2183.
• Citation: 595 F.3d 699
• Parties: Crystal ELUSTRA and Christine Lopez, as Next Friend of Moriah Elustra and Najati Elustra, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Tom MINEO and Brad Fralich, individually and doing business as Buffalo Wild Wings, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

595 F.3d 699

Crystal ELUSTRA and Christine Lopez, as Next Friend of Moriah Elustra and Najati Elustra, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Tom MINEO and Brad Fralich, individually and doing business as Buffalo Wild Wings, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 09-2183.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued September 23, 2009.

Decided February 9, 2010.

Edward M. Fox (argued), Fox & Associates, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

James G. Sotos, Christina S. White (argued), Sotos & Associates, Itasca, IL, for Tom Mineo.

Ronald W. Payne (argued), Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Chicago, IL, for Brad Fralich.

Before FLAUM, WOOD, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

WOOD, Circuit Judge.

On the surface, this appeal presents a straightforward question: did the district court err when it concluded that the parties reached an enforceable oral agreement to settle their dispute? But we cannot reach that question unless the appellants can overcome several procedural hurdles. The underlying case was brought by Crystal Elustra and her mother Christine Lopez, who appeared as next friend of Crystal's younger sisters, Moriah Elustra and Najati Elustra (both minors). The suit arose out of an argument that erupted on July 22, 2007, over the bill that the Elustra girls and some friends owed at the Buffalo Wild Wings restaurant, which is owned by Brad Fralich. Before things settled down, the police had been called and the girls were arrested on charges of disorderly conduct and curfew violations. Those charges were ultimately dropped, paving the way for this action against Frankfurt Police Officer Tom Mineo, Fralich, and Buffalo Wild Wings. The Elustras asserted that Officer Mineo had violated their civil rights and that Fralich had falsely imprisoned them. Moriah Elustra also complained about injuries to her head and wrists that she suffered during the course of the arrest.

Shortly after the suit was filed, the parties initiated settlement discussions. Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow presided over a two-hour settlement conference, the details of which we provide below. He concluded that the parties reached an oral settlement at the end of that conference and recommended that the district court enter judgment dismissing the suit pursuant to the agreement. The district court did so. Although the court proceedings were not as smooth as they might have been, we see no error in the district court's decision, and we therefore affirm.

I

The settlement conference before Judge Denlow took place on November 21, 2008. The Elustras attended the conference with their attorney, Michael Conway. Defendants were present only through counsel. During the conference, defendants presented a global settlement offer of $6,000 in exchange for a release of all claims. What happened next is disputed, but it appears that Judge Denlow communicated this offer to the plaintiffs and their attorney and they accepted the offer. The settlement conference was off the record, but Judge Denlow later reported that "agreement was reached."

Before anyone had a chance to commit the terms of the agreement to writing, Morad Elustra—the father of the Elustra girls and a nonparty—asked to speak with Conway. The two men began to argue, and the conversation ended with Morad telling Conway that the family would find another lawyer. The entire family then re-entered the courtroom, gathered their coats, and left; they pointedly ignored warnings that it was in their best interest to stay and participate in the hearing.

At that point, the defendants orally moved to enter judgment dismissing the case with prejudice, in accordance with the settlement agreement, and Judge Denlow announced that he would rule immediately. He confirmed that an agreement had been reached and indicated that everyone (in particular the plaintiffs) had understood the settlement and that the process had been a fair one. Conway was present for this hearing and continued to speak for the Elustras, despite the exchange with their father. Judge Denlow concluded with a recommendation to the district court to "enforce the settlement"—by which he meant to dismiss the case with prejudice in accordance with the agreement the parties had reached. On December 3, 2008, the district court held a brief hearing. Conway appeared for the plaintiffs, notwithstanding Morad's effort to terminate his representation. (The record does not indicate whether Crystal Elustra or Lopez shared Morad's dissatisfaction with Conway.) Conway told the court, without elaboration, that plaintiffs' recollection was that there was no agreement; he did not mention the confrontation with Morad. Relying on Judge Denlow's report, the district court entered an order on December 11, 2008, granting the defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice.

On December 29, 2008, Lopez filed a terse, handwritten pro se motion to vacate and reinstate the claims. With new counsel, the Elustras supplemented Lopez's motion on January 7, 2009. Interpreting the January 7 filing as a motion for relief from final judgment under Rule 60(b) (because it was filed after the expiration of the 10-day period for Rule 59(e) motions), the district court denied the motion on April 2, 2009. The Elustras now appeal.

II

The Elustras have asked this court to decide whether the district court correctly found that the parties reached a binding settlement agreement, under which the case would be dismissed with prejudice in exchange for a global payment of $6,000. The defendants, however, argue that we cannot review that decision directly. In their view, the only question properly before us is whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied the motion to reconsider. Thus, there are at least two preliminary questions before us: first, was the district court correct to treat the January 7 filing as the first motion to reconsider, and thus one filed under Rule 60(b), or did it have before it a timely Rule 59(e) motion, thanks to Lopez's December 29 filing; second, if we are to use the December 29 motion as our point of reference, was it effective to postpone the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal? If the answer to that is yes, then we may reach the merits of the dispute over the settlement agreement.^* Otherwise, we would consider only the question whether the district court abused its discretion in rejecting plaintiffs' request for reconsideration.

A

Although the defendants never raised the issue, we were concerned about Lopez's apparent effort directly to represent, without counsel, both her minor daughters and her adult daughter when she filed the December 29 motion. We therefore requested supplemental briefing on this question. Normally, representative parties such as next friends may not conduct litigation pro se; pleadings may be brought before the court only by parties or their attorney. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (providing that "parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel"); FED.R.CIV.P. 11(a) (requiring that every motion be signed by an attorney or a party proceeding pro se). See also Lewis v. Lenc-Smith Mfg. Co., 784 F.2d 829, 830-31 (7th Cir.1986) (per curiam). Lopez is neither a party nor an attorney. This means that her December 29 motion may have been utterly without legal significance.

The first question we must address is whether we should look to state or federal law to resolve this problem. On the one hand, FED.R.CIV.P. 17(b) provides that "capacity to sue" is defined by state law. On the other hand, federal courts are entitled to use their own procedures, whether the case is one arising under federal law (as this one was, in part) or it is one based on another ground such as supplemental jurisdiction (as this one also was, in part) or diversity of citizenship. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965). Our problem has less to do with capacity to sue than it does with the right to act in court, which is normally a matter regulated by the rules of professional conduct. Federal courts have the inherent authority to adopt their own rules in this field, and the Northern District of Illinois has done so. See N.D. ILL. LOC. R. 83.10 (2009) (general bar local rule governing admission to practice before the district court); N.D. ILL. LOC. R. 83.55.5 (2009) (unauthorized practice of law); N.D. ILL. LOC. R. 83.58.1 (2009) (bar admission and disciplinary matters). All of this suggests that even though the ultimate issue before us concerns a settlement agreement, which is a matter governed by state law, it is federal law that dictates whether Lopez was entitled to act for one or more of her three daughters in the way that she did.

Even though federal law controls, this is the kind of question for which state law might provide useful guidance. It is common for federal law to borrow principles from state law, especially when there is a benefit to having a uniform answer within a particular state on a certain topic. See generally Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 63 S.Ct. 573, 87 L.Ed. 838 (1943). The ability of a parent to represent a child's interests is a question that arises frequently in state court. And when we look for general guidance to Illinois law, it turns out that a number of Illinois state court decisions offer support to the Elustras. See Applebaum v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., 231 Ill.2d 429, 326 Ill.Dec. 45, 899 N.E.2d 262, 266 (2008) (stating that the nullity rule, which invalidates complaints filed by a nonparty, "should be invoked only where it fulfills its purposes of protecting both the public and the integrity of the court system from the actions of the unlicensed, and where no other alternative remedy is possible"); Pratt-Holdampf v. Trinity Med. Ctr., 338 Ill.App.3d 1079, 273 Ill.Dec. 708, 789 N.E.2d 882, 887-89 (2003) (reinstating a complaint improperly filed pro se on...