Emerald Casino, Inc. v. Illinois Gaming Bd.

• Citation: 852 N.E.2d 512
• Decision Date: 30 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. 1-05-3142.,1-05-3142.
• Parties: EMERALD CASINO, INC., an Illinois Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The ILLINOIS GAMING BOARD, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

852 N.E.2d 512

EMERALD CASINO, INC., an Illinois Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The ILLINOIS GAMING BOARD, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1-05-3142.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division.

June 30, 2006.

Robert A. Clifford and Michael S. Krzak, Clifford Law Offices, P.C., Chicago (Robert P. Sheridan, of counsel), for Appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Richard S. Huszagh, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, for Appellees.

Justice WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court:

Emerald Casino, Inc., has launched two appellate attacks on the Illinois Gaming Board's license revocation order. One brought under the Illinois Riverboat Gambling Act is pending in the Fourth Appellate District. The other, in this court, stems from an unsuccessful Cook County circuit court challenge to the constitutionality of some of the Board's rules that governed the revocation proceeding.

Before we can consider the merits of Emerald's contentions we have to decide whether, under the circumstances of this case, this case is properly before us. We hold it is not.

BACKGROUND

In 1992, Emerald was granted one of the 10 casino operator's licenses authorized by the Illinois Riverboat Gambling Act (RGA) (230 ILCS 10/1 et seq. (West 1992)). In 2001, the Board initiated disciplinary proceedings against Emerald in order to revoke its license, alleging Emerald had committed multiple violations of Illinois law.

On May 10, 2002, the administrative law judge presiding over the disciplinary proceeding entered an order upholding the constitutionality of the Board's administrative rules in general, and its discovery rules in particular. In response, Emerald filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Board in the circuit court of Cook County, alleging that many of the Board's administrative rules were facially unconstitutional and denied Emerald due process of law.

The trial court dismissed Emerald's complaint with prejudice and denied Emerald's motion for a preliminary injunction on September 2, 2005. Emerald appealed.

While this appeal was pending, the disciplinary proceeding was completed. The Board issued a final decision revoking Emerald's license on December 20, 2005. Emerald directly appealed the Board's revocation decision in the Fourth District of the Illinois Appellate Court, as required by section 17.1(a) of the RGA. 230 ILCS 10/17.1(a) (West 2004). It referred to its petition as "seeking administrative review of a final order of the Illinois Gaming Board."

DECISION

On appeal, Emerald contends the trial court erred when it found none of the Board's rules facially unconstitutional. Emerald asks us to reverse the trial court's order and declare the disciplinary proceedings null and void.

The Board contends Emerald may challenge the validity of the revocation order only in a statutorily authorized proceeding for administrative review. Because Emerald is presently pursuing review in the Fourth District, the Board contends Emerald cannot seek the same relief — directly or indirectly — in this appeal. We agree.

Section 17.1(a) of the RGA states:

"Jurisdiction and venue for the judicial review of a final order of the Board relating to owners, suppliers or special event licenses is vested in the Appellate Court of the judicial district in which Sangamon County is located. A petition for judicial review of a final order of the Board must be filed in the Appellate Court, within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected by the decision." 230 ILCS 10/17.1(a) (West 2004).

The ultimate relief Emerald asks us for is a declaration that the revocation proceedings are "null and void." That is, Emerald, in fact, seeks review of a "final order of the Board" as that term is used in section 17.1(a) of the RGA.

Final administrative decisions are appealable only as provided by law. Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, §§ 6, 9; Collinsville Community Unit School District v. Regional Board of School Trustees of St. Clair County, 218 Ill.2d 175, 181, 300 Ill. Dec. 15, 843 N.E.2d 273 (2006) ("Collinsville"). Because review of a final administrative decision may be obtained only as provided by statute, a court is said to exercise "`special statutory jurisdiction'" when it reviews an administrative decision. Collinsville, 218 Ill.2d at 182, 300 Ill.Dec. 15, 843 N.E.2d 273, quoting ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 191 Ill.2d 26, 30, 245 Ill.Dec. 288, 727 N.E.2d 1022 (2000). "Special statutory jurisdiction is `limited to the language of the act conferring it and the court has no powers from any other source.'" Collinsville, 218 Ill.2d at 182, 300 Ill.Dec. 15, 843 N.E.2d 273, quoting Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue, 109 Ill.2d 202, 210, 93 Ill.Dec. 360, 486 N.E.2d 893 (1985). The remedy under the act is exclusive and alternate methods of direct review or collateral attack are not permitted. Board of Education of Hawthorne School District v. Eckmann, 103 Ill.App.3d 1127, 1129, 59 Ill.Dec. 714, 432 N.E.2d 298 (1982); People ex rel. Petersen v. Turner Co., 37 Ill. App.3d 450, 456, 346 N.E.2d 102 (1976).

Generally, a party may not seek judicial relief from an administrative action unless the party has exhausted all available administrative remedies. Arvia v. Madigan, 209 Ill.2d 520, 531, 283 Ill.Dec. 895, 809 N.E.2d 88 (2004).

Where the Administrative Review Law is applicable and a reviewing court may grant the relief a party seeks within the context of reviewing the agency's decision, a circuit court has no authority to entertain independent causes of action regarding the agency's actions. Arvia, 209 Ill.2d at 532, 283 Ill.Dec. 895, 809 N.E.2d 88. "`Any other conclusion would enable a party to litigate separately every alleged error committed by an agency in the course of the administrative proceeding.'" Arvia, 209 Ill.2d at 532, 283 Ill.Dec. 895, 809 N.E.2d 88, quoting Dubin v. Personnel Board, 128 Ill.2d 490, 499, 132 Ill.Dec. 437, 539 N.E.2d 1243 (1989).

In its petition for administrative review in the Fourth District, Emerald launched a global attack on the revocation order. The petition is 27 plus pages long. The reasons for relief given by Emerald literally range from A to Z, with subsections. Most of the issues raised by Emerald have to do with denial of due process rights. Of particular relevance to this appeal are paragraphs N., U., and W.

Paragraph N. contends the disciplinary proceeding was invalid because it required Emerald to carry the burden of proving its fitness by clear and convincing evidence. The paragraph is an attack on Rule 1140(a) (86 Ill. Adm.Code 3000.1140).

Paragraph U. contends the Board's subpoena rules denied Emerald its right to cross-examine and otherwise challenge adverse witnesses. That is an attack on Rule 1139 (86 Ill. Adm.Code 3000.1139).

Paragraph W. is a broad attack on the Board's rules. It contends:

"Emerald was denied its due process rights and...