Elwell v. Hennepin County
| Decision Date | 23 August 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 44303,44303 |
| Citation | 301 Minn. 63,221 N.W.2d 538 |
| Parties | Laurance ELWELL, Jr., Respondent, v. COUNTY OF HENNEPIN, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. (a) When the constitutionality of a statute is argued by the parties in briefs submitted to the trial court, and considered in the trial court's memorandum, it is within the scope of our review on appeal.
(b) Although the general rule is that a public official charged with the performance of a ministerial duty will not be allowed to question the constitutionality of a statute, the facts of the present case bring it within an exception to that rule because a substantial public interest is involved and the public official is not performing purely ministerial duties.
(c) Appellant was required by Rule 24.04, Rules of Civil Procedure, to give notice to the attorney general that it was asserting the unconstitutionality of Minn.St. 273.111. However, the failure to give that notice does not deprive this court of jurisdiction on appeal. To the extent that In re Condemnation by Oak Center Creamery Co. v. Grobe, 264 Minn. 435, 119 N.W.2d 729 (1963), is inconsistent with this opinion, it is expressly overruled. Under the circumstances of this case, we will decide the constitutionality of the disputed statute.
2. The Minnesota Constitution permits classification statutes for tax purposes so long as there is a reasonable basis for the classification. Classification of property according to use has been determined to be a reasonable basis. Held, Minn.St. 273.111, commonly referred to as the green acres statute, is a constitutionally valid tax-classification statute, with the classification based upon the use to which land is devoted.
3. In determining whether property is devoted to agricultural use pursuant to § 273.111, subd. 6, the phrase 'total production income including rental from the property' contained therein should be interpreted to mean that production income can be comprised solely and exclusively of rental income. Therefore, there is no requirement in the statute that the land must be actively farmed by the owner himself. So long as the lessee of farm property devotes it to the agricultural pursuits set forth in subd. 6 which qualify the property for green acres valuation, the land may be considered to be devoted by the lessor-owner to those purposes.
4. Because we have determined that real estate need not be actively farmed by the owner in order to qualify for green acres valuation, a fortiori, real estate owned by several persons, each holding a fractional interest, qualifies under the act, even if all the owners are not engaged in farming activities on the property.
Gary W. Flakne, County Atty., David E. Culbert, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for appellant.
Faegre & Benson and James A. Dueholm, Minneapolis, for respondent.
Considered and decided by the court en banc.
The issues in this case are the constitutionality of Minn.St. 273.111, commonly referred to as the green acres statute, and, in the event it is constitutional, the construction of certain of its provisions. The trial court upheld its constitutionality and interpreted the statute in favor of taxpayer. We affirm.
The green acres statute provides that certain real estate devoted to agricultural use 1 is entitled to be valued for real estate tax purposes on a basis which does not consider nonagricultural factors. 2 With the exploding expansion and development in urban areas over the past few decades, there have been rapidly increasing land values in the periphery of metropolitan areas. Both the value of farmland located in those areas and real estate taxes based upon that value have increased accordingly. These higher property taxes, coupled with special assessments caused by sewer and water improvement projects for new development on the fringes of established urban areas which often must pass through intervening farmland, have become so great in many cases that the owner is no longer financially able to continue the agricultural use of the land. This, in turn, has led to forced sales and other hardships to the owners of such land. The legislature recognized this problem and, in 1967, passed the green acres legislation designed to provide property tax relief so that the land could economically be continued in use for agricultural purposes. The essence of the statute is that farmland, if it meets the requirements of the act, will be valued for tax purposes solely with reference to its agricultural use, which may not necessarily be the same value it would have if other potential uses for the land were considered by the assessor.
In this case, respondent, Laurance Elwell, Jr., made timely application for green acres valuation of two tracts of land in Hennepin County, of which he was part owner, with respect to real estate taxes payable in 1973. The Hennepin County assessor denied the applications, and respondent commenced an action in district court to contest the denial. Respondent also commenced a second action to contest a corrected tax statement for taxes payable in 1972 on one of the tracts of land. The property for which the corrected tax statement was issued had been assessed under the green acres statute in 1971 and 1972, and the correction was made after the Hennepin County assessor denied the 1973 green acres valuation. The cases were consolidated, and the district court, sitting without a jury, found that respondent's property was eligible for valuation under the green acres statute for each of the years for which timely applications were filed. Judgment was entered, and Hennepin County has appealed from the judgment.
One of the two tracts of real estate involved in this appeal is located in the village of Plymouth and the other in the village of Medina. The Plymouth property consists of two parts which are physically separated. One part contains 132 acres, 60 of which are tillable, and lies in the southwest corner of Plymouth. The other part is in the northwest corner of Plymouth and consists of approximately 80 acres, of which 60 are tillable. 3
All of the Plymouth property is owned by the same parties: Laurance Elwell, Jr., and his wife, Ruth, own an undivided one-fourth interest; a brother of Laurance, Phillip A. Elwell, and his wife, Katherine, own an undivided one-fourth interest; and a cousin of Laurance, Edwin S. Elwell, Jr., owns an undivided one-half interest.
The Medina property adjoins that portion of the Plymouth property lying in the northwest corner of Plymouth. It is a single tract running from north to south along the Plymouth-Medina border. The northwest portion of the Medina property, consisting of approximately 230 acres, 160 of which are tillable, is owned by the same persons who own the Plymouth property. The balance of the Medina property, consisting of approximately 110 acres, 100 of which are tillable, is owned by Laurance and his brother and mother, Phillip A. Elwell and Virginia K. Elwell. These same individuals have owned the Plymouth property since 1941, and the Medina property since at least 1954.
Since 1965, all of the property has been leased by the owners to Elwell Farms, Inc., a Minnesota corporation. Its shareholders are Laurance and his wife, Ruth; Phillip A. Elwell and his wife, Katherine; and Edwin S. Elwell, Jr. The same individuals are the officers and directors of the corporation. During the term of the lease, all of the land has been operated as a single farming corporation and has been devoted to agricultural purposes, to-wit, raising turkeys. The farming operation on a day-to-day basis is conducted by Laurance. His wife, Ruth, is also very active in the day-to-day farming operations; Phillip A. Elwell occasionally assists; and Edwin S. Elwell, Jr., does not assist in any way in the active farming of the property.
There are a number of issues which we shall discuss and decide: (1) Whether the constitutionality of Minn.St. 273.111 is properly before this court for decision; (2) if so, whether the statute is unconstitutional as an exemption from taxation not authorized by the Minnesota Constitution; (3) whether the 'total production income,' referred to in § 273.111, subd. 6, may be comprised solely of cash rental; and (4) whether real estate owned by several persons, each holding fractional undivided interests in the property, may qualify for valuation under § 273.111, even if all of the owners are not actively engaged in farming operations on the property.
1. Several preliminary questions must be resolved before we determine the basic constitutional question:
(a) Apparently questions concerning the constitutionality of the statute were not directly raised at any time during the trial. Respondent contends, therefore, that the issue should not be considered by us on this appeal. Questions not presented to and considered by the trial court are generally held to be beyond the scope of review on appeal. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M.R. Co. v. St. Paul Mercury-Ind. Co., 268 Minn. 390, 129 N.W.2d 777 (1964); Ukkonen v. City of Minneapolis, 280 Minn. 494, 160 N.W.2d 249 (1968); Faber v. Roelofs, 298 Minn. 16, 212 N.W.2d 856 (1973). However, the rule is inapposite in this case because the constitutionality of the statute was argued by the parties in briefs submitted after the trial and was discussed at length in the trial court's memorandum. Hence, the question was considered by the trial court and is within the scope of our review.
(b) Respondent argues that public officers, including the county officials in this case, are prohibited from challenging the constitutionality of a statute. Respondent relies upon State ex rel. Clinton Falls Nursery Co. v. County of Steele, 181 Minn. 427, 430, 232 N.W. 737, 738 (1930), in which we said:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County
...that there is a valid factual basis for the challenged statute. See Matter of McCannel, supra, 301 N.W.2d at 916; Elwell v. Hennepin County, 301 Minn. 63, 221 N.W.2d 538 (1974). Certainly the Legislature may not establish formal classifications of property that result in nonuniform or dispr......
-
Board of Sup'rs of Linn County v. Department of Revenue
...officer whose duty it is to examine legislation or the purpose thereof in connection with his regular duties. Elwell v. County of Hennepin, 301 Minn. 63, 221 N.W.2d 538, 543 (1974); Fulton Foundation, 108 N.W.2d at 317 & n.1. Similarly, where an official would be personally liable for imple......
-
Minnesota State Bd. of Health by Lawson v. City of Brainerd
...exception to the foregoing rule when the rights of the state or the public interest are involved.' See, also, Elwell v. County of Hennepin, 301 Minn. 63, 221 N.W.2d 538 (1974). In Commr. of Taxation v. Crow Wing County, 275 Minn. 9, 13, 144 N.W.2d 717, 719 (1966), we recognized a second '* ......
-
Matter of McCannel, 50428
...protection and uniformity clauses unless there is no reasonable basis for the classification. For example, in Elwell v. Hennepin County, 301 Minn. 63, 221 N.W.2d 538 (1974), we upheld a land classification system for tax purposes which permitted certain real estate devoted to agricultural u......